Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEIE Transactions on Smart Processing and Computing

An Improvement of Certification-based One-Round Tripartite Key Agreement Protocols

Kambombo Mtong, Eun‐Jun Yoon

Published Oct 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Key agreement protocols allow multi-parties exchanging public information to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an insecure network. Since Joux first published the pairing-based one round tripartite key agreement protocol, many authenticated protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, many of them have been broken while others have been shown to be deficient in some desirable security attributes. In 2004, Cheng et al. presented two protocols aimed at strengthening Shim’s certificate-based and Zhang et al.’s tripartite identitybased protocols. This paper reports that 1) In Cheng et al.’s identity-based protocol, an adversary can extract long-term private keys of all the parties involved; and 2) Cheng et al.’s certificationbased protocol is weak against key integrity attacks. This paper suggests possible remedies for the security flaws in both protocols and then presents a modified Cheng et al.’s identity-based, oneround tripartite protocol that is more secure than the original protocol.

Related papers

Weakness of Several Identity-based Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols.

Xi Lin, Lin Sun

Abstract: Key agreement allows multi-parties exchanging public information to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an insecure network. In recent years, several identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed. In this study, we analyze three identity-based tripartite authenticated key agreement protocols. After the analysis, we found that these protocols do not possess the desirable security attributes.

•Jan 1, 2013•2 citations

An Improved One-Round ID-Based Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol.

Meng-Hui Lim, Sang-Gon Lee

Abstract. A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is generally designed to accommodate the need of three speci c entities in communicating over an open network with a shared secret key, which is used to preserve con dentiality and data integrity. Since Joux initiates the development of tripartite key agreement protocol, many prominent tripartite schemes have been proposed subsequently. In 2005, Tso et al. have proposed an ID-based non-interactive tripartite key agreement scheme with k-resilience. Based on this scheme, they have further proposed another one-round tripartite application scheme. Although they claimed that both schemes are e cient and secure, we discover that both schemes are in fact breakable. In this paper, we impose several impersonation attacks on Tso et al.s schemes in order to highlight their aws. Subsequently, we propose an enhanced scheme which will not only conquer their defects, but also preserve the desired security attributes of a key agreement protocol. 1

•Jan 1, 2007•6 citations

Cryptanalysis of Two Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

Yang Lu, Quanling Zhang, Jiguo Li

The tripartite authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality to subsequent communications among three parties over an insecure public network. In recent years, several identity-based and certificate less tripartite AKA protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, most of them are insecure. In this paper, we analyze an identity-based tripartite AKA protocol and a certificate less tripartite AKA protocol. Our cryptanalysis shows that one neither meets the desirable security properties.

International Symposium on Distributed Computing and Applications for Business Engineering and Science (DCABES)•Aug 1, 2015•3 citations

Insider Impersonation Attack on a Tripartite ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol with Bilinear Pairings

Meng-Hui Lim, Sang-Gon Lee, Hoon Jae Lee

A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which can subsequently be used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. Since Joux has pioneered the notion of pairing-based tripartite key agreement protocol, various group key agreement schemes have been proposed after then. In 2003, Liu et al. proposed a tripartite identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol using bilinear pairings. Although the scheme is claimed to be efficient and secure, we discover that it is in fact breakable. In this paper, we highlight the flaw by demonstrating an insider impersonation attack on the scheme and suggest a few enhancements to conquer the defect.

International Conference on Next Generation Web Services Practices•Oct 1, 2008•1 citation

An efficient and secure one-round authenticated key agreement protocol without pairings

Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu

Two-Party Authenticated key agreement protocol is essential for setting up the common session key for parties to establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. Most of proposed schemes require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. So such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis two schemes recently proposed by Cao etc., and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with more desired security attributes, which need no pairing operations while still achieve nice computational efficiency. These security attributes include known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. Moreover, it captures the enhanced security attributes known session-specific temporary key information secrecy, which means that even the ephemeral secret key were compromised, the adversary can hardly acquire the agreed session key.

International Conference on Multimedia Technology (ICMT)•Jul 1, 2011•4 citations

Tripartite Key Agreement Protocols and Insider Impersonation Attack

Hung‐Yu Chien, Ru-Yu Lin

Even though several certificate-based tripartite key agreement protocols with pairings have been proposed, the insider impersonation attack was not noticed. This specific threat applies to those key agreement protocols where there are more than two communicating parties. This paper re-examines the previous protocols. We find that both Shim's scheme and the LHL scheme are not secure. The Shim scheme is weak in key-compromise impersonation attack, insider impersonation attack, and replay attack. The LHL tripartite key scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, outsider impersonation attack, and key-compromise impersonation attack. Furthemore, we propose two approaches to improve the security. Our schemes are more efficient than Al-Riyami-Paterson's tripartite key confirmation protocol, which is the most secure one among the referenced works.

朝陽學報•Jun 1, 2005•0 citations
Key agreement protocols allow multi-parties exchanging public information to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an insecure network. Since Joux first published the pairing-based one round tripartite key agreement protocol, many authenticated protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, many of them have been broken while others have been shown to be deficient in some desirable security attributes. In 2004, Cheng et al. presented two protocols aimed at strengthening Shim’s certificate-based and Zhang et al.’s tripartite identitybased protocols. This paper reports that 1) In Cheng et al.’s identity-based protocol, an adversary can extract long-term private keys of all the parties involved; and 2) Cheng et al.’s certificationbased protocol is weak against key integrity attacks. This paper suggests possible remedies for the security flaws in both protocols and then presents a modified Cheng et al.’s identity-based, oneround tripartite protocol that is more secure than the original protocol.
Abstract. A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is generally designed to accommodate the need of three speci c entities in communicating over an open network with a shared secret key, which is used to preserve con dentiality and data integrity. Since Joux initiates the development of tripartite key agreement protocol, many prominent tripartite schemes have been proposed subsequently. In 2005, Tso et al. have proposed an ID-based non-interactive tripartite key agreement scheme with k-resilience. Based on this scheme, they have further proposed another one-round tripartite application scheme. Although they claimed that both schemes are e cient and secure, we discover that both schemes are in fact breakable. In this paper, we impose several impersonation attacks on Tso et al.s schemes in order to highlight their aws. Subsequently, we propose an enhanced scheme which will not only conquer their defects, but also preserve the desired security attributes of a key agreement protocol. 1
The tripartite authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality to subsequent communications among three parties over an insecure public network. In recent years, several identity-based and certificate less tripartite AKA protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, most of them are insecure. In this paper, we analyze an identity-based tripartite AKA protocol and a certificate less tripartite AKA protocol. Our cryptanalysis shows that one neither meets the desirable security properties.
A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which can subsequently be used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. Since Joux has pioneered the notion of pairing-based tripartite key agreement protocol, various group key agreement schemes have been proposed after then. In 2003, Liu et al. proposed a tripartite identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol using bilinear pairings. Although the scheme is claimed to be efficient and secure, we discover that it is in fact breakable. In this paper, we highlight the flaw by demonstrating an insider impersonation attack on the scheme and suggest a few enhancements to conquer the defect.
Two-Party Authenticated key agreement protocol is essential for setting up the common session key for parties to establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. Most of proposed schemes require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. So such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis two schemes recently proposed by Cao etc., and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with more desired security attributes, which need no pairing operations while still achieve nice computational efficiency. These security attributes include known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. Moreover, it captures the enhanced security attributes known session-specific temporary key information secrecy, which means that even the ephemeral secret key were compromised, the adversary can hardly acquire the agreed session key.
Even though several certificate-based tripartite key agreement protocols with pairings have been proposed, the insider impersonation attack was not noticed. This specific threat applies to those key agreement protocols where there are more than two communicating parties. This paper re-examines the previous protocols. We find that both Shim's scheme and the LHL scheme are not secure. The Shim scheme is weak in key-compromise impersonation attack, insider impersonation attack, and replay attack. The LHL tripartite key scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, outsider impersonation attack, and key-compromise impersonation attack. Furthemore, we propose two approaches to improve the security. Our schemes are more efficient than Al-Riyami-Paterson's tripartite key confirmation protocol, which is the most secure one among the referenced works.