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Lecture notes in computer science

Strongly Secure Two-Pass Attribute-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Kazuki Yoneyama

Published Jan 1, 2010• 19 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-17455-1_10

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IDOAKE: strongly secure ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol

Hai Huang, Zhenfu Cao

Abstract ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol allows the sender Alice to generate a session key without interacting with receiver Bob. As a result, it is better suitable for some application scenarios than the two‐pass counterpart. However, currently there are few ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocols with a security proof in a formal model. The paper investigates the ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model. We propose a new ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol IDOAKE, which is shown secure under Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) assumption in the eCK model. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first provably secure ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange in the eCK model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Security and Communication Networks•Dec 3, 2010•5 citations
This paper firstly provides the extended Canetti-Krawzcyk (eCK) security model for predicate-based authenticated key exchange (AKE) that guarantees resistance to leakage of ephemeral secret keys. Moreover, we propose two-pass key-policy (resp. session-policy) attribute-based AKE protocol secure in the proposed predicate-based eCK security model based on key-policy (resp. ciphertext-policy) attribute-based encryption. The proposed protocols have advantages in security against leakage of ephemeral secret keys and the round complexity compared to the previous predicate-based AKE protocols.
Abstract ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol allows the sender Alice to generate a session key without interacting with receiver Bob. As a result, it is better suitable for some application scenarios than the two‐pass counterpart. However, currently there are few ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocols with a security proof in a formal model. The paper investigates the ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model. We propose a new ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol IDOAKE, which is shown secure under Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) assumption in the eCK model. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first provably secure ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange in the eCK model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.