An application of quantum communications is the transmission of qubits to create shared symmetric encryption keys in a process called quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to public-private key encryption, symmetric encryption is considered safe from (quantum) computing attacks, i.e. it provides forward security and is thus attractive for secure communications. In this paper we argue that for free-space quantum communications, especially with satellites, if one assumes that man-in-the-middle attacks can be detected by classical channel monitoring techniques, simplified quantum communications protocols and hardware systems can be implemented that offer improved key rates. We term these protocols photon key distribution (PKD) to differentiate them from the standard QKD protocols. We identify three types of photon sources and calculate asymptotic secret key rates for PKD protocols and compare them to their QKD counterparts. PKD protocols use only one measurement basis which we show roughly doubles the key rates. Furthermore, with the relaxed security assumptions one can establish keys at very high losses, in contrast to QKD where at the same losses privacy amplification would make key generation impossible.
An application of quantum communications is the transmission of qubits to create shared symmetric encryption keys in a process called quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to public-private key encryption, symmetric encryption is considered safe from (quantum) computing attacks, i.e. it provides forward security and is thus attractive for secure communications. In this paper we argue that for free-space quantum communications, especially with satellites, if one assumes that man-in-the-middle attacks can be detected by classical channel monitoring techniques, simplified quantum communications protocols and hardware systems can be implemented that offer improved key rates. We term these protocols photon key distribution (PKD) to differentiate them from the standard QKD protocols. We identify three types of photon sources and calculate asymptotic secret key rates for PKD protocols and compare them to their QKD counterparts. PKD protocols use only one measurement basis which we show roughly doubles the key rates. Furthermore, with the relaxed security assumptions one can establish keys at very high losses, in contrast to QKD where at the same losses privacy amplification would make key generation impossible.
As more aspects of modern society depend on digital communication, we increasingly rely on infrastructure that ensures the privacy and security of this communication. Classically, this has been provided by cryptographic protocols such as public-key encryption, in which secrets called keys are exchanged between different parties to enable secure communication. The rapid development of quantum algorithms which violate the assumptions of these protocols, however, poses a security challenge to modern cryptography. \n \nQuantum resources can also be used to strengthen cryptographic security, particularly the security of key exchange protocols. This approach, QKD, can be implemented by encoding in quantum systems such as single photons sent through free-space or a fiber. Fiber based QKD devices are already commercially available, but are fundamentally limited to distributing keys over a few hundred kilometers. To address this distance limitation, research QKD systems are being developed to exchange keys through free-space to satellites. This work considers practical challenges to building and testing both types of QKD devices. \n \nFirstly, we consider modeling and mission analysis for airborne demonstrations of QKD to stratospheric balloons and aircraft to simulate a satellite. Based on the mission parameters available for both platforms, we found aircraft platforms were more promising for testing prototype QKD satellite systems. We developed a mission planning tool to help design the flight geometries for testing the device. \n \nNext, we developed three new components for a QKD satellite prototype. The requirements for electro-optical devices in orbit are very different from lab environments, mandating new approaches to designing QKD devices. We developed a quad single photon detector package to meet the requirements for free-space links to low earth orbit. Moreover, we designed and built optical systems for analyzing the polarization of photons and an adaptive optics unit to increase the efficiency of collecting the encoded photons. All three devices were tested in conditions that simulated the time and loss of a satellite pass. \n \nFinally, we demonstrated a laser damage attack on a live commercial QKD system. Our attack injected additional optical power into the sender device to modify security-critical components. Specifically, our attack damaged the PIN diodes which monitor the encoded photon number, reducing their sensitivity or completely blinding them. Our damage could compromise the entire key, and was performed during system operation while raising no alarms. \n \nIn summary, this work shows the trade-offs of testing QKD payloads on different airborne platforms, develops components for a satellite QKD payload, and demonstrates a security vulnerability in a commercial QKD system that can fully compromise the key. These results help address practical challenges to building QKD devices, improving the security of modern cryptography.
With the rapid advancement of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, ensuring the security of satellite-to-ground communication has become a critical concern. Traditional cryptographic techniques, while effective against classical attacks, face increasing threats from quantum computing. This paper proposes a quantum key secure transmission method tailored for LEO satellite-ground communication scenarios. The method integrates quantum key distribution (QKD) with dynamic channel estimation and orbital mobility prediction to support secure and low-latency key handshakes between satellites and ground stations. A hybrid encryption strategy is introduced, where QKD-generated keys are used to refresh symmetric session keys in real time, significantly enhancing resistance to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method ensures stable key distribution under Doppler-shifted and intermittent link conditions, achieving improved secrecy capacity and resilience against quantum-level adversaries. This work provides a viable and scalable quantum-safe communication solution for future secure satellite networks.
Quantum communication promises to outperform its classical counterparts and enable protocols previously impossible. Specifically, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows a cryptographic key to be shared between distant parties with provable security. Much work has been performed on theoretical and experi- mental aspects of QKD, and the push is on to make it commercially viable and integrable with existing technologies. To this end I have performed simulations and experiments on QKD and other quantum protocols in regimes previously unexplored. \nThe first experiment involves QKD via distributed entanglement through the standard telecommunications optical fibre network. I show that entanglement is preserved, even when the photons used are a shorter wavelength than the design of the optical fibre calls for. This surprising result is then used to demonstrate QKD over installed optical fibre, even with co-propagating classical traffic. Because the quantum and classical signals are sufficiently separated in wavelength, little cross-talk is observed, leading to high compatibility between this type of QKD and existing telecommunications infrastructure. \nSecondly, I demonstrate the key components of fully-modulated decoy-state QKD over the highest-loss channel to date, using a novel photon source based on weak coherent (laser) pulses. This system has application in a satellite uplink of QKD, which would enable worldwide secure communication. The uplink allows the complex quantum source to be kept on the ground while only simple receivers are in space, but suffers from high link loss due to atmospheric turbulence, necessitating the use of specific photon detectors and highly tailored photon pulses. My results could be applied in a near term satellite mission.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most established approach in quantum communication. However, long-distance free-space implementations, particularly satellite links, remain challenging, especially during the day due to daylight background noise. Quantum keyless private communication (QKPC) is a quantum communication protocol that enables information-theoretic security with simpler system requirements, improved robustness against noise, and without the need for secret key distribution. QKPC and QKD are complementary, with QKPC enabling free-space links where QKD is impractical, while QKD provides channel monitoring for applications that require eavesdropping detection. Here, we report a complete implementation of QKPC in a daylight free-space experiment over a 90 m rooftop link, using an experimentally simple setup. Our demonstration includes all stages of the protocol, from encoding and synchronization to message decoding, operates entirely without auxiliary classical synchronization channels, and is implemented offline through post-processing. This work demonstrates the feasibility of practical and scalable quantum communication over high-noise daylight links and highlights the potential of QKPC as a complementary solution to QKD for future ground-based and space-based communication systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), a novel cryptographic technique for secure distribution of secret keys between two parties, is the first successful quantum technology to emerge from quantum information science. The security of QKD is guaranteed by fundamental properties of quantum mechanical systems, unlike public-key cryptography whose security depends on difficult to solve mathematical problems such as factoring. Current terrestrial quantum links are limited to about 250 km. However, QKD could soon be deployed on a global scale over free-space links to an orbiting satellite used as a trusted node. \n \nEnvisioning a photonic uplink to a quantum receiver positioned on a low Earth orbit satellite, the Canadian Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat) is a collaborative project involving Canadian universities, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and industry partners. This thesis presents some of the research conducted towards feasibility studies of the QEYSSat mission. \n \nOne of the main goals of this research is to develop technologies for data acquisition and processing required for a satellite-based QKD system. A working testbed system helps to establish firmly grounded estimates of the overall complexity, the computing resources necessary, and the bandwidth requirements of the classical communication channel. It can also serve as a good foundation for the design and development of a future payload computer onboard QEYSSat. \n \nThis thesis describes the design and implementation of a QKD post-processing system which aims to minimize the computing requirements at one side of the link, unlike most traditional implementations which assume symmetric computing resources at each end. The post-processing software features precise coincidence analysis, error correction based on low-density parity-check codes, privacy amplification employing Toeplitz hash functions, and a procedure for automated polarization alignment. \n \nThe system's hardware and software components integrate fully with a quantum optical apparatus used to demonstrate the feasibility of QKD with a satellite uplink. Detailed computing resource requirements and QKD results from the operation of the entire system at high-loss regimes are presented here.
We study information-theoretical security for space links between a satellite and a ground station. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a well-established method for information-theoretical secure communication, giving the eavesdropper unlimited access to the channel and technological resources limited by only the laws of quantum physics. But QKD for space links is extremely challenging, the achieved key rates are extremely low, and daytime operating impossible. However, eavesdropping on a channel in free space without being noticed seems complicated, given the constraints imposed by orbital mechanics. If we also exclude the eavesdropper's presence in a given area around the emitter and receiver, we can guarantee that he has access to only a fraction of the optical signal. In this setting, quantum keyless private (direct) communication based on the wiretap channel model is a valid alternative to provide information-theoretical security. Like for QKD, we assume that the legitimate users are limited by state-of-the-art technology, while the potential eavesdropper is only limited by physical laws: either by specifying her detection strategy (Helstrom detector) or by bounding her knowledge, assuming the most powerful strategy through the Holevo information. Nevertheless, we demonstrate information-theoretical secure communication rates (positive keyless private capacity) over a classical-quantum wiretap channel using on-off keying of coherent states. We present numerical results for a setting equivalent to the recent experiments with the Micius satellite and compare them to the fundamental limit for the secret key rate of QKD. We obtain much higher rates compared with QKD with an exclusion area of less than 13 m for low earth orbit satellites. Moreover, we show that the wiretap channel quantum keyless privacy is much less sensitive to noise and signal dynamics and daytime operation is possible.