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International Journal of Modern Physics B

INFEASIBILITY OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITHOUT EAVESDROPPING CHECK

Wei Yang, Liusheng Huang, Fang Song, QIYAN WANG

Published Mar 30, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Secure key distribution is impossible in pure classical environment. Unconditional secure key distribution is available when quantum means are introduced, assisted by a classical communication channel. What is possible when a quantum key distribution scheme is without classical communication? We present a general model with this constraint and show that quantum key distribution without classical eavesdropping check is in principle impossible. For an adversary can always succeed in obtaining the secret key via a special case of man-in-the-middle attack, namely intercept-and-forward attack without any risk of being captured.

DOI
10.1142/s0217979211058407

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Secure key distribution is impossible in pure classical environment. Unconditional secure key distribution is available when quantum means are introduced, assisted by a classical communication channel. What is possible when a quantum key distribution scheme is without classical communication? We present a general model with this constraint and show that quantum key distribution without classical eavesdropping check is in principle impossible. For an adversary can always succeed in obtaining the secret key via a special case of man-in-the-middle attack, namely intercept-and-forward attack without any risk of being captured.
Quantum protocols for generating shared secret keys represent an effective method of ensuring secure information transmission using quantum communication channels. However, they are limited in scalability due to the physical constraints of quantum channels, which necessitates the use of classical communication channels for exchanging information between participants. This leads to the necessity of developing security threat models and network protection, especially in the case of hybrid networks, where quantum channels are used alongside classical ones. The peculiarity of constructing quantum key distribution protocols is associated with the costliness of implementation and implies the inevitable use of classical communication channels for key distribution. This paper addresses the task of ensuring the security of communication between subscribers not directly connected by quantum channels, through intermediary nodes, and analyzes threats from internal and external adversaries. Special attention is paid to situations where both types of adversaries have information about the processes and protocols in the network. The paper examines widely used key distribution protocols employed in practice. It describes the main security requirements applied to key distribution protocols, and presents the results of an analysis of the compliance of the discussed protocols with these requirements
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a new way of sharing secret cryptographic keys with unconditional security by means of encoding of secret bits in quantum particles like photons. There are various potential security holes in the practical implementations of QKD, which may be exploited by the adversary to attack the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the scheme. This paper is an attempt to present various constraints, possible attacks and countermeasures on practical QKD systems. The paper classifies the already known attacks strategies and shows how these attacks may compromise the security QKD, while utilizing it as part of secure communication scheme in practice.
An application of quantum communications is the transmission of qubits to create shared symmetric encryption keys in a process called quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to public-private key encryption, symmetric encryption is considered safe from (quantum) computing attacks, i.e. it provides forward security and is thus attractive for secure communications. In this paper we argue that for free-space quantum communications, especially with satellites, if one assumes that man-in-the-middle attacks can be detected by classical channel monitoring techniques, simplified quantum communications protocols and hardware systems can be implemented that offer improved key rates. We term these protocols photon key distribution (PKD) to differentiate them from the standard QKD protocols. We identify three types of photon sources and calculate asymptotic secret key rates for PKD protocols and compare them to their QKD counterparts. PKD protocols use only one measurement basis which we show roughly doubles the key rates. Furthermore, with the relaxed security assumptions one can establish keys at very high losses, in contrast to QKD where at the same losses privacy amplification would make key generation impossible.
Secure key distribution among two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the other hand, a secure key distribution is possible when both parties are quantum. What is possible when only one party (Alice) is quantum, yet the other (Bob) has only classical capabilities? We present a protocol with this constraint and prove its robustness against attacks: we prove that any attempt of an adversary to obtain information necessarily induces some errors that the legitimate users could notice.
Abstract An important advantage of quantum cryptography over classical cryptography consists in the fact that the security of the transmitted keys is not related to the assumptions about the eavesdropper capabilities and is guaranteed by the laws of nature. Nevertheless, in some situations it makes sense to consider some reasonable assumptions about the eavesdropper capabilities, which can increase the secret key distribution rate. Methods are proposed for legitimate users to employ some practical limitations, and attacks are constructed that the eavesdropper can apply under the conditions of these limitations.