Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

International Conference on Management of e-Commerce and e-Government

An Improved Provably Secure Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Yang Li, Jianming Zhu, Wei Zhang, Yang Xin

Published Oct 1, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We revisit the identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Wang et al. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for practical applications except being vulnerable to Intermediate results leakage (IRL) and Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack. We propose an improved protocol following the Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR-1) scheme to ensure the signature change every time. We also prove it to be secure in the strengthened extended Canetti -- Krawczyk (seCK) model provides better support for adversary's query than previous. In addition, the improved protocol also has an advantage over most existing protocols on security and efficiency.

DOI
10.1109/icmecg.2014.29

Related papers

RYY ++ : A Novel Provably Secure Identity‐Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Yang Li, Jianming Zhu, Ning Zhang +2 more

Based on revisiting the RYY+ Identitybased (ID-Based) key agreement protocol, we find it’s vulnerable to Intermediate results leakage (IRL) and Keycompromise impersonation (KCI) attack. A novel protocol called RYY++ is proposed to make up for its deficiencies. Our protocol follows the Full dual exponential challenge response (FDCR-1) scheme to ensure the signature change every time, so the master public key of Private key generator (PKG) joined in signature generation can guarantee two parties trust each other. The RYY++ protocol is also proven to be secure in the Strengthened extended Canetti– Krawczyk (SeCK) model which provides better support for adversary’s query and has an advantage over most existing protocols on security and efficiency.

Chinese Journal of Electronics•Apr 1, 2015•2 citations

Provably secure identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol and its application

Shuai Shao, Bin Tian, Xin Wang +1 more

We point out the RYY+ identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol is vulnerable to Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack and Intermediate results leakage (IRL) attack. Then we give the improved protocol which provides KCI and IRL resistance. The novel protocol is provably secure under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the seCK model, which enhances the adversary's queries comparing with previous ID based AKE models. The proposed scheme also has an advantage over most previous schemes on security and efficiency.

IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing and Intelligence Systems (CCIS)•Oct 1, 2012•0 citations

Security-provable Identity-based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Yafei Wang

Most Identity-based Authenticated Key Agreement(ID-AKA) protocols have poor performance on security and the efficiency.To solve this problem,this paper presents an improved ID-AKA protocol.Security proof with the modular approach in the mBR model is provided,which means the new protocol satisfies perfect forward security,PKG forward security,resistant to key-compromise impersonation.Furthermore,the new protocol can satisfy resistance to leakage of ephemeral secrets.Compared with previous ID-AKA protocols which can satisfy the same security properties,the new protocol has higher efficiency.

Jisuanji gongcheng•Jan 1, 2012•0 citations

Security Proof for the Improved Ryu-Yoon-Yoo Identity-Based Key Agreement Protocol.

Shengbao Wang, Zhenfu Cao, Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo +1 more

Abstract. Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. The protocol design is, however, extremely error-prone as evidenced by the iterative process of fixing discovered attacks on published protocols. We revisit an efficient identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Ryu, Yoon and Yoo. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for real-world applications despite offering no resilience against key-compromise impersonation (K-CI). We then show that the protocol is, in fact, insecure against reflection attacks. A slight modification to the protocol is proposed, which results in significant benefits for the security of the protocol without compromising on its efficiency. Finally, we prove the improved protocol secure in a widely accepted model.

•Jan 1, 2008•3 citations

On the Security of Wang's Provably Secure Identity-based Key Agreement Protocol

Maurizio Adriano Strangio

In a 2005 IACR report, Wang published an efficient identity-based key agreement protocol (IDAK) suitable for resource constrained devices. The author shows that the IDAK key agreement protocol is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model with random oracles and also provides separate ad-hoc security proofs claiming that the IDAK protocol is not vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation attacks and also enjoys Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In this report, we review the security properties of the protocol and point out that it is vulnerable to Unknown Key Share attacks. Although such attacks are often difficult to setup in a real world environment they are nevertheless interesting from a theoretical point of view so we provide a version of the protocol that fixes the problem in a standard way. We also provide a security proof of the IDAK protocol based on the Gap Bilinear Diffie Hellman and random oracle assumptions in the stronger extended Canetti-Krawczyk security model of distributed computing.

arXiv:1312.4363•Dec 16, 2013•0 citations

A strongly secure identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol without pairings under the GDH assumption

Haiyan Sun, Qiaoyan Wen, Hua Zhang +1 more

Among the existing identity-based authenticated key agreement ID-AKA protocols, there are only a few of them that can resist to leakage of ephemeral secret keys, which is about the protection of the session secret key after the ephemeral secret keys of users are compromised. However, all these ID-AKA protocols with leakage of ephemeral secret keys resistance require expensive bilinear pairing operations. In this paper, we present a pairing-free ID-AKA protocol with ephemeral secrets leakage resistance. We also provide a full proof of its security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, which not only can capture resistance to leakage of ephemeral secret keys but also can capture other basic security properties such as master key forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance. Compared with the existing ID-AKA protocols, our scheme is a good trade-off between security and efficiency. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Security and Communication Networks•Mar 23, 2015•19 citations
We revisit the identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Wang et al. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for practical applications except being vulnerable to Intermediate results leakage (IRL) and Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack. We propose an improved protocol following the Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR-1) scheme to ensure the signature change every time. We also prove it to be secure in the strengthened extended Canetti -- Krawczyk (seCK) model provides better support for adversary's query than previous. In addition, the improved protocol also has an advantage over most existing protocols on security and efficiency.
Based on revisiting the RYY+ Identitybased (ID-Based) key agreement protocol, we find it’s vulnerable to Intermediate results leakage (IRL) and Keycompromise impersonation (KCI) attack. A novel protocol called RYY++ is proposed to make up for its deficiencies. Our protocol follows the Full dual exponential challenge response (FDCR-1) scheme to ensure the signature change every time, so the master public key of Private key generator (PKG) joined in signature generation can guarantee two parties trust each other. The RYY++ protocol is also proven to be secure in the Strengthened extended Canetti– Krawczyk (SeCK) model which provides better support for adversary’s query and has an advantage over most existing protocols on security and efficiency.
We point out the RYY+ identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol is vulnerable to Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack and Intermediate results leakage (IRL) attack. Then we give the improved protocol which provides KCI and IRL resistance. The novel protocol is provably secure under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the seCK model, which enhances the adversary's queries comparing with previous ID based AKE models. The proposed scheme also has an advantage over most previous schemes on security and efficiency.
Most Identity-based Authenticated Key Agreement(ID-AKA) protocols have poor performance on security and the efficiency.To solve this problem,this paper presents an improved ID-AKA protocol.Security proof with the modular approach in the mBR model is provided,which means the new protocol satisfies perfect forward security,PKG forward security,resistant to key-compromise impersonation.Furthermore,the new protocol can satisfy resistance to leakage of ephemeral secrets.Compared with previous ID-AKA protocols which can satisfy the same security properties,the new protocol has higher efficiency.
Abstract. Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. The protocol design is, however, extremely error-prone as evidenced by the iterative process of fixing discovered attacks on published protocols. We revisit an efficient identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Ryu, Yoon and Yoo. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for real-world applications despite offering no resilience against key-compromise impersonation (K-CI). We then show that the protocol is, in fact, insecure against reflection attacks. A slight modification to the protocol is proposed, which results in significant benefits for the security of the protocol without compromising on its efficiency. Finally, we prove the improved protocol secure in a widely accepted model.
In a 2005 IACR report, Wang published an efficient identity-based key agreement protocol (IDAK) suitable for resource constrained devices. The author shows that the IDAK key agreement protocol is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model with random oracles and also provides separate ad-hoc security proofs claiming that the IDAK protocol is not vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation attacks and also enjoys Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In this report, we review the security properties of the protocol and point out that it is vulnerable to Unknown Key Share attacks. Although such attacks are often difficult to setup in a real world environment they are nevertheless interesting from a theoretical point of view so we provide a version of the protocol that fixes the problem in a standard way. We also provide a security proof of the IDAK protocol based on the Gap Bilinear Diffie Hellman and random oracle assumptions in the stronger extended Canetti-Krawczyk security model of distributed computing.
Among the existing identity-based authenticated key agreement ID-AKA protocols, there are only a few of them that can resist to leakage of ephemeral secret keys, which is about the protection of the session secret key after the ephemeral secret keys of users are compromised. However, all these ID-AKA protocols with leakage of ephemeral secret keys resistance require expensive bilinear pairing operations. In this paper, we present a pairing-free ID-AKA protocol with ephemeral secrets leakage resistance. We also provide a full proof of its security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, which not only can capture resistance to leakage of ephemeral secret keys but also can capture other basic security properties such as master key forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance. Compared with the existing ID-AKA protocols, our scheme is a good trade-off between security and efficiency. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.