Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Information Processing Letters

Cryptanalysis of the Wu–Varadhrajan fair exchange protocol

Olivier Markowitch, Shahrokh Saeednia

Published Jun 2, 2003• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/s0020-0190(03)00270-9

Related papers

An Improvement of Tseng–Wu Group Key Exchange Protocol

Min‐Shiang Hwang, Yung‐Chen Chou, Chia‐Chun Wu +1 more

Advances in intelligent systems and computing•Aug 22, 2018•0 citations

Cryptanalysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol

Almudena Alcaide, Juan Tapiador, Julio Cesar Hernandez-Castro +1 more

The notion of rational exchange introduced by Syverson in 1998 is a particularly interesting alternative when an e?cient scheme for fair exchange is required but the existence of a trusted third party simply cannot be assumed. A rational exchange protocol cannot provide true fairness, but it ensures that rational –i.e. self-interested– parties would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. In this paper, we identify some weaknesses in Syverson’s rational exchange protocol which were neither detected by the original author nor by subsequent analysis. After presenting some attacks, we indicate how the scheme should be modi?ed to overcome these vulnerabilities. We also provide a formal analysis of our enhancement using BAN logic.

International journal of network security•Sep 1, 2008•2 citations

Cryptanalysis on Cheng et al. protocol

Tejeshwari Thakur

AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations

Some Remarks on a Fair Exchange Protocol

Jianying Zhou, Robert Huijie Deng, Feng Bao

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2000•91 citations

Cryptanalysis and improvement of an efficient authenticated key exchange protocol with tight security reduction

Siqi Lu, Jinhua Zhao, Qingfeng Cheng

Summary The SMEN protocol, proposed by Wu and Ustaoglu in 2009, has been considered to be secure as the authors claimed, and numerous theories are proposed based on this protocol. This paper analyzes the SMEN protocol and finds that this protocol is not resistant to the session corruption attack and the key compromise impersonation attack. Then, we propose an improved protocol with tight security reduction. Our improved protocol not only avoids the above attacks but also embraces the same efficiency as the SMEN protocol in terms of exponentiation. Besides, formal analysis of the improved protocol is presented by using the formal automatic security analysis tool Scyther. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

International Journal of Communication Systems•Nov 20, 2014•5 citations

Replay Attack in a Fair Exchange Protocol

Macià Mut–Puigserver, M. Magdalena Payeras–Capellà, Josep Lluís Ferrer Gomila +1 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2008•1 citation
The notion of rational exchange introduced by Syverson in 1998 is a particularly interesting alternative when an e?cient scheme for fair exchange is required but the existence of a trusted third party simply cannot be assumed. A rational exchange protocol cannot provide true fairness, but it ensures that rational –i.e. self-interested– parties would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. In this paper, we identify some weaknesses in Syverson’s rational exchange protocol which were neither detected by the original author nor by subsequent analysis. After presenting some attacks, we indicate how the scheme should be modi?ed to overcome these vulnerabilities. We also provide a formal analysis of our enhancement using BAN logic.
Summary The SMEN protocol, proposed by Wu and Ustaoglu in 2009, has been considered to be secure as the authors claimed, and numerous theories are proposed based on this protocol. This paper analyzes the SMEN protocol and finds that this protocol is not resistant to the session corruption attack and the key compromise impersonation attack. Then, we propose an improved protocol with tight security reduction. Our improved protocol not only avoids the above attacks but also embraces the same efficiency as the SMEN protocol in terms of exponentiation. Besides, formal analysis of the improved protocol is presented by using the formal automatic security analysis tool Scyther. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.