In this paper, we examine an argument of Jauch and Piron, which aims to prove the impossibility of hidden variables underlying the quantum theory, on the basis of certain assumptions that are weaker than those used by von Neumann for the same purpose. We show that, while the assumptions of Jauch and Piron are in fact weaker than those of von Neumann, the net result is that they actually prove nothing new at all. The conclusions of Jauch and Piron concerning the nonexistence of hidden variables are indeed seen to follow from a false assumption; i.e., that the impossibility of propositions that describe simultaneously the results of measurements of two noncommuting observables is an "empirical fact." Actually, it is shown that this assumption follows if and only if one first assumes what the authors set out to prove; i.e., that the current linguistic structure of quantum mechanics is the only one that can be used correctly to describe the empirical facts underlying the theory.
In this paper, we examine an argument of Jauch and Piron, which aims to prove the impossibility of hidden variables underlying the quantum theory, on the basis of certain assumptions that are weaker than those used by von Neumann for the same purpose. We show that, while the assumptions of Jauch and Piron are in fact weaker than those of von Neumann, the net result is that they actually prove nothing new at all. The conclusions of Jauch and Piron concerning the nonexistence of hidden variables are indeed seen to follow from a false assumption; i.e., that the impossibility of propositions that describe simultaneously the results of measurements of two noncommuting observables is an "empirical fact." Actually, it is shown that this assumption follows if and only if one first assumes what the authors set out to prove; i.e., that the current linguistic structure of quantum mechanics is the only one that can be used correctly to describe the empirical facts underlying the theory.
It is shown that, although correct mathematically, the celebrated 1932 theorem of von Neumann which is often interpreted as proving the impossibility of the existence of "hidden variables" in Quantum Mechanics, is in fact based on an assumption which is physically not reasonable. Apart from that, the alleged conclusion of von Neumann proving the impossibility of the existence of "hidden variables" was already set aside in 1952 by the counterexample of the possibility of a physical theory, such as given by what is usually called the "Bohmian Mechanics". Similar arguments apply to other two well known mathematical theorems, namely, of Gleason, and of Kochen and Specker, which have often been seen as equally proving the impossibility of the existence of "hidden variables" in Quantum Mechanics.
The problem of hidden variables, purely conceptual at the start, has been early influenced by the practical aims of “causal theories” towards a mathematical scheme broader than the quantum formalism. Thus several authors have examined if a new formalism, built in the same spirit as that of quantum mechanics, however more general, might admit a determination by means of hidden parameters, and concluded negatively. In the present paper the two aspects (conceptual and practical) are considered separately. It first contains a study of the unrestricted proofs (Von Neumann, Jauch and Piron), given for the non-existence of hidden parameters. They are focussed on the dispersion-free states bound to them. Thus a preliminary stage consists in analyzing what properties these states should have. A method is given here for displaying these; they are shown to have an artificial character, which fits neither Von Neumann's proof nor that of Jauch and Piron and other authors (Misra). Thus, these proofs do not establish the inexistence of hidden variables, but only that of dispersion free states built more or less on the pattern of the quantum states. Suggestions are then proposed on the probable features of hidden parameters. They lead us to regard as improbable the hope of building a new deterministic scheme to be substituted for the quantum formalism. Thus, the determinism which can be maintained appears as purely conceptual. The question of a “deeper level” and the relation between determination and pictorial description are discussed briefly.
Introduction To know the quantum mechanical state of a system implies, in general, only statistical restrictions on the results of measurements. It seems interesting to ask if this statistical element be thought of as arising, as in classical statistical mechanics, because the states in question are averages over better defined states for which individually the results would be quite determined. These hypothetical ‘dispersion free’ states would be specified not only by the quantum mechanical state vector but also by additional ‘hidden variables’ – ‘hidden’ because if states with prescribed values of these variables could actually be prepared, quantum mechanics would be observably inadequate. Whether this question is indeed interesting has been the subject of debate. The present paper does not contribute to that debate. It is addressed to those who do find the question interesting, and more particularly to those among them who believe that ‘the question concerning the existence of such hidden variables received an early and rather decisive answer in the form of von Neumann's proof on the mathematical impossibility of such variables in quantum theory.’ An attempt will be made to clarify what von Neumann and his successors actually demonstrated. This will cover, as well as von Neumann's treatment, the recent version of the argument by Jauch and Piron, and the stronger result consequent on the work of Gleason. It will be urged that these analyses leave the real question untouched.
The question of the possible existence of hidden variables is re-examined. It is shown that hidden variables can exist only if every proposition (yes-no experiment) is compatible with every other one. It is further shown that this property is in contradiction with empirical facts. The theorem which leads to this conclusion is a strengthening of the theorem of von Neumann on the same subject. The question is raised whether there exist perhaps quantum mechanical systems which admit approximate dispersion-free states.
The impossibility of theories with hidden variables as an alternative and replacement for quantum mechanics was discussed by J. von Neumann in 1932. His proof was criticized as being logically circular, by Grete Hermann soon after, and as fundamentally flawed, by John Bell in 1964. Bell's severe criticism of Neumann's proof and the explicit (counter) example of a hidden variable model for the measurement of a quantum spin are considered by most researchers, though not all, as the definitive demonstration that Neumann's proof is inadequate. Despite being an argument of mathematical physics, an ambiguity of decision remains to this day. I show that Neumann's assumption of the linear additivity of the expectation values, even for incompatible (noncommuting) observables, is a necessary constraint related to the nature of observable physical variables and to the conservation laws. Therefore, any theory should necessarily obey it to qualify as a physically valid theory. Then, obviously, the hidden variable theories with dispersion-free ensembles that violate this assumption are ruled out. I show that it is Bell's counter-example that is fundamentally flawed, being inconsistent with the factual mechanics. Further, it is shown that the local hidden variable theories, for which the Bell's inequalities were derived, are grossly incompatible with the fundamental conservation laws. I identify the intrinsic uncertainty in the action as the reason for the irreducible dispersion, which implies that there are no dispersion-free ensembles at any scale of mechanics. With the unconditional validity of its central assumption shown, Neumann's proof is fully resurrected.
This article reviews the history of J. von Neumann’s analysis of hidden variables in quantum mechanics and the subsequent analysis by others. In his book The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, published in 1932, von Neumann performed an analysis of the consequences of introducing hidden parameters (hidden variables) into quantum mechanics. He arrived at two principal conclusions: first, hidden variables cannot be incorporated into the existing theory of quantum mechanics without major modifications, and second, if they did exist, the theory would have already failed in situations where it has been successfully applied. This analysis has been taken as an “incorrect proof” against the existence of hidden variables, possibly due to a mistranslation of the German word prufen. von Neumann’s so-called proof isn’t even wrong as such a proof does not exist, but it is an examination of the limitations imposed by internal consistency of the Hilbert space formulation of the theory. One of the earliest attempts to eliminate uncertainty, by D. Bohm, requires a major modification of quantum mechanics (observables are not represented by Hermitian operators), which supports von Neumann’s first principal conclusion. However, testing the Bohm theory requires constructing a physically impossible initial state. As such, the theory has no experimental consequences, so W. Pauli referred to it as an “uncashable check”. As there are no observable consequences, the Bohm theory is possibly a counterexample to von Neumann’s second conclusion that hidden variables in particular would have already led to a failure of the theory.