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Physics Essays

The Proven Demise of QM Needs a New Realistic Phenomenology, Which Is Referenced Here and Further Discussed

William M. Honig

Published Sep 1, 2001• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.4006/1.3025487

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In the year 2000, in a paper titled Quantum Theory Needs No 'Interpretation', Chris Fuchs and Asher Peres presented a series of instrumentalist arguments against the role played by 'interpretations' in QM. Since then --quite regardless of the publication of this paper-- the number of interpretations has experienced a continuous growth constituting what Adan Cabello has characterized as a "map of madness". In this work, we discuss the reasons behind this dangerous fragmentation in understanding and provide new arguments against the need of interpretations in QM which --opposite to those of Fuchs and Peres-- are derived from a representational realist understanding of theories --grounded in the writings of Einstein, Heisenberg and Pauli. Furthermore, we will argue that there are reasons to believe that the creation of 'interpretations' for the theory of quanta has functioned as a trap designed by anti-realists in order to imprison realists in a labyrinth with no exit. Taking as a standpoint the critical analysis by David Deutsch to the anti-realist understanding of physics, we attempt to address the references and roles played by 'theory' and 'observation'. In this respect, we will argue that the key to escape the anti-realist trap of interpretation is to recognize that --as Einstein told Heisenberg almost one century ago-- it is only the theory which can tell you what can be observed. Finally, we will conclude that what QM needs is not a new interpretation but instead, a theoretical (formal-conceptual) consistent, coherent and unified scheme which allows us to understand what the theory is really talking about.

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The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and their fit with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called 'phenomenological realism': theories are merely tools to construct other theories and models, including phenomenological models; phenomenological models are the vehicles of representation. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism which can overcome the problem generated by the argument from scientific revolutions, and which depend on the scientific practice. The realist tried to overcome this problem by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that different types of dichotomy presented by realists did not overcome the problem, these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy between high level theoretical abstractions and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical work in physics have two distinct types depending on the way they are built these are: theoretical models which built depending on a top-down approach and phenomenological models which are built depending on a bottom-up approach, this dichotomy cuts the division along a horizontal line between low and high level theory. I present two case studies. One from superconductivity where I contrast the BCS theory of superconductivity with the phenomenological model of Landau and Ginzburg. I show how in that field of physics the historical developments favoured phenomenological models over high-level theoretical abstraction. I show how the BCS theory of superconductivity was constructed, and why it was accepted as the fundamental theory of superconductivity, and how later failed to account for new kinds of superconductors. I contrast that with the building of the widely accepted phenomenological model of superconductivity. The other case study is a fresh look at the Bohr-Einstein debate. I think that the main difference between Bohr and Einstein was their position from how theoretical work ought to be conducted in physics. Einstein always sought the mathematical clarity and simplicity, he adopted a top-down approach toward theoretical work, while Bohr insisted on a bottom-up approach. (author)

•Feb 1, 2013•5 citations
In the year 2000, in a paper titled Quantum Theory Needs No 'Interpretation', Chris Fuchs and Asher Peres presented a series of instrumentalist arguments against the role played by 'interpretations' in QM. Since then --quite regardless of the publication of this paper-- the number of interpretations has experienced a continuous growth constituting what Adan Cabello has characterized as a "map of madness". In this work, we discuss the reasons behind this dangerous fragmentation in understanding and provide new arguments against the need of interpretations in QM which --opposite to those of Fuchs and Peres-- are derived from a representational realist understanding of theories --grounded in the writings of Einstein, Heisenberg and Pauli. Furthermore, we will argue that there are reasons to believe that the creation of 'interpretations' for the theory of quanta has functioned as a trap designed by anti-realists in order to imprison realists in a labyrinth with no exit. Taking as a standpoint the critical analysis by David Deutsch to the anti-realist understanding of physics, we attempt to address the references and roles played by 'theory' and 'observation'. In this respect, we will argue that the key to escape the anti-realist trap of interpretation is to recognize that --as Einstein told Heisenberg almost one century ago-- it is only the theory which can tell you what can be observed. Finally, we will conclude that what QM needs is not a new interpretation but instead, a theoretical (formal-conceptual) consistent, coherent and unified scheme which allows us to understand what the theory is really talking about.
We discuss the demise of flavour tagging due to the loss of the particle–antiparticle identity of neutral B -mesons in the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correlated states. Such a situation occurs in cases where the CPT operator is ill-defined, as happens, for example, in quantum gravity models with induced decoherence in the matter sector. The time evolution of the perturbed B 0 – B ¯ 0 initial state, as produced in B -factories, is sufficient to generate new two-body states. For flavour specific decays at equal times, we discuss two definite tests of the two body entanglement: (i) search for the would-be forbidden B 0 B 0 and B ¯ 0 B ¯ 0 states; (ii) deviations from the indistinguishable probability between the permuted states B ¯ 0 B 0 and B 0 B ¯ 0 .
The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and their fit with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called 'phenomenological realism': theories are merely tools to construct other theories and models, including phenomenological models; phenomenological models are the vehicles of representation. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism which can overcome the problem generated by the argument from scientific revolutions, and which depend on the scientific practice. The realist tried to overcome this problem by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that different types of dichotomy presented by realists did not overcome the problem, these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy between high level theoretical abstractions and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical work in physics have two distinct types depending on the way they are built these are: theoretical models which built depending on a top-down approach and phenomenological models which are built depending on a bottom-up approach, this dichotomy cuts the division along a horizontal line between low and high level theory. I present two case studies. One from superconductivity where I contrast the BCS theory of superconductivity with the phenomenological model of Landau and Ginzburg. I show how in that field of physics the historical developments favoured phenomenological models over high-level theoretical abstraction. I show how the BCS theory of superconductivity was constructed, and why it was accepted as the fundamental theory of superconductivity, and how later failed to account for new kinds of superconductors. I contrast that with the building of the widely accepted phenomenological model of superconductivity. The other case study is a fresh look at the Bohr-Einstein debate. I think that the main difference between Bohr and Einstein was their position from how theoretical work ought to be conducted in physics. Einstein always sought the mathematical clarity and simplicity, he adopted a top-down approach toward theoretical work, while Bohr insisted on a bottom-up approach. (author)