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International Journal of Information Security

Integrating identity-based and certificate-based authenticated key exchange protocols

Berkant Ustaoğlu

Published May 27, 2011• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10207-011-0136-3

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Abstract Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is a very important primitive in cryptography. In the last decades, many AKE protocols appeared either in the certificate‐based (cert‐based) setting or in the identity‐based (id‐based) setting. In real applications, entities from different settings may also have the requirement to communicate with each other. Several papers have concentrated on supporting either multiple certification authorities or multiple key generation centers, but very few have considered the interoperability between the two settings. Furthermore, existing approaches are still inadequate in supporting parameters from different algebraic groups. In this paper, we consider AKE protocols integrating cert‐based and id‐based settings with varied groups. Based on two extract algorithms for id‐based entities, we present two AKE protocols where one entity is cert‐based and the other is id‐based, and the parameters of both entities come from different groups. An extended AKE security model of Chatterjee et al. and Ustaoǧlu [1, 2] is proposed to support multiple certification authorities and multiple key generation centers in which the proposed protocols are proved to be secure. Other variant protocols are also presented. Then, extensions to support forward secrecy and resistance to leakage of both ephemeral keys are provided. Finally, we present a more efficient integrating protocol than existing constructions for users who use the same group. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Abstract Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is a very important primitive in cryptography. In the last decades, many AKE protocols appeared either in the certificate‐based (cert‐based) setting or in the identity‐based (id‐based) setting. In real applications, entities from different settings may also have the requirement to communicate with each other. Several papers have concentrated on supporting either multiple certification authorities or multiple key generation centers, but very few have considered the interoperability between the two settings. Furthermore, existing approaches are still inadequate in supporting parameters from different algebraic groups. In this paper, we consider AKE protocols integrating cert‐based and id‐based settings with varied groups. Based on two extract algorithms for id‐based entities, we present two AKE protocols where one entity is cert‐based and the other is id‐based, and the parameters of both entities come from different groups. An extended AKE security model of Chatterjee et al. and Ustaoǧlu [1, 2] is proposed to support multiple certification authorities and multiple key generation centers in which the proposed protocols are proved to be secure. Other variant protocols are also presented. Then, extensions to support forward secrecy and resistance to leakage of both ephemeral keys are provided. Finally, we present a more efficient integrating protocol than existing constructions for users who use the same group. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme is one of the most widely used cryptographic primitives in practice, even in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) environments. In order to resist side-channel attacks, several works have been proposed for defining leakage-resilient (LR) security models and constructing LR-AKE protocols. However, all these LR-AKE schemes employed the traditional X.509 certificate-based public-key infrastructure authentication framework, where the online transmission and verification of the public-key certificate are the major drawbacks. In this paper, we first propose a general framework for constructing identity-based AKE protocols in the bounded after-the-fact LR extended-Canetti–Krawczyk security model, and show a formal proof in the standard model. Our proposed scheme offers a flexible approach to simplify the certificate management. Moreover, our result could be extended to the bounded-retrieval model, yielding the first LR-AKE protocol in this model.
Key agreement protocols allow multi-parties exchanging public information to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an insecure network. Since Joux first published the pairing-based one round tripartite key agreement protocol, many authenticated protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, many of them have been broken while others have been shown to be deficient in some desirable security attributes. In 2004, Cheng et al. presented two protocols aimed at strengthening Shim’s certificate-based and Zhang et al.’s tripartite identitybased protocols. This paper reports that 1) In Cheng et al.’s identity-based protocol, an adversary can extract long-term private keys of all the parties involved; and 2) Cheng et al.’s certificationbased protocol is weak against key integrity attacks. This paper suggests possible remedies for the security flaws in both protocols and then presents a modified Cheng et al.’s identity-based, oneround tripartite protocol that is more secure than the original protocol.