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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Nonlocal Influences and Possible Worlds—A Stapp in the Wrong Direction

Robert K. Clifton, Jeremy Butterfield, Michael L. G. Redhead

Published Mar 1, 1990• 32 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Stapp ([1971], [1977], [1985a], henceforth Stapp 1) claims to give a proof of the existence of nonlocal influences acting on correlated spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state which does not require any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM). (Except Stapp holds that the proof fails under a many-worlds interpretation of QM—a claim we analyse in 1.2.) Recently, in responding to Redhead's ([1987], pp. 90-6) criticism that the Stapp 1 proof fails under an indeterministic interpretation of QM, Stapp [1989] (henceforth Stapp 2), has revised the logical structure of his proof including its crucial locality assumption. Our main aim is to show that this revision is a step in the wrong direction because it faces two difficulties which undermine the resulting proof's significance (3.1) and validity (3. 2). We also clarify and extend the Stapp 1 proof (1. 1) with the aid of Lewis' analysis of counterfactuals (1. 2) and causal dependence (2. 2 and 2. 3). In so doing, we are able to identify two new defects in the Stapp 1 proof (1. 3 and 2. 1) in addition to corroborating Redhead's criticism (2. 2). Also, the additional assumptions which save the Stapp 1 proof's validity are detailed (2. 3) and some new difficulties for the determinist are pointed out by exploiting a slightly extended version of the proof (2. 4). In providing this full analysis of the Stapp 1 proof, we also construct the necessary framework within which to provide a critique of Stapp 2's proof (3).

DOI
10.1093/bjps/41.1.5

Related papers

Comment on “Nonlocal character of quantum theory,” by Henry P. Stapp [Am. J. Phys. 65 (4), 300–304 (1997)]

Abner Shimony, Howard Stein

A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.

American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 2001•18 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Nonlocality counterfactuals, and quantum mechanics’ ”

William George Unruh

Stapp [preceding Comment, Phys. Rev. A 60, 2595 (1999)] has argued that my criticism of his nonlocality proof is wrong. I point out that counterfactual arguments are fraught with dangers, and that any such claim should use them in a conservative manner. A reanalysis of his claims continues to lead me to the conclusion that the nonlocality of quantum mechanics remains unproven.

Physical Review A•Sep 1, 1999•2 citations

Comments on ‘Nonlocal Influences and Possible Worlds’

Henry Pierce Stapp

Clifton, Butterfield, and Redhead [1989] have constructed two separate arguments that bear some resemblances to a proof of mine pertaining to the nonlocal character of quantum theory. Their arguments have flaws, which they point out. I explicate my proof by explaining in detail both how it differs logically from the two arguments they have constructed, and how it avoids the pitfalls of both.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Mar 1, 1990•7 citations

Nonlocality, counterfactuals, and quantum mechanics

William George Unruh

Stapp [Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)] has recently argued from a version of the Hardy-type experiments that quantum mechanics must be nonlocal, independent of any additional assumptions such as realism or hidden variables. I argue either that his conclusions do not follow from his assumptions or that his assumptions are not true of quantum mechanics and can be interpreted as assigning an unwarranted level of reality to the value of certain quantum attributes.

Physical Review A•Jan 1, 1999•36 citations

Quantum Locality?

Stapp, Henry

Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.

•Nov 10, 2011•0 citations

Quantum Locality?

Henry Pierce Stapp

Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.

•Jun 20, 2016•0 citations
Stapp ([1971], [1977], [1985a], henceforth Stapp 1) claims to give a proof of the existence of nonlocal influences acting on correlated spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state which does not require any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM). (Except Stapp holds that the proof fails under a many-worlds interpretation of QM—a claim we analyse in 1.2.) Recently, in responding to Redhead's ([1987], pp. 90-6) criticism that the Stapp 1 proof fails under an indeterministic interpretation of QM, Stapp [1989] (henceforth Stapp 2), has revised the logical structure of his proof including its crucial locality assumption. Our main aim is to show that this revision is a step in the wrong direction because it faces two difficulties which undermine the resulting proof's significance (3.1) and validity (3. 2). We also clarify and extend the Stapp 1 proof (1. 1) with the aid of Lewis' analysis of counterfactuals (1. 2) and causal dependence (2. 2 and 2. 3). In so doing, we are able to identify two new defects in the Stapp 1 proof (1. 3 and 2. 1) in addition to corroborating Redhead's criticism (2. 2). Also, the additional assumptions which save the Stapp 1 proof's validity are detailed (2. 3) and some new difficulties for the determinist are pointed out by exploiting a slightly extended version of the proof (2. 4). In providing this full analysis of the Stapp 1 proof, we also construct the necessary framework within which to provide a critique of Stapp 2's proof (3).
A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.
Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.
Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.