Abstract: The paper investigates possible readings of the later Heisenberg's remarks on the nature of quantum states. It discusses, in particular, whether Heisenberg should be seen as a proponent of the epistemic conception of states---the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning observers' epistemic relations to these systems. On the one hand, it seems plausible that Heisenberg subscribes to that view, given how he defends the notorious “collapse of the wave function ” by relating it to a sudden change in the epistemic situation of the observer registering a measured result. On the other hand, his remarks on quantum probabilities as “potentia ” or “objective tendencies ” are difficult to reconcile with such a reading. The accounts that are attributed to Heisenberg by the different possible readings considered are subjected to closer scrutiny; at the same time, their respective virtues and problems are discussed. 1. Heisenberg and the epistemic conception of quantum states The epistemic conception of quantum states is the idea that quantum states are not descriptions of the properties of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning
Abstract: The paper investigates possible readings of the later Heisenberg's remarks on the nature of quantum states. It discusses, in particular, whether Heisenberg should be seen as a proponent of the epistemic conception of states---the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning observers' epistemic relations to these systems. On the one hand, it seems plausible that Heisenberg subscribes to that view, given how he defends the notorious “collapse of the wave function ” by relating it to a sudden change in the epistemic situation of the observer registering a measured result. On the other hand, his remarks on quantum probabilities as “potentia ” or “objective tendencies ” are difficult to reconcile with such a reading. The accounts that are attributed to Heisenberg by the different possible readings considered are subjected to closer scrutiny; at the same time, their respective virtues and problems are discussed. 1. Heisenberg and the epistemic conception of quantum states The epistemic conception of quantum states is the idea that quantum states are not descriptions of the properties of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning
The paper investigates the epistemic conception of quantum states---the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the assigning agents' epistemic relations to the systems. This idea, which can be found already in the works of Copenhagen adherents Heisenberg and Peierls, has received increasing attention in recent years because it promises an understanding of quantum theory in which neither the measurement problem nor a conflict between quantum non-locality and relativity theory arises. Here it is argued that the main challenge for proponents of this idea is to make sense of the notion of a state assignment being performed correctly without thereby acknowledging the notion of a true state of a quantum system---a state it is in. An account based on the epistemic conception of states is proposed that fulfills this requirement by interpreting the rules governing state assignment as constitutive rules in the sense of John Searle.
The paper discusses objections against non-hidden variable versions of the epistemic conception of quantum states - the view that quantum states do not describe the properties of quantum systems but reflect, in some way to be specified, the epistemic conditions of agents assigning them. In the first half of the paper, the main motivation for the epistemic conception of quantum states is sketched, and a version of it is outlined, which combines ideas from an earlier study of it [Friederich 2011] with elements of Richard Healey's recent pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory [Healey 2012]. In the second half, various objections against epistemic accounts of quantum states are discussed in detail, which are based on criticisms found in the literature. Possible answers by the version outlined here are compared with answers from the quantum Bayesian point of view, which is at present the most discussed version of the epistemic conception of quantum states.
A quantum state, via the Born Rule, assigns probabilities to the different possible values of observables of a quantum system. It is only in virtue of these probabilities — or, alternatively, expectation values — that quantum mechanics is empirically testable. Since assigning a state to a system means assigning probabilities to the values of observables, it may seem natural to read Peierls’ claim that the state ‘represents our knowledge of the system’ (Peierls [1991], p. 19) as a shorthand for saying that the state represents our knowledge of these probabilities. The latter view is sometimes even straightforwardly identified with the epistemic conception of states, for example by Marchildon, who claims that ‘[i]n the epistemic view [of quantum states], the state vector (or wave function or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic system […], but rather our knowledge of the probabilities of outcomes of future measurements’ (Marchildon [2004], p. 1454). However, according to an argument due to Fuchs and endorsed by Timpson, 31 the idea that quantum states represent our knowledge about quantum probabilities should not be regarded as the core claim of the epistemic conception of quantum states, simply because, as they argue, this idea is in fact incompatible with the latter. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Even after a hundred years of quantum theory, the true meaning of the quantum state has not yet been clearly understood. Does a pure quantum state, described by a wave function φ, represent a real physical quantity, comparable to position and momentum in classical mechanics, or does it, even as a pure state, only have a statistical significance, similar to a probability distribution? In this paper, we show that there is no contradiction between these two interpretations. Two concepts must be distinguished here: on the one hand, physical objects, which have a finite lifetime, and on the other hand, subsystems (i.e., tensor factors) of the Hilbert space of the universe. A complete description of an object at a point in time t is given by a linear subspace A of its Hilbert space, which, in the case of dim A = 1, can be specified by a wave function φ as A = [φ]. However, for every subsystem Q, for each point in time t, and for every condition B, the conditional quantum state W = W(Q,t|B) can be defined as a statistical operator on the Hilbert space of Q. Using W, certain (conditional) probabilities can be calculated. In the case of rank W = 1, the operator W can also be specified by a wave function φ, namely as W = |φ><φ|. It is the subsystems of the Hilbert space that play the role of "quantum systems" in the Copenhagen formalism, and the quantum states defined for them behave exactly as described by this formalism. If a wave function φ represents the description of a (quantum) object, then we are dealing with a real physical property, that is, φ plays an "ontic" role. However, if φ represents a quantum state, then its role is merely "statistical". If, in this case, condition B corresponds to the knowledge of a subject, φ plays an "epistemic" role. Additional Remarks The reasoning in this paper is largely based on a new systematic approach to solving the interpretation problem of quantum theory, which was originally published in 2018 (in German) under the title "Realistische Quantentheorie". A comprehensive account of this approach (in English) was published in February 2026 under the title "Realistic Quantum Theory: Solving the Interpretation Problem". It is available in the Zenodo repository (zenodo.18644694, see link below under "Related works" / "References"). The present document provides an English version of an earlier paper in German under the same title, which is also available in the Zenodo repository (zenodo.10694813, see link below).
The ideas in Heisenberg's paper on quantum mechanics in 1925 mark the beginning not only of a new phase in modern physics, but also of Heisenberg's own philosophical journey. This thesis examines that journey between 1925 and the late 1950s by situating Heisenberg's philosophy of quantum mechanics in the context of his encounters with his contemporaries as well as the context of various strands of thought in the German-speaking world at the time. Heisenberg's early philosophical critique of the 'classical' viewpoint between 1925 and 1927 bears the decisive influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, more specifically, the positivism he saw as underpinning Einstein's emancipation from Newtonian physics. The positivist influence on Heisenberg's early attitude to quantum mechanics is evident in three ways: (a) his invocation of an observability principle in 1925 to justify the renunciation of the concept of the electron orbit, (b) an instrumentalist conception of understanding, which characterised Heisenberg's response to Schrodinger's demand for classical visualisation in space and time in 1926-7, and (c) the introduction of an operational definition of concepts such as position and velocity in 1927, in an attempt to replace the concepts of classical physics. But after discussions with Bohr and Einstein in 1926-7, Heisenberg soon recognised what we might term his `empiricist' viewpoint was problematic. In 1927 Heisenberg's thought undergoes a shift away from the `empiricist' viewpoint that had underpinned his early philosophy of quantum mechanics. The nature and scope of this transformation, which forms the central theme in this thesis, has, up until now, been poorly understood and often completely neglected. Through his discussions with Bohr, Heisenberg came to the realisation that despite their limitations, classical concepts were conditions for the possibility of the description of all experience. This marked the abandonment of his earlier attempt to replace classical concepts with quantum concepts. The recognition of the primacy of classical language forms the point of departure for much of Heisenberg's later thought, which brought him into contact with the attempts in the German-speaking world in the 1920s to reconstruct Kantian epistemology. By the mid-1930s, Heisenberg advocated a 'pragmatic transformation' of Kantian philosophy, in which classical concepts were held to be a priori in the sense that they remained the conditions for the possibility of experience, but were no longer held to be necessary or universal in a strict Kantian sense. After 1940 Heisenberg saw the paradoxes of quantum mechanics under the aegis of what can be termed a 'transcendental conception of language', according to which language is not a mere tool, but actively shapes, gives form, and objectifies, our 'reality'. The limits of a classical 'description' in quantum mechanics therefore came to signify for Heisenberg, the limits of 'objective reality'. While Bohr exerted perhaps the most important philosophical influence on Heisenberg, their intellectual relationship was characterised by disagreement and misunderstanding. This is most strikingly displayed in their respective views on wave-particle duality and complementarily. While after 1927 Heisenberg accepted Bohr's basic insight that our knowledge of the quantum world is mediated through classical language, he did not share Rohr's interpretation of complementarity. While Heisenberg certainly used terms such as 'complementarity' and wave-particle duality' in his writings, a close reading reveals that these terms had very different meanings for the two physicists. This is particularly evident in the contrast between Heisenberg's notion of wave-particle equivalence and Bohr's idea of complementarity. In bringing to light these divergences between Bohr and Heisenberg, this thesis lends further weight to the view - already advocated by scholars such as John Hendry and Mara Beller - that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics should not be thought of as a unified philosophical position, but actually comprises a number of different strands.
Werner Heisenberg introduced the notion of quantum potentia in order to accommodate the indeterminism associated with quantum measurement. Potentia captures the capacity of the system to be found to possess a property upon a corresponding sharp measurement in which it is actualized. The specific potentiae of the individual system are represented formally by the complex amplitudes in the measurement bases of the eigenstate in which it is prepared. All predictions for future values of system properties can be made by an experimenter using the probabilities which are the squared moduli of these amplitudes that are the diagonal elements of the density matrix description of the pure ensemble to which the system, so prepared, belongs. Heisenberg considered the change of the ensemble attribution following quantum measurement to be analogous to the classical change in Gibbs’ thermodynamics when measurement of the canonical ensemble enables a microcanonical ensemble description. This analogy, presented by Heisenberg as operating at the epistemic level, is analyzed here. It has led some to claim not only that the change of the state in measurement is classical mechanical, bringing its quantum character into question, but also that Heisenberg held this to be the case. Here, these claims are shown to be incorrect, because the analogy concerns the change of ensemble attribution by the experimenter upon learning the result of the measurement, not the actualization of the potentia responsible for the change of the individual system state which—in Heisenberg’s interpretation of quantum mechanics—is objective in nature and independent of the experimenter’s knowledge.