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Security and Communication Networks

New rational parties relying on reputation

Yilei Wang, Zhe Liu, Qiuliang Xu

Published Nov 28, 2013• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we redefine the utilities considering other parts such as reputation in order to give rational parties incentives to participate in the protocol and finally get the correct outputs. The most distinct contribution of this paper is the proposal of rational covert adversaries whose behaviors are combinations of rational parties and covert adversaries. Finally, given proper parameters, we prove that all parties have incentives to participate in the rational secure computation protocol. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

DOI
10.1002/sec.844

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Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science•Oct 1, 2013•85 citations
In this paper, we redefine the utilities considering other parts such as reputation in order to give rational parties incentives to participate in the protocol and finally get the correct outputs. The most distinct contribution of this paper is the proposal of rational covert adversaries whose behaviors are combinations of rational parties and covert adversaries. Finally, given proper parameters, we prove that all parties have incentives to participate in the rational secure computation protocol. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Reputation is commonly used in game theory for mutual cooperation. Assuming that parties value their reputation as well as their payoffs just like people in the real world, this paper considers reputation assumptions when defining the utilities. The new utility consists of two parts: the reputation part and payoff part. The parties are redefined according to the new utility definition. Besides, to represent a more realistic adversary model, a new adversary named semi-rational party is proposed. The semi-rational parties behave like the combination of rational and covert parties. At last, a rational two-party secure computation protocol is constructed. The proof of fairness in the presence of the semi-rational party is stressed in this paper.
We study multi-party computation in the model where none of n participating parties are honest: they are either rational, acting in their selfish interest to maximize their utility, or adversarial, acting arbitrarily. In this new model, which we call the mixed-behavior model, we define a class of functions that can be computed in the presence of an adversary using a trusted mediator. We then give a protocol that allows the rational parties to emulate the mediator and jointly compute the function such that (1) assuming that each rational party prefers that it learns the output while others do not, no rational party has an incentive to deviate from the protocol; and (2) the rational parties are protected from a malicious adversary controlling ⌈n/2⌉ − 2 of the participants: the 2 adversary can only either cause all rational participants to abort (so no one learns the function they are trying to compute), or can only learn whatever information is implied by the output of the function.
SUMMARY Rational party is a new kind of parties who behave neither like honest parties nor like malicious adversaries. The crux point of rational party is the definition of the utility function, as rational parties only care about how to maximize their utility. In other words, rational parties choose the strategies, which can bring them the highest utilities. In rational secure two‐party computation protocol, the main task is how to boost mutual cooperation to complete the protocol. Social rational secure multi‐party computation (SRSMPC) means that in a social network, some distributed and rational parties with reputation properties want to jointly compute a functionality. The seemingly simple task becomes tough under three conditions. The first condition is that the network composed by parties may not be complete. That is, two parties may not be neighbors and they are connected through other parties. The second is that the network may be not secure. That is, messages may be tempered by malicious parties. The third condition is that parties may run the protocol under incomplete information scenario. That is, parties may have types and each type has a corresponding utility function. Under the first and second conditions, parties need to consider how to securely transmit messages between two parties who are not neighbors. Under the third condition, we propose the Tit‐for‐Tat strategy and prove that mutual cooperation is a sequential equilibrium between two parties. In this paper, we construct an SRSMPC protocol by using mechanism design under incomplete information to facilitate the implementation of the SRSMPC protocol within constant rounds. Meanwhile, newcomers are allowed to participate in the protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first social rational secure computation protocol for multi‐party under an incomplete information scenario and an incomplete network. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
With the rapid development of mobile devices and wireless technologies, mobile social networks become increasingly available. People can implement many applications on the basis of mobile social networks. Secure computation, like exchanging information and file sharing, is one of such applications. Fairness in secure computation, which means that either all parties implement the application or none of them does, is deemed as an impossible task in traditional secure computation without mobile social networks. Here we regard the applications in mobile social networks as specific functions and stress on the achievement of fairness on these functions within mobile social networks in the presence of two rational parties. Rational parties value their utilities when they participate in secure computation protocol in mobile social networks. Therefore, we introduce reputation derived from mobile social networks into the utility definition such that rational parties have incentives to implement the applications for a higher utility. To the best of our knowledge, the protocol is the first fair secure computation in mobile social networks. Furthermore, it finishes within constant rounds and allows both parties to know the terminal round.
Existing work on “rational cryptographic protocols ” treats each party (or coalition of parties) running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a fundamentally different approach that is better suited to modeling a protocol under attack from an external entity. Specifically, we consider a two-party game between an protocol designer and an external attacker. The goal of the attacker is to break security properties such as correctness or privacy, possibly by corrupting protocol participants; the goal of the protocol designer is to prevent the attacker from succeeding. We lay the theoretical groundwork for a study of cryptographic protocol design in this setting by providing a methodology for defining the problem within the traditional simulation paradigm. Our framework provides ways of reasoning about important cryptographic concepts (e.g., adaptive corruptions or attacks on communication resources) not handled by previous game-theoretic treatments of cryptography. We also prove composition theorems that—for the first time—provide a sound way to design rational protocols assuming “ideal communication resources ” (e.g., broadcast or authenticated channels) and then instantiate these resources using standard cryptographic tools. Finally, we investigate the problem of secure function evaluation in our framework, where the attacker has to pay for each party it corrupts. Our results demonstrate how knowledge of the attacker’s incentives can be used to circumvent known impossibility results in this setting. 1
Existing work on "rational cryptographic protocols" treats each party (or coalition of parties) running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a fundamentally different approach that is better suited to modeling a protocol under attack from an external entity. Specifically, we consider a two-party game between an protocol designer and an external attacker. The goal of the attacker is to break security properties such as correctness or privacy, possibly by corrupting protocol participants; the goal of the protocol designer is to prevent the attacker from succeeding. We lay the theoretical groundwork for a study of cryptographic protocol design in this setting by providing a methodology for defining the problem within the traditional simulation paradigm. Our framework provides ways of reasoning about important cryptographic concepts (e.g., adaptive corruptions or attacks on communication resources) not handled by previous game-theoretic treatments of cryptography. We also prove composition theorems that-for the first time-provide a sound way to design rational protocols assuming "ideal communication resources" (such as broadcast or authenticated channels) and then instantiate these resources using standard cryptographic tools. Finally, we investigate the problem of secure function evaluation in our framework, where the attacker has to pay for each party it corrupts. Our results demonstrate how knowledge of the attacker's incentives can be used to circumvent known impossibility results in this setting.