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Mobile Information Systems

Fair Secure Computation with Reputation Assumptions in the Mobile Social Networks

Yilei Wang, Chuan Sheng Zhao, Qiuliang Xu, Zhihua Zheng, Zhenhua Chen, Zhe Liu

Published Jan 1, 2015• 12 citations
Publisher

Abstract

With the rapid development of mobile devices and wireless technologies, mobile social networks become increasingly available. People can implement many applications on the basis of mobile social networks. Secure computation, like exchanging information and file sharing, is one of such applications. Fairness in secure computation, which means that either all parties implement the application or none of them does, is deemed as an impossible task in traditional secure computation without mobile social networks. Here we regard the applications in mobile social networks as specific functions and stress on the achievement of fairness on these functions within mobile social networks in the presence of two rational parties. Rational parties value their utilities when they participate in secure computation protocol in mobile social networks. Therefore, we introduce reputation derived from mobile social networks into the utility definition such that rational parties have incentives to implement the applications for a higher utility. To the best of our knowledge, the protocol is the first fair secure computation in mobile social networks. Furthermore, it finishes within constant rounds and allows both parties to know the terminal round.

DOI
10.1155/2015/637458

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With the rapid development of mobile devices and wireless technologies, mobile social networks become increasingly available. People can implement many applications on the basis of mobile social networks. Secure computation, like exchanging information and file sharing, is one of such applications. Fairness in secure computation, which means that either all parties implement the application or none of them does, is deemed as an impossible task in traditional secure computation without mobile social networks. Here we regard the applications in mobile social networks as specific functions and stress on the achievement of fairness on these functions within mobile social networks in the presence of two rational parties. Rational parties value their utilities when they participate in secure computation protocol in mobile social networks. Therefore, we introduce reputation derived from mobile social networks into the utility definition such that rational parties have incentives to implement the applications for a higher utility. To the best of our knowledge, the protocol is the first fair secure computation in mobile social networks. Furthermore, it finishes within constant rounds and allows both parties to know the terminal round.
Reputation is commonly used in game theory for mutual cooperation. Assuming that parties value their reputation as well as their payoffs just like people in the real world, this paper considers reputation assumptions when defining the utilities. The new utility consists of two parts: the reputation part and payoff part. The parties are redefined according to the new utility definition. Besides, to represent a more realistic adversary model, a new adversary named semi-rational party is proposed. The semi-rational parties behave like the combination of rational and covert parties. At last, a rational two-party secure computation protocol is constructed. The proof of fairness in the presence of the semi-rational party is stressed in this paper.
In traditional rational multi-party computation, parties are assumed to have utility functions and they act according to the utility assumptions. In economics and political scenarios, parties in multi-party computation may have some other properties such as reputation which plays an important role on boosting mutual cooperation in multiparty computation. In this paper we put forward a new kind of parties satisfying reputation assumption and utility assumptions. Meanwhile we construct a social rational multiparty computation protocol under incomplete information and incomplete network to facilitate the implementation of the protocol within constant rounds.
We consider the problem of fair two-party computation, where fairness (informally) means that both parties should learn the correct output. A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) shows that fairness is, in general, impossible to achieve for malicious parties. Here, we treat the parties as rational and seek to understand what can be done. Asharov et al. (Eurocrypt 2011) recently considered this problem and showed impossibility of rational fair computation for a particular function and a particular set of utilities. We observe, however, that in their setting the parties have no incentive to compute the function even in an ideal world where fairness is guaranteed. Revisiting the problem, we show that rational fair computation is possible (for arbitrary functions and utilities) as long as the parties have a strict incentive to compute the function in the ideal world. This gives a new example where game theory can be used to circumvent impossibility results in cryptography.
In this paper, we redefine the utilities considering other parts such as reputation in order to give rational parties incentives to participate in the protocol and finally get the correct outputs. The most distinct contribution of this paper is the proposal of rational covert adversaries whose behaviors are combinations of rational parties and covert adversaries. Finally, given proper parameters, we prove that all parties have incentives to participate in the rational secure computation protocol. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
SUMMARY Rational party is a new kind of parties who behave neither like honest parties nor like malicious adversaries. The crux point of rational party is the definition of the utility function, as rational parties only care about how to maximize their utility. In other words, rational parties choose the strategies, which can bring them the highest utilities. In rational secure two‐party computation protocol, the main task is how to boost mutual cooperation to complete the protocol. Social rational secure multi‐party computation (SRSMPC) means that in a social network, some distributed and rational parties with reputation properties want to jointly compute a functionality. The seemingly simple task becomes tough under three conditions. The first condition is that the network composed by parties may not be complete. That is, two parties may not be neighbors and they are connected through other parties. The second is that the network may be not secure. That is, messages may be tempered by malicious parties. The third condition is that parties may run the protocol under incomplete information scenario. That is, parties may have types and each type has a corresponding utility function. Under the first and second conditions, parties need to consider how to securely transmit messages between two parties who are not neighbors. Under the third condition, we propose the Tit‐for‐Tat strategy and prove that mutual cooperation is a sequential equilibrium between two parties. In this paper, we construct an SRSMPC protocol by using mechanism design under incomplete information to facilitate the implementation of the SRSMPC protocol within constant rounds. Meanwhile, newcomers are allowed to participate in the protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first social rational secure computation protocol for multi‐party under an incomplete information scenario and an incomplete network. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Abstract Fairness is a security notion of secure computation and cannot always be achieved if an adversary corrupts a majority of parties in standard settings. Lindell (CT-RSA 2008) showed that imposing a monetary penalty on an adversary can circumvent the impossibility. He formalized such a security notion as “legally enforceable fairness" for the two-party setting based on the ideal trusted bank functionality and showed a protocol achieving the requirements. Based on the same framework, we introduce secure multi-party computation with legally enforceable fairness that is applicable for an arbitrary number of parties. Further, we propose two protocols that realize our introduced functionality. The first one achieves O(n) rounds and O(nα)O(n \alpha )O(nα) O ( n α ) fees, where n is the number of parties, and α\alpha α α is a parameter for the penalty amount. The fee refers to the balance amount in the bank required at the beginning of the protocol, which evaluates the difficulty of participating in the protocol in a financial sense. The second one achieves O(1) rounds and O(n2α)O(n^2 \alpha )O(n2α) O ( n 2 α ) fees.