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Physics of Atomic Nuclei

Relation between energy and mass in Bohr's essay on his debate with einstein

Lev B. Okun

Published Mar 1, 2001• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The famous debate between Einstein and Bohr on the (in)consistency of quantum mechanics was described in detail by Bohr in his essay of 1949. The present article comments not on the main subject of the debate but only on the terminology that is relevant to the notions of the theory of relativity and which was used by the participants. In particular, their statement on the equivalence of mass and energy should not be taken literally. In fact, the rest energy is meant here. The authority of the two great physicists should not be misused to preserve the confusing terminology.

DOI
10.1134/1.1358478

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Perspectives on Science•Feb 11, 2008•1 citation
The famous debate between Einstein and Bohr on the (in)consistency of quantum mechanics was described in detail by Bohr in his essay of 1949. The present article comments not on the main subject of the debate but only on the terminology that is relevant to the notions of the theory of relativity and which was used by the participants. In particular, their statement on the equivalence of mass and energy should not be taken literally. In fact, the rest energy is meant here. The authority of the two great physicists should not be misused to preserve the confusing terminology.
The Bohr–Einstein debate over the ‘‘weighing of energy’’ and the validity of the time–energy uncertainty relation is reexamined in the context of gravitation theories that do not respect the equivalence principle. Bohr’s use of the equivalence principle is shown to be sufficient, but not necessary, to establish the validity of this uncertainty relation in Einstein’s ‘‘weighing-of-energy’’ gedanken experiment. The uncertainty relation is shown to hold in any energy-conserving theory of gravity, and so a failure of the equivalence principle does not engender a failure of quantum mechanics. The relationship between the gravitational redshift and the equivalence principle is reviewed.
The famous debate between Einstein and Bohr began at the Solvay Council in 1927. The debate was about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, but also addressed the fundamental question of what the purpose and aim of a physical theory should be. Their conflicting positions were based on two diametrically opposed philosophical approaches to the fundamental problems of physics. The many books popularising quantum mechanics quite rightly place the emphasis on the problem of interpretation: they discuss the opposing positions of Einstein’s “realism” and the “Copenhagen interpretation” of which Bohr is seen as the leading protagonist.
The fifth Solvay conference is usually remembered for the clash that took place between Bohr and Einstein, supposedly concerning in particular the possibility of breaking the uncertainty relations. It might be assumed that this clash took the form of an official debate that was the centrepiece of the conference. However, no record of any such debate appears in the published proceedings, where both Bohr and Einstein are in fact relatively silent. The available evidence shows that in 1927 the famous exchanges between Bohr and Einstein actually consisted of informal discussions, which took place semiprivately (mainly over breakfast and dinner), and which were overheard by just a few of the participants, in particular Heisenberg and Ehrenfest. The historical sources for this consist, in fact, entirely of accounts given by Bohr, Heisenberg and Ehrenfest. These accounts essentially ignore the extensive formal discussions appearing in the published proceedings. As a result of relying on these sources, the perception of the conference by posterity has been skewed on two counts. First, at the fifth Solvay conference there occurred much more that was memorable and important besides the Bohr–Einstein clash. Second, as shown in detail by Howard (1990), the real nature of Einstein's objections was in fact misunderstood by Bohr, Heisenberg and Ehrenfest – for Einstein's main target was not the uncertainty relations, but what he saw as the non-separability of quantum theory.
Now that my account of Bohr's philosophy of physics has been completed, it remains for me to give a general assessment of it. What value should we assign to Bohr's main ideas – the notions of correspondence and complementarity? How does his interpretation of quantum physics fare in comparison with some of its rivals? What should our assessment of the Bohr–Einstein debate be? I shall take up these questions in the reverse order. Einstein or Bohr? The final verdict The Bohr–Einstein debate is primarily a dispute about the philosophical foundations in terms of which the interpretation of quantum mechanics should be based: specifically it is a dispute about the intrinsic-properties theory, i.e. about the scope of a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. Einstein wished to maintain the two realist theses, the intrinsic-properties theory and the objective-values theory, whereas Bohr wished to hold only the latter. My own philosophical leanings are in the direction of realism. To my mind the notion of a physical reality the existence and constitution of which are independent of human thought and perception is coherent and plausible: what physical objects there are, and what properties they have, is not determined by human thought or perception, or by human practical interests. I have sympathy, therefore, with Einstein's position concerning the indefinability thesis and the question of the completeness of quantum mechanics.
The debate between Bohr and Einstein on the consistency, completeness, and finality of quantum theory ranks as one of the most significant philosophical debates of the twentieth century. It was a philosophical debate not in the sense that it had a considerable impact on the relatively technical field of the philosophy of physics. It was philosophical because at its root there lay two rival conceptions of physical reality and of our capacity to comprehend physical reality. With the possible exception of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence in which Leibniz and Clarke - with the latter acting as Newton's frontman - pressed their respective conceptions of space and time in the early part of the eighteenth century, the Einstein-Bohr dialogue has no parallel in the history of physics. Unlike the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, the Bohr-Einstein debate contained no bitterness and was not based on any personal rivalry. The debate was continuous from about 1927 and lasted right up to Einstein's death in 1955. For the contemporary philosopher of physics the most important episodes took place in the years between 1927 and 1935. However, in one respect at least the differences between Bohr and Einstein predated quantum mechanics itself. One is tempted to view the disagreement between Bohr and Einstein as the opposition of Bohr the revolutionary and Einstein the conservative, and in his best and clearest account of it Bohr certainly writes as if that were so.
Although Dirac rarely participated in the interpretational debates over quantum theory, it is traditionally assumed that his views were aligned with Heisenberg and Bohr in the so-called Copenhagen-Göttingen camp. However, an unpublished—and apparently unknown—lecture of Dirac's reveals that this view is mistaken; in the famous debate between Einstein and Bohr, Dirac sided with Einstein. Surprisingly, Dirac believed that quantum mechanics was not complete, that the uncertainty principle would not survive in the future physics, and that a deterministic description of the microworld would be recovered. In this paper I show how we can make sense of this unpublished lecture in the context of Dirac's broader philosophy of quantum mechanics, and how our present understanding of Dirac's philosophical views must be revised.