On the bizarre results of weak measurements

Ruth E. Kastner

Josiah Sinclair, David Spierings, Aharon Brodutch +1 more

Constructing an ontology for quantum theory is challenging, in part due to unavoidable measurement back-action. The Aharonov-Albert-Vaidman weak measurement formalism provides a method to predict measurement results (weak values) in a regime where back-action is negligible. The weak value appears analogous to a classical conditional mean and in fact, has a number of features that further suggest it may be interpreted as being related to some underlying ontological model. However, the ontology appears bizarre since the weak values are complex and unbounded. Here, we study weak values in the context of a recent quantum optical experiment involving two-photon interactions. The results of the experiment are reinterpreted within a 'stochastic optics' model of light. The model is based on standard (Maxwell) electromagnetic theory, supplemented by stochastic fluctuations of the electromagnetic fields. We show that the conditional means of the electric field intensities correspond to the experimentally observed weak values. This is a provocative result, as it suggests that at least within this experiment, the weak value gives us information about the average of an ontological quantity (the intensity). We study the breakdown of the stochastic optics model, which occurs outside the experimentally probed regime, and in particular in the limit where the weak value predicts 'anomalous' results.

Miguel Orszag

Francesca Ferlaino, Rudolf Grimm

A prediction that resonantly interacting particles can form weakly bound trimer states remained a mere theoretical oddity for more than three decades until tunable ultracold gases caused the field to explode, with enormous progress in just the last year.

P. D. Magnus

The Bare Theory was offered by David Albert as a way of standing by the completeness of quantum mechanics in the face of the measurement problem. This paper surveys objections to the Bare Theory that recur in the literature: what will here be called the oddity objection, the coherence objection, and the context-of-the-universe objection. Critics usually take the Bare Theory to have unacceptably bizarre consequences, but to be free from internal contradiction. Bizarre consequences need not be decisive against the Bare Theory, but a further objection—dubbed here the calibration objection—has been underestimated. This paper argues that the Bare Theory is not only odd but also inconsistent. We can imagine a successor to the Bare Theory—the Stripped Theory—which avoids the objections and fulfills the original promise of the Bare Theory, but at the cost of amplifying the bizarre consequences. The Stripped Theory is either a stunning development in our understanding of the world or a reductio disproving the completeness of quantum mechanics. 1. The Bare Theory 2. The usual objections 3. The calibration objection 4. Beyond the Bare Theory

Jan Roik, Karel Lemr, Antonín Černoch +1 more