Privacy and security is of increasing concern in wireless, wired, Internet and optical communication networks. Modern optical communication networks, known as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), transport aggregate traffic per single mode fiber has exceeded Tbps. When massive amounts of information are transported, the issue of privacy and security becomes important not only on the client data application layer but also on the node management as well as the physical layer. In optical networks, fiber links are many kilometers long and thus there are many opportunities for sophisticated eavesdroppers to tap the fiber, copy a channel, isolate a specific payload and attempt to decrypt it if the encryption key is known or is breakable with a fast computer. In this paper, we present a novel WDM link security methodology that borrows certain concepts of the double DNA helix and we call it DNA-inspired; it encrypts multiple channels randomly with multiple keys to render channel monitoring by eavesdroppers virtually impossible. We also discuss source authentication, sensing of fiber tapping as well as sensing data-mimicking by intruders.
Privacy and security is of increasing concern in wireless, wired, Internet and optical communication networks. Modern optical communication networks, known as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), transport aggregate traffic per single mode fiber has exceeded Tbps. When massive amounts of information are transported, the issue of privacy and security becomes important not only on the client data application layer but also on the node management as well as the physical layer. In optical networks, fiber links are many kilometers long and thus there are many opportunities for sophisticated eavesdroppers to tap the fiber, copy a channel, isolate a specific payload and attempt to decrypt it if the encryption key is known or is breakable with a fast computer. In this paper, we present a novel WDM link security methodology that borrows certain concepts of the double DNA helix and we call it DNA-inspired; it encrypts multiple channels randomly with multiple keys to render channel monitoring by eavesdroppers virtually impossible. We also discuss source authentication, sensing of fiber tapping as well as sensing data-mimicking by intruders.
In telecommunication networks and in computer grid networks, a significant ongoing research is in a technology known as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), which is capable to transport more than 1 Tbps aggregate traffic over a single fiber. However, when massive amounts of information are transported, as in optical networks, there are three issues that stand, cost-efficient ultra-high bandwidth delivery, security of information and data, and security of the network and of the transporting link layer. In optical networks, each fiber link consists of segments, each several kilometers long. Since a single WDM channel carries traffic, there are opportunities for sophisticated eavesdroppers to tap the fiber, copy a channel, isolate a specific payload and attempt to decrypt it if the encryption key is known or it is breakable with a fast computer. Therefore, end-to-end data security should not only rely on the client's encryption method but also on securing the transmission method on the optical link. In this paper, we present a WDM link security methodology that encrypts multiple channels and with multiple keys to render channel monitoring by eavesdroppers virtually impossible. Although our paper presents the applicability of the method on a point-to-point topology, it is applicable to a multilink and edge-to-edge network path.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) is a photonic technology capable to transport over a single fiber more than a Tbit/s aggregate traffic. Currently, WDM is the only deployed method in transcontinental and transoceanic applications. In the optical network, each fiber link consists of segments, each several kilometers long, the connecting points of which are amenable to tapping. When a small amount of optical signal is extracted from a tap, when the signal is properly amplified it can be monitored by unauthorized personnel thus threatening communications and land-security. Since each WDM channel carries traffic from one customer, it is not difficult for the connoisseur to demultiplex a specific channel, isolate a specific payload and break the encrypted datagram. Therefore, in addition to data encryption, high-speed communications security should also rely on securing the optical links. In this paper, we present a WDM link security method that, even if fiber is tapped, constitutes channel monitoring and information decrypting by an eavesdropper or unauthorized personnel virtually impossible. In addition, we describe the circuit building blocks behind the method that makes eavesdropping impossible.
Dense wavelength division multiplexing optical networks transport a huge aggregate traffic exceeding Tbps per single fiber, and passive optical network technology has been extended to include the residential and enterprise network layer with fiber-to-the premises. Because this network allows for multimedia and extremely high data rates to end-users, optical communications security is important not only on the client and the node management layers, but also on the physical layer. Thus, cyber-security becomes also important in optical networks, including unbreakable cipher keys, cipher key distribution, identification of malicious actors, source authentication, physical link signature, and countermeasure strategies. In this paper we overview the security of the WDM optical network. We discuss advanced cryptographic methods that stem from quantum mechanics, known as quantum cryptography, and we identify specific vulnerabilities. We also look into the security of the next-generation optical network.
The secure transport of messages was the concern of many early civilizations. Since then, different methods have been developed to assure that only the sender and the addressee would be able to read a message, while it would be illegible or without significant meaning to a third party. Today, this practice continues with more fervor. Wireless, wired, and optical communication networks are able to transport unimaginable amounts of data and thus privacy of information and security of the network are of the utmost concern because a good part of the transported information may be very sensitive and/or confidential. Confidentiality of information has been particularly popularized with the explosive growth of the Internet, which has touched most people's lives. However, from the outset, the Internet was based on open network architecture with computer-based nodes and without network security, and thus was vulnerable to attackers and hackers. Wireless networks transmit in unguarded space and thus are also subject to malicious actors. Dense wavelength-division multiplexing (DWDM) optical networks transport a massive aggregate traffic that has exceeded terabits per second per single fiber; therefore, the issues of information privacy and network security are equally important. As a result, the development of unbreakable cipher keys, cipher-key distribution, identification of malicious actors, source authentication, physical-link signature identification, countermeasures, and so forth has been the major thrust of research efforts with regard to cyber-security. This article focuses on cryptography, and is the first of a series of three articles on cryptography and security in communications. Subsequent articles will cover wireless and IP network security, as well as optical network security, quantum cryptography, and quantum-key distribution processes specific to optical networks.
Network security concerns have recently been increased due to the vast amount of information that flows in a single fiber. At the application layer, data security relies on end-user encryption algorithms, many of which are known to be vulnerable, and authentication algorithms are not foolproof as the sophistication of eavesdroppers and unauthorized bad actors increases. As a result, the communications link may be attacked by eavesdroppers to access data, to mimic the source, or to cause service denial. To accomplish this however, the transmission link must be compromised. Therefore, if an a priori link and channel signature has been established at the receiver, then an unauthorized intervention is possible to be detected, reported and counteracted. In this paper we provide an analysis of the link and channel parameters that affect the signal performance, which also constitute the identification signature of the optical channel. When the medium is compromised, the channel parameters are affected and thus the channel performance. We also develop a model and we simulate conditions of channel attack
Security in optical communications has been recently a concern due primarily of the vast amount and the sensitivity of information that a single fiber carries. It is generally accepted that data security is encrypted by the end-user and that the optical network is not easy to tap as it was with wired networks. However, the sophistication of eavesdroppers has increased and if an optical link is accessed, then the encryption code of data can be broken with the use of supercomputers. In addition to data eavesdropping, eavesdroppers may access the link for malicious attacks, or for transmitting erroneous data by mimicking a source. Therefore, it is important that the receiver has the means and intelligence to recognize the signature of the source and the optical channel so that when the link is tapped, the receiver recognizes it and it alerts the network management or it triggers a data rerouting process. In fact, an optical channel, including source, fiber and optical components, has its own optical parameters that constitute a signature. These parameters are the result of linear and non-linear phenomena that affect the quality characteristics of the optical signal and which can not be mimicked. Therefore, the understanding of optical parameters that define the optical channel signature is very critical. In this paper we provide an analysis of the factors affecting the signal quality and thus they constitute the signature of the optical channel, we model the optical channel and demonstrate via simulations that small parametric variation affect the signature of the channel. As a result, monitoring the signal parameters leads to source and channel authentication whereas detecting the parametric variability of channel deducts channel degradation or tapping.