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International Symposium on High-capacity Optical Networks and Enabling Technologies

Optical fiber tapping: Methods and precautions

M. Zafar Iqbal, Habib Fathallah, Nezih Belhadj

Published Dec 1, 2011• 77 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Optical fiber communication is not as secure as generally perceived. There are a number of known methods of extracting or injecting information into a fiber link, while avoiding detection. Few incidents have been reported as a successfully tapped fiber is difficult to detect. In this paper we highlight a number of known fiber tapping methods. We report simulation of optical characteristics of a fiber being tapped by `bend' method and proof of concept with physical experiment. We also presented visualized scenarios in which a resourceful eavesdropper can compromise security of a fiber link with existing technologies. Some measures to prevent fiber tapping or to nullify the significance of information tapped from fiber were also discussed.

DOI
10.1109/honet.2011.6149809

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Optical fiber communication is not as secure as generally perceived. There are a number of known methods of extracting or injecting information into a fiber link, while avoiding detection. Few incidents have been reported as a successfully tapped fiber is difficult to detect. In this paper we highlight a number of known fiber tapping methods. We report simulation of optical characteristics of a fiber being tapped by `bend' method and proof of concept with physical experiment. We also presented visualized scenarios in which a resourceful eavesdropper can compromise security of a fiber link with existing technologies. Some measures to prevent fiber tapping or to nullify the significance of information tapped from fiber were also discussed.
Optical fiber-based communications are not secure enough as it was expected. It is possible to tap information from fiber-based communication. In this paper, we introduce some known methods of invasive and non-invasive information tapping from optical fibers. We investigated the possibility of tapping information from fiber-based communication by simply amplifying leaked fields out of the fiber. We implemented two methods of analytical solution for the Helmholtz equation and the numerical finite element method to simulate the leaked field. Finally by comparing the responses of both methods, we observed that some portion of field in different modes leaks off the fiber enough to be amplified. This enables tapping of information transmitted through the fiber.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) is a photonic technology capable to transport over a single fiber more than a Tbit/s aggregate traffic. Currently, WDM is the only deployed method in transcontinental and transoceanic applications. In the optical network, each fiber link consists of segments, each several kilometers long, the connecting points of which are amenable to tapping. When a small amount of optical signal is extracted from a tap, when the signal is properly amplified it can be monitored by unauthorized personnel thus threatening communications and land-security. Since each WDM channel carries traffic from one customer, it is not difficult for the connoisseur to demultiplex a specific channel, isolate a specific payload and break the encrypted datagram. Therefore, in addition to data encryption, high-speed communications security should also rely on securing the optical links. In this paper, we present a WDM link security method that, even if fiber is tapped, constitutes channel monitoring and information decrypting by an eavesdropper or unauthorized personnel virtually impossible. In addition, we describe the circuit building blocks behind the method that makes eavesdropping impossible.
One important advantage of fiberoptic communication is security. Compared with conventional electric cables, optical fiber cables are very hard to tap on information because no elctric or magnetic fields are generated from the cables. However, it is still possible to make an optical fiber to leak some of its power by peeling the jacket and bending the fiber or removing the cladding. Methods to pro-tect fiberoptic communication from tapping has been proposedl). In this paper we propose a new, simple but effective method bases on intermodal interference to protect multimode fiberoptic communication. The optical fiber detects any mechanical distortion of itself, which unavoidably occurs in an attempt to tap information. Although the lightwave carries both communication and security informations, we demonstrate that there is no degradation in communication quality.
Optical fiber communication was widely believed that an optical network was a good way to prevent hacking through wiretaps which intercept network data. However, fiber optic cable is not particularly secure. Various tapping methods can be used to extract data from fiber optic networks with little or no risk of detection. One of the easiest ways of intruding into a fiber optic communication link is creating a bend on the fiber cable. Even small percentage of the transmitted light acquired with the bending method is enough for recovering the data by the attacker. Though there are some techniques and devices that can track the power and intensity inside the fiber cable, these methods cannot detect an attack exploiting small leakage. Therefore, it is critical to determine a range of radii of curvature for which tapping attacks are not detectable. Though there are some studies to quantify the power loss both theoretically and numerically, as of the authors' knowledge, there has not been any experimental validation of those studies. In this respect, an experimental optical setup and a technique relying on the ADC conversion capability of Arduino UNO to measure power loss resulting from different bending radii are proposed in this paper. A lower limit for radius of curvature for an attack to be undetected is obtained and the estimations in the literature for power loss resulting from fiber bending is validated.
Initially considered secure against interception, fiber-optic networks were subsequently found susceptible to covert tapping, although such attacks require different coupling mechanisms and components than those used for twisted pair and coaxial cables. Fiber-optic networks carry the majority of data and voice traffic worldwide, including backhaul and fronthaul traffic in 4G and 5G radio networks, connections between data centers, and submarine cable systems. Consequently, physical access to fibers for interception has attracted the attention of intelligence agencies and industrial spies. This vulnerability is facilitated by the fact that single-mode optical fibers (SMFs) used in telecommunication networks have evolved relatively little over the last 40 years. Fibers of substantially different designs—anti-resonant hollow core fibers (HCF) and multi-core fibers (MCF)—made their commercial debut around 2023, and their susceptibility to tapping may differ substantially from that of conventional SMFs. New promising fiber monitoring techniques based on polarization measurements have also been demonstrated recently. While established tapping techniques remain feasible for conventional fibers, new fiber designs and monitoring technologies can make covert interception difficult. This review examines physical fiber tapping techniques and their practical feasibility, with particular emphasis on optical power constraints, introduced loss, detectability, and implementation limitations. It also reviews prevention and monitoring approaches, including optical time-domain reflectometry, received-power monitoring, and state-of-polarization (SOP) monitoring, and provides a prospective engineering assessment of the susceptibility of MCFs and HCFs to physical tapping.