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Physica Scripta

Cryptanalysis of the secure quantum private comparison protocol

Xingtong Liu, Jingjing Zhao, Jian Wang, Chaojing Tang

Published May 15, 2013• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Recently, Yang et al [2009 Phys. Scr. 80 065002] presented the first quantum private comparison protocol that involves single photons only. This protocol is very promising in practice. However, in this paper, we analyze the security of the protocol and point out a subtle loophole. It is shown that both Eve and Charlie could obtain Bob's secret by launching a special dense-coding attack. Moreover, details of this attack and its correctness are given, and also two solutions are demonstrated to improve the protocol in order to overcome the fatal flaw.

DOI
10.1088/0031-8949/87/06/065004

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Cryptanalysis is an important branch in the study of cryptography, including both the classical cryptography and the quantum one. In this paper we analyze the security of two three-party quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs) proposed recently, and point out that they are susceptible to a simple and effective attack, i.e., the dense-coding attack. It is shown that the eavesdropper Eve can totally obtain the session key by sending entangled qubits as the fake signal to Alice and performing collective measurements after Alice's encoding. The attack process is just like a dense-coding communication between Eve and Alice, where a special measurement basis is employed. Furthermore, this attack does not introduce any errors to the transmitted information and consequently will not be discovered by Alice and Bob. The attack strategy is described in detail and a proof for its correctness is given. Finally, the root cause of this insecurity and a possible way to improve these protocols are discussed.
Cryptanalysis is an important branch in the study of cryptography, including both the classical cryptography and the quantum one. In this paper we analyze the security of two three-party quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs) proposed recently, and point out that they are susceptible to a simple and effective attack, i.e. the dense-coding attack. It is shown that the eavesdropper Eve can totally obtain the session key by sending entangled qubits as the fake signal to Alice and performing collective measurements after Alice's encoding. The attack process is just like a dense-coding communication between Eve and Alice, where a special measurement basis is employed. Furthermore, this attack does not introduce any errors to the transmitted information and consequently will not be discovered by Alice and Bob. The attack strategy is described in detail and a proof for its correctness is given. At last, the root of this insecurity and a possible way to improve these protocols are discussed.
Abstract Recently, Wu et al (2019 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58 1854) found a serious information leakage problem in Ye and Ji’s quantum private comparison protocol (2017 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 56 1517), that is, a malicious participant can steal another’s secret data without being detected through an active attack means. In this paper, we show that Wu et al ’s active attack is also effective for several other existing protocols, including the ones proposed by Ji et al and Zha et al (2016 Commun. Theor. Phys. 65 711; 2018 Int. J. Theor. Phys. 57 3874). In addition, we propose what a passive attack means, which is different from Wu et al ’s active attack in that the malicious participant can easily steal another’s secret data only by using his own secret data after finishing the protocol, instead of stealing the data by forging identities when executing the protocol. Furthermore, we find that several other existing quantum private comparison protocols also have such an information leakage problem. In response to the problem, we propose a simple solution, which is more efficient than the ones proposed by Wu et al , because it does not consume additional classical and quantum resources.