In telecommunication networks and in computer grid networks, a significant ongoing research is in a technology known as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), which is capable to transport more than 1 Tbps aggregate traffic over a single fiber. However, when massive amounts of information are transported, as in optical networks, there are three issues that stand, cost-efficient ultra-high bandwidth delivery, security of information and data, and security of the network and of the transporting link layer. In optical networks, each fiber link consists of segments, each several kilometers long. Since a single WDM channel carries traffic, there are opportunities for sophisticated eavesdroppers to tap the fiber, copy a channel, isolate a specific payload and attempt to decrypt it if the encryption key is known or it is breakable with a fast computer. Therefore, end-to-end data security should not only rely on the client's encryption method but also on securing the transmission method on the optical link. In this paper, we present a WDM link security methodology that encrypts multiple channels and with multiple keys to render channel monitoring by eavesdroppers virtually impossible. Although our paper presents the applicability of the method on a point-to-point topology, it is applicable to a multilink and edge-to-edge network path.
In telecommunication networks and in computer grid networks, a significant ongoing research is in a technology known as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), which is capable to transport more than 1 Tbps aggregate traffic over a single fiber. However, when massive amounts of information are transported, as in optical networks, there are three issues that stand, cost-efficient ultra-high bandwidth delivery, security of information and data, and security of the network and of the transporting link layer. In optical networks, each fiber link consists of segments, each several kilometers long. Since a single WDM channel carries traffic, there are opportunities for sophisticated eavesdroppers to tap the fiber, copy a channel, isolate a specific payload and attempt to decrypt it if the encryption key is known or it is breakable with a fast computer. Therefore, end-to-end data security should not only rely on the client's encryption method but also on securing the transmission method on the optical link. In this paper, we present a WDM link security methodology that encrypts multiple channels and with multiple keys to render channel monitoring by eavesdroppers virtually impossible. Although our paper presents the applicability of the method on a point-to-point topology, it is applicable to a multilink and edge-to-edge network path.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) is a photonic technology capable to transport over a single fiber more than a Tbit/s aggregate traffic. Currently, WDM is the only deployed method in transcontinental and transoceanic applications. In the optical network, each fiber link consists of segments, each several kilometers long, the connecting points of which are amenable to tapping. When a small amount of optical signal is extracted from a tap, when the signal is properly amplified it can be monitored by unauthorized personnel thus threatening communications and land-security. Since each WDM channel carries traffic from one customer, it is not difficult for the connoisseur to demultiplex a specific channel, isolate a specific payload and break the encrypted datagram. Therefore, in addition to data encryption, high-speed communications security should also rely on securing the optical links. In this paper, we present a WDM link security method that, even if fiber is tapped, constitutes channel monitoring and information decrypting by an eavesdropper or unauthorized personnel virtually impossible. In addition, we describe the circuit building blocks behind the method that makes eavesdropping impossible.
Privacy and security is of increasing concern in wireless, wired, Internet and optical communication networks. Modern optical communication networks, known as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), transport aggregate traffic per single mode fiber has exceeded Tbps. When massive amounts of information are transported, the issue of privacy and security becomes important not only on the client data application layer but also on the node management as well as the physical layer. In optical networks, fiber links are many kilometers long and thus there are many opportunities for sophisticated eavesdroppers to tap the fiber, copy a channel, isolate a specific payload and attempt to decrypt it if the encryption key is known or is breakable with a fast computer. In this paper, we present a novel WDM link security methodology that borrows certain concepts of the double DNA helix and we call it DNA-inspired; it encrypts multiple channels randomly with multiple keys to render channel monitoring by eavesdroppers virtually impossible. We also discuss source authentication, sensing of fiber tapping as well as sensing data-mimicking by intruders.
Dense wavelength division multiplexing optical networks transport a huge aggregate traffic exceeding Tbps per single fiber, and passive optical network technology has been extended to include the residential and enterprise network layer with fiber-to-the premises. Because this network allows for multimedia and extremely high data rates to end-users, optical communications security is important not only on the client and the node management layers, but also on the physical layer. Thus, cyber-security becomes also important in optical networks, including unbreakable cipher keys, cipher key distribution, identification of malicious actors, source authentication, physical link signature, and countermeasure strategies. In this paper we overview the security of the WDM optical network. We discuss advanced cryptographic methods that stem from quantum mechanics, known as quantum cryptography, and we identify specific vulnerabilities. We also look into the security of the next-generation optical network.
Protecting the security of optical network is a major worldwide challenge. The conventional schemes for securing communications are based on cryptography at the MAC layer and its higher layers, which are facing a great threat with the development of quantum computers. Optical encryption is a promising way for building security on the physical layer of optical communications. In this work, we propose a novel optical encryption scheme for wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) fiber-optic communication systems, by utilizing the private chaotic phase scrambling. Secure transmission of 50 Gbps signal over 50-km standard single-mode fiber is experimentally and numerically demonstrated. The results show that the WDM signal is efficiently encrypted into a noise-like signal, due to the spectral broadening effect of chaotic phase scrambling. Since the processes of encryption and decryption are totally implemented in the optical domain, the proposed scheme can encrypt the entire network traffic with low latency and high speed. Moreover, the proposed encryption scheme is compatible with the existing WDM optical networks, and only one pair of encryption and decryption devices is sufficient to encrypt all WDM channels, thus the scheme can be easily implemented at low hardware cost.
Network security concerns have recently been increased due to the vast amount of information that flows in a single fiber. At the application layer, data security relies on end-user encryption algorithms, many of which are known to be vulnerable, and authentication algorithms are not foolproof as the sophistication of eavesdroppers and unauthorized bad actors increases. As a result, the communications link may be attacked by eavesdroppers to access data, to mimic the source, or to cause service denial. To accomplish this however, the transmission link must be compromised. Therefore, if an a priori link and channel signature has been established at the receiver, then an unauthorized intervention is possible to be detected, reported and counteracted. In this paper we provide an analysis of the link and channel parameters that affect the signal performance, which also constitute the identification signature of the optical channel. When the medium is compromised, the channel parameters are affected and thus the channel performance. We also develop a model and we simulate conditions of channel attack
Network security has traditionally been limited to network access and network administration, whereas data security is left to end clients where text is encrypted and decrypted. In the last decade, there has been a rapid increase in bandwidth demand mainly due to the explosion of the Internet and mobile telephony. The explosive bandwidth has been comfortably met with optical networks having many optical channels multiplexed in the same fiber, known as wavelength division multiplexing,. Data rate exceeding 1 Tbps within a fiber implies that there are tributaries that carry sensitive and proprietary data. Although data are encrypted by the end client, there is no assurance that, if captured by an eavesdropper, they may not be decrypted. Therefore, three new requirements emerge; monitor the optical link integrity, detect if an optical channel is compromised by tapping the fiber, and adopt a countermeasure strategy. One way to accomplish this is to monitor the channel performance parameters for changes in real-time. In this paper, we analyze key performance parameters of the optical signal, we describe how these parameters impact the channel performance. In addition, we develop a method to estimate in real-time the bit error rate and signal to noise ratio, and how these can be used to detect fiber intrusion. Finally, we develop a countermeasure protocol that we believe outsmarts the eavesdropper.