Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Japanese Journal of Applied Physics

Single-Event Correlation Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution with Single-Photon Sources

Shangli Dong, Xiaobo Wang, Guo‐Feng Zhang, Liantuan Xiao, Suotang Jia

Published Apr 1, 2010• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Multiple photons exist that allow efficient eavesdropping strategies that threaten the security of quantum key distribution. In this paper, we theoretically discuss the photon correlations between authorized partners in the case of practical single-photon sources including a multiple-photon background. To investigate the feasibility of intercept-resend attacks, the cross correlations and the maximum intercept-resend ratio caused by the background signal are determined using single-event correlation analysis based on single-event detection.

DOI
10.1143/jjap.49.042801

Related papers

Cross correlations of quantum key distribution based on single-photon sources

Shuangli Dong, Xiaobo Wang, Guofeng Zhang +4 more

We theoretically analyze the second-order correlation function in a quantum key distribution system with real single-photon sources. Based on single-event photon statistics, the influence of the modification caused by an eavesdropper's intervention and the effects of background signals on the cross correlations between authorized partners are presented. On this basis, we have shown a secure range of correlation against the intercept–resend attacks.

Physica Scripta•Jun 12, 2009•1 citation

Security of quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch in the multiphoton case

Anton Sergeevich Trushechkin

Detection-efficiency mismatch is a common problem in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Current security proofs of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch rely either on the assumption of the single-photon light source on the sender side or on the assumption of the single-photon input of the receiver side. These assumptions impose restrictions on the class of possible eavesdropping strategies. Here we present a rigorous security proof without these assumptions and, thus, solve this important problem and prove the security of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch against general attacks (in the asymptotic regime). In particular, we adapt the decoy state method to the case of detection-efficiency mismatch.

arXiv:2004.07809•Quantum•Jul 22, 2022•27 citations

Mitigating the Source-Side Channel Vulnerability by Characterisation of Photon Statistics

Tanya Sharma, Ayan Biswas, Jayanth Ramakrishnan +2 more

Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.

arXiv:2308.14402•Journal of Lightwave Technology•Feb 1, 2024•4 citations

Simulation and Security Analysis of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol under Intercept–Resend and PNS Attacks

Md. Rayhan Kabir Khan, Istiak Ahammed, Abu Obaidah

The BB84 protocol is fundamental to quantum-secure communications, yet its extension to multi-receiver networks remains underexplored. This study addresses this gap by implementing a dual-receiver BB84 framework in Qiskit to evaluate security against intercept–resend and photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks. Our methodology incorporates weak coherent pulses and realistic channel imperfections. Key findings show that intercept–resend attacks induce a detectable (~25%) increase in QBER, while PNS attacks allow a 100% gain in eavesdropper information with less than 2.5% QBER—revealing a critical vulnerability, which highlights the importance of a true single-photon source. The findings emphasize the suitability of BB84 for multiparty QKD scenarios, either as a decoy-state mechanism for enhanced eavesdropping detection or as a direct secure communication protocol.

International Conference on Electrical, Computer & Telecommunication Engineering (ICECTE)•Jan 29, 2026•0 citations

Finite-key security analysis of decoy-state QKD with source and detector imperfections

Xoel Sixto, Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo, Margarida Pereira +3 more

Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most widely adopted approach for overcoming the limitations of imperfect single-photon sources. However, existing security proofs typically either neglect important device imperfections or rely on assumptions that are difficult to justify in realistic high-speed implementations, such as the independent and identically distributed nature of the emitted signals. In this work, we combine and extend several recent theoretical advances to provide a comprehensive analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state QKD that simultaneously incorporates multiple practically relevant transmitter and receiver imperfections, including state-preparation flaws, bit and basis side-channel leakage and correlations, setting-independent intensity fluctuations, and detection-efficiency mismatches.

quant-pharXiv:2606.29943•Jun 30, 2026•1 citation

Demystifying Security Analysis of Intercept-and-Resend Attack Over Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Protocols

Karthika Sorna Ilakkia J, Immanuel Johnraja Jebadurai, Getzi Jeba Leelipushpam Paulraj

In the contemporary quantum world, all the things depend on upcoming quantum technology because of its effectiveness and robustness on deploying it in certain devices. An important use of quantum cryptography is quantum key distribution (QKD), which promises strong security by utilising quantum mechanical properties. However, real-world attack strategies have created practical vulnerabilities. The practical security analysis of intercept-and-resend attacks over continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) and discrete variable quantum key distribution (DV-QKD) protocols is investigated in this work. The simulation models can be developed using custom NumPy and QuTip, we systematically analyze the protocols performance under changing channel losses and attack probabilities for the successful emulation of quantum communication processes. In order to evaluate protocol robustness, our study assesses key security measures such as Key generation rate and channel loss exemplified by simulation over QKD protocols. Our simulation testbed shows the sensitivity of the protocols to Intercept-and-Resend (IR) attacks and recognize under various environments where the security premises breakdown. The main objective of this work is to bridge the research gap between quantum theoretic security and its deployment in real-world communication networks, provides a clear insight into the design and development of more sophisticated quantum secure framework.

International Conference on Sustainable Computing and Data Communication Systems (ICSCDS)•Aug 6, 2025•2 citations
Multiple photons exist that allow efficient eavesdropping strategies that threaten the security of quantum key distribution. In this paper, we theoretically discuss the photon correlations between authorized partners in the case of practical single-photon sources including a multiple-photon background. To investigate the feasibility of intercept-resend attacks, the cross correlations and the maximum intercept-resend ratio caused by the background signal are determined using single-event correlation analysis based on single-event detection.
Detection-efficiency mismatch is a common problem in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Current security proofs of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch rely either on the assumption of the single-photon light source on the sender side or on the assumption of the single-photon input of the receiver side. These assumptions impose restrictions on the class of possible eavesdropping strategies. Here we present a rigorous security proof without these assumptions and, thus, solve this important problem and prove the security of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch against general attacks (in the asymptotic regime). In particular, we adapt the decoy state method to the case of detection-efficiency mismatch.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.
The BB84 protocol is fundamental to quantum-secure communications, yet its extension to multi-receiver networks remains underexplored. This study addresses this gap by implementing a dual-receiver BB84 framework in Qiskit to evaluate security against intercept–resend and photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks. Our methodology incorporates weak coherent pulses and realistic channel imperfections. Key findings show that intercept–resend attacks induce a detectable (~25%) increase in QBER, while PNS attacks allow a 100% gain in eavesdropper information with less than 2.5% QBER—revealing a critical vulnerability, which highlights the importance of a true single-photon source. The findings emphasize the suitability of BB84 for multiparty QKD scenarios, either as a decoy-state mechanism for enhanced eavesdropping detection or as a direct secure communication protocol.
Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most widely adopted approach for overcoming the limitations of imperfect single-photon sources. However, existing security proofs typically either neglect important device imperfections or rely on assumptions that are difficult to justify in realistic high-speed implementations, such as the independent and identically distributed nature of the emitted signals. In this work, we combine and extend several recent theoretical advances to provide a comprehensive analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state QKD that simultaneously incorporates multiple practically relevant transmitter and receiver imperfections, including state-preparation flaws, bit and basis side-channel leakage and correlations, setting-independent intensity fluctuations, and detection-efficiency mismatches.
In the contemporary quantum world, all the things depend on upcoming quantum technology because of its effectiveness and robustness on deploying it in certain devices. An important use of quantum cryptography is quantum key distribution (QKD), which promises strong security by utilising quantum mechanical properties. However, real-world attack strategies have created practical vulnerabilities. The practical security analysis of intercept-and-resend attacks over continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) and discrete variable quantum key distribution (DV-QKD) protocols is investigated in this work. The simulation models can be developed using custom NumPy and QuTip, we systematically analyze the protocols performance under changing channel losses and attack probabilities for the successful emulation of quantum communication processes. In order to evaluate protocol robustness, our study assesses key security measures such as Key generation rate and channel loss exemplified by simulation over QKD protocols. Our simulation testbed shows the sensitivity of the protocols to Intercept-and-Resend (IR) attacks and recognize under various environments where the security premises breakdown. The main objective of this work is to bridge the research gap between quantum theoretic security and its deployment in real-world communication networks, provides a clear insight into the design and development of more sophisticated quantum secure framework.