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Birkhäuser Basel eBooks

Max von Laue: On Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Relations and their Epistemological Significance [June 29, 1934]

Klaus Hentschel

Published Jan 1, 1996• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Two years ago I indicated in this journal* [1] that the conclusions drawn from the formalism of quantum mechanics, and in particular from the uncertainty relations, [2] do not seem to necessarily indicate a failure of the causality principle, because the conceptual structures on which these conclusions are based stem from Newton’s mechanics and, like all of classical mechanics, are of empirical origin. In my opinion this reasoning only refutes applying those [classical] concepts to atomic processes. There is one argument in the discussion of this subject, however, that I had not commented on at the time, which initially sounds quite convincing. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

DOI
10.1007/978-3-0348-9008-3_31

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Two years ago I indicated in this journal* [1] that the conclusions drawn from the formalism of quantum mechanics, and in particular from the uncertainty relations, [2] do not seem to necessarily indicate a failure of the causality principle, because the conceptual structures on which these conclusions are based stem from Newton’s mechanics and, like all of classical mechanics, are of empirical origin. In my opinion this reasoning only refutes applying those [classical] concepts to atomic processes. There is one argument in the discussion of this subject, however, that I had not commented on at the time, which initially sounds quite convincing. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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