While secrecy in communication systems has historically been obtained through cryptographic means in the upper layers, recent research efforts have focused on the physical layer and have unveiled ample opportunities for security design. In particular, the combination of signal processing techniques with channel coding for secrecy has been central to the development of physical-layer security efforts. Although implicit coding techniques for secrecy have been known since the 1970s, explicit code constructions have only been discovered within the last decade. The purpose of this article is to provide a synopsis of the state of the art in coding for secrecy. We discuss the general principles of coding, and we illustrate them with several examples. In particular, we discuss the importance of a nested code structure and stochastic encoding, which allow for both data reliability and security.
While secrecy in communication systems has historically been obtained through cryptographic means in the upper layers, recent research efforts have focused on the physical layer and have unveiled ample opportunities for security design. In particular, the combination of signal processing techniques with channel coding for secrecy has been central to the development of physical-layer security efforts. Although implicit coding techniques for secrecy have been known since the 1970s, explicit code constructions have only been discovered within the last decade. The purpose of this article is to provide a synopsis of the state of the art in coding for secrecy. We discuss the general principles of coding, and we illustrate them with several examples. In particular, we discuss the importance of a nested code structure and stochastic encoding, which allow for both data reliability and security.
The renewed interest for physical-layer security techniques has put forward a new role for error-control codes. In addition to ensuring reliability, carefully designed codes have been shown to provide a level of information-theoretic secrecy, by which the amount of information leaked to an adversary may be controlled. The ability to achieve information-theoretic secrecy relies on the study of alternative coding mechanisms, such as channel resolvability and privacy amplification, in which error-control codes are exploited as a means to shape the distribution of stochastic processes. This use of error-control codes, which goes much beyond that of correcting errors, creates numerous new design challenges. The objective of this paper is threefold. First, the paper aims at providing system engineers with explicit tools to build simple secrecy codes in order to stimulate interest and foster their integration in communication system prototypes. Second, it aims at providing coding and information theorists with a synthetic overview of the theoretical concepts and techniques for secrecy. Finally, it aims at highlighting the open challenges and opportunities faced for the integration of these codes in practical systems.
Physical layer security, or information-theoretic security, has attracted considerable attention recently, due to its potential to enhance the transmission secrecy of wireless communications. Various secrecy signaling and coding schemes have been designed at the physical layer of wireless systems to guarantee confidentiality against information leakage to unauthorized receivers, among which the strategy based on the idea of node cooperation is promising. This article provides an overview of the recent research on enhancing wireless transmission secrecy via cooperation. We take a signal processing perspective and focus on the secrecy signal design and optimization techniques to increase secrecy performance. We also propose some future research directions on this topic.
The fast development of wireless networks, which are intrinsically exposed to eavesdropping, has created a growing concern for confidentiality. While classical cryptographic schemes require a key provided by the end-user, physical-layer security leverages the randomness of the physical communication medium as a source of secrecy. The main benefit of physical-layer security techniques is their relatively low cost and their ability to combine with any existing security mechanisms. This dissertation provides an analysis including the theoretical study of the two-way wiretap channel to obtain a better insight into how to design coding mechanisms, practical tests with experimental systems, and the design of actual codes. From a theoretical standpoint, the study confirms the benefits of combining several multi-user coding techniques including cooperative jamming, coded cooperative jamming and secret key generation. For these different mechanisms, the trade-off between reliability, secrecy and communication rate is clarified under a stringent strong secrecy metric. Regarding the design of practical codes, spatially coupled LDPC codes, which were originally designed for reliability, are modified to develop a coded cooperative jamming code. Finally, a proof-of-principle practical wireless system is provided to show how to implement a secret key generation system on experimental programmable radios. This testbed is then used to assess the realistic performance of such systems in terms of reliability, secrecy and rate.
In this work, we consider the pros and cons of using various layers of keyless coding to achieve secure and reliable communication over the Gaussian wiretap channel. We define a new approach to information theoretic security, called practical secrecy and the secrecy benefit, to be used over real-world channels and finite blocklength instantiations of coding layers, and use this new approach to show the fundamental reliability and security implications of several coding mechanisms that have traditionally been used for physical-layer security. We perform a systematic/structured analysis of the effect of error-control coding, scrambling, interleaving, and coset coding, as coding layers of a secrecy system. Using this new approach, scrambling and interleaving are shown to be of no effect in increasing information theoretic security, even when measuring the effect at the output of the eavesdropper's decoder. Error control coding is shown to present a trade-off between secrecy and reliability that is dictated by the chosen code and the signal-to-noise ratios at the legitimate and eavesdropping receivers. Finally, the benefits of secrecy coding are highlighted, and it is shown how one can shape the secrecy benefit according to system specifications using combinations of different layers of coding to achieve both reliable and secure throughput.
Providing secure communications over the physical layer with the objective of achieving secrecy without requiring a secret key has been receiving growing attention within the past decade. The vast majority of the existing studies in the area of physical layer security focus exclusively on the scenarios where the channel inputs are Gaussian distributed. However, in practice, the signals employed for transmission are drawn from discrete signal constellations such as phase shift keying and quadrature amplitude modulation. Hence, understanding the impact of the finite-alphabet input constraints and designing secure transmission schemes under this assumption is a mandatory step toward a practical implementation of physical layer security. With this motivation, this paper reviews recent developments on physical layer security with finite-alphabet inputs. We explore transmit signal design algorithms for single-antenna as well as multi-antenna wiretap channels under different assumptions on the channel state information at the transmitter. Moreover, we present a review of the recent results on secure transmission with discrete signaling for various scenarios including multi-carrier transmission systems, broadcast channels with confidential messages, cognitive multiple access and relay networks. Throughout the article, we stress the important behavioral differences of discrete versus Gaussian inputs in the context of the physical layer security. We also present an overview of practical code construction over Gaussian and fading wiretap channels, and discuss some open problems and directions for future research.
Communications, wired and wireless, have integrated various cryptographic techniques to ensure privacy and counter surveillance. These techniques have been integrated in most of the network layers, except for the physical layer. This physical layer has, thus far, dealt with schemes such as source coding, channel coding, and (de)modulation, to enable the transmission of data in a reliable and efficient manner. The emergence of physical layer security extends the functionalities at the physical layer to include secure communication, aiming at the transmission of a signal that can only be correctly retrieved by the intended receiver. Therefore, the goals of physical layer security align with cryptographic schemes utilized at the other network layers. From the extensive study of physical layer security schemes, we have observed that there is a knowledge gap regarding certain security principles practiced by cryptographers and the experts within physical layer security, causing many physical layer security schemes to be impractical for standardization and the wide-scale integration into information and communication technologies. This paper describes a variety of security principles and concepts, practiced by cryptographers, and of importance to physical layer security experts. We aim to raise the awareness of these security principles and concepts to experts within the field of physical layer security to improve the practicality, standardization, and integration potential of the design of future physical layer security schemes.