This paper presents a comprehensive treatement of the problem of measurement in microscopic physics, consistent with the indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and information theory. It is pointed out that there are serious difficulties in reconciling the deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics, based on the concepts of a universal wave function or hidden variables, with the principle of contiguity. Quantum mechanics is reformulated entirely in terms of observables, represented by matrices, including the statistical matrix, and the utility of information theory is illustrated by a discussion of the EPR paradox. The principle of contiguity is satisfied by all conserved quantities. A theory of the operation of macroscopic measuring devices is given in the interaction repesentation, and the attenuation of the indeterminacy of a microscopic observable in the process of measurement is related to observable changes of entropy.
This paper presents a comprehensive treatement of the problem of measurement in microscopic physics, consistent with the indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and information theory. It is pointed out that there are serious difficulties in reconciling the deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics, based on the concepts of a universal wave function or hidden variables, with the principle of contiguity. Quantum mechanics is reformulated entirely in terms of observables, represented by matrices, including the statistical matrix, and the utility of information theory is illustrated by a discussion of the EPR paradox. The principle of contiguity is satisfied by all conserved quantities. A theory of the operation of macroscopic measuring devices is given in the interaction repesentation, and the attenuation of the indeterminacy of a microscopic observable in the process of measurement is related to observable changes of entropy.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is investigated from a philosophical point of view. It is justified the opinion that the philosophical attitude the Copenhagen interpretation is based on is in principle inevitable for a real comprehension of quantum theory. This attitude is mainly related to epistemological arguments. However, the measurement problem often seems not to be treated clearly enough within the interpretation. By referring to the property of the necessity to use macroscopic measurement instruments obeying classical concepts it is made the attempt to solve the measurement problem. According to this consideration the indeterministic character of quantum theory seems to have its origin in a lack of knowledge and thus it appears in a similar but more principle way than in statistical mechanics. It is emphasized the ontological character of the uncertainty relation and the related non locality of quantum theory suggesting that the existence of a position space is not as fundamental as the assumptions of general quantum theory.
The present paper contains a new attack on the measurement problem. The point of departure is a realist view according to which i) state functions in quantum theory describe physical states of affairs and not information states attributed to observers, and ii) in theses states, some observables are indeterminate and not merely unknown, i.e., value determinism is rejected. Furthermore, quantisation of interaction is accepted as an empirically established fact, independently of any interpretations of quantum theory. From these assumptions it follows that Hermitian operators replacing classical variables may be viewed as representing actions from the environment done on physical systems represented by the state functions upon which the operators operate. Sometimes this influence is followed by a discontinuous, indeterministic and irreversible state change; in other words, the system undergoes a collapse, which is represented by a projection operator. Thus, assuming a realistic view on quantum states and their changes, we have an explanation for the collapse of the wave function. Since the collapse is a discontinuous, random and irreversible state change, the classical form of physical explanation in terms of a mechanism which describes how a system continuously changes its state is impossible. Hence, if we accept quantisation of interaction, we must give up our demand for a ordinary mechanical explanation for the collapse. Neither can we state, in advance, sufficient conditions for the collapse, since it is an indeterministic theory.
In this paper, we shall show how the theory of measurements is to be understood from the point of view of a physical interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of "hidden" variables, developed in a previous paper. We find that in principle, these "hidden" variables determine the precise results of each individual measurement process. In practice, however, in measurements that we now know how to carry out, the observing apparatus disturbs the observed system in an unpredictable and uncontrollable way, so that the uncertainty principle is obtained as a practical limitation on the possible precision of measurements. This limitation is not, however, inherent in the conceptual structure of our interpretation. We shall see, for example, that simultaneous measurements of position and momentum having unlimited precision would in principle be possible if, as suggested in the previous paper, the mathematical formulation of the quantum theory needs to be modified at very short distances in certain ways that are consistent with our interpretation but not with the usual interpretation.We give a simple explanation of the origin of quantum-mechanical correlations of distant objects in the hypothetical experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, which was suggested by these authors as a criticism of the usual interpretation.Finally, we show that von Neumann's proof that quantum theory is not consistent with hidden variables does not apply to our interpretation, because the hidden variables contemplated here depend both on the state of the measuring apparatus and the observed system and therefore go beyond certain of von Neumann's assumptions.In two appendixes, we treat the problem of the electromagnetic field in our interpretation and answer certain additional objections which have arisen in the attempt to give a precise description for an individual system at the quantum level.
This chapter presents the measurement problem from the point of view of the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. Everything physicists measure is measured in a thermal environment, for which statistical thermodynamics is relevant. The thermal interpretation agrees with how one interprets measurements in thermodynamics, the macroscopic part of quantum physics, derived via statistical mechanics. By its very construction, the thermal interpretation naturally matches the classical properties of our quantum world: The thermal interpretation assigns states-and a realistic interpretation for them-to individual quantum systems, in a way that large quantum systems are naturally described by classical observables. Since measurement devices are large quantum systems, this is the key to solving the measurement problem. We discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. Since quantum physics makes many deterministic predictions, for example regarding observed spectra, but also assertions about probabilities, we distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements. To clarify the meaning of the concept of measurement, we postulate (in Section 11.1) a measurement principle that defines what it means in the thermal interpretation to measure a quantity with a specified uncertainty. This turns the measurement problem from a philosophical riddle into a scientific problem in the domain of quantum statistical mechanics, namely how the quantum dynamics correlates macroscopic readings from an instrument with properties of the state of a measured microscopic system. The essence of scientific practice is the reproducibility of measurements, discussed in Section 11.2. Unlike in traditional interpretations, single, nonreproducible observations do not count as measurements, since this would violate the reproducibility of measurements-the essence of scientific practice. As a consequence, the measurement of a Hermitian quantity A is regarded as giving an uncertain value approximating the q-expectation {A} rather than (as tradition wanted to have it) as an exact revelation of an eigenvalue of A. This difference is most conspicuous in the interpretation of single discrete microscopic events. Except in very special circumstances, these are not reproducible. Thus, they have no scientific value in themselves and do not constitute measurement results. Scientific value is, however, in ensembles of such observations, which result in approximate measurements of q-probabilities and q-expectations. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements, depending on whether a single observation is reproducible, and discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. How to measure the q-probabilities of events, described in terms of POVMs, is discussed in Section 11.5. Section 11.6 poses the measurement problem as a problem of the statistical mechanics of measurement devices, and discuss recent work by Allahverdyan, Balian, and Nieuwenhuizen on its resolution. Section 11.7 discusses the problem how, in the thermal interpretation, discrete events can arise, although qexpectations are by their very nature continuous. This is resolved by pointing to work by Breuer and Petruccione on piecewise deterministic processes (PDP). Section 11.8 sheds additional light on the origin of discrete events by an analysis of the role dissipative bistability plays in obtaining discreteness in classical physics.
In the well known Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum mechanics, advocated by N. Bohr, the physical objects and the experimental results can be described only in a macroscopic language, leaving any possible microscopic description as unspeakable. This point of view has been deepened by C. Rovelli in the relational interpretation of Quantum mechanics. Most of the alternative interpretations, which try a detailed microscopic description of physical phenomena and of their evolution, have in common the explicit introduction of the wave function as the basic element of the theory. These interpretations require the notion of quantum state as the fundamental concept of the theory, which is the typical unspeakable physical element according to the Copenhagen interpretation. The two basic physical entities are intimately bound together by the integrity of the wave function. These interpretations are usually indicated as realistic. It is well known that the use of the wave function and its time evolution in the description of the physical processes leads unavoidably to some difficulties or so-called paradoxes. The measurement problem is at the center of these difficulties, mainly because it requires the introduction of the reduction process of the wave function, which is not included explicitly within the mathematical formalism of Quantum Mechanics. In this paper we build up and propose a model which goes beyond the standard formalism and which is able to solve the measurement problem and all the other difficulties which, in a way or in another, are related to it.
Quantum mechanics is an immensely successful theory, occupying a unique position in the history of science. It has solved mysteries ranging from macroscopic superconductivity to the microscopic theory of elementary particles and has provided deep insights into the nature of vacuum on the one hand and the description of the nucleon on the other. Whole new fields such as quantum optics and quantum electronics owe their very existence to this body of knowledge. However, despite the stunning successes of quantum mechanics, there is no general agreement on the conceptual foundations and interpretation of the subject. The theory provides unambiguous information about the outcome of a measurement of a physical object. However, many feel that it does not provide a satisfactory answer to the nature of the “reality” we should attribute to the physical objects between the acts of measurement. The conceptual difficulty comes about because the wave function |ψ〉 is usually given by a coherent superposition of various distinguishable experimental outcomes. If we denote the collection of states that represent the possible outcomes of an experiment by |ψ j 〉, then |ψ〉 = ∑ j c j |ψ j 〉 where c j = 〈ψ j |ψ〉. The probability of the outcome |ψ j 〉 is P j =|c j | 2 . In the process of measurement, the so called collapse of the wave function takes place and a single, definite state |ψ i 〉 of the physical object is chosen. The difficulty comes about in the interpretation of the mechanism by which this definite state is chosen from amongst all the possible outcomes.