Special relativity and realism in quantum physics

Jay Newman

Huang Zheng-xin

In this paper some recent experimental progress in testing non-local is summarized, and the physical connotation of the word realism in experimental tests of Bell's and Leggett's inequalities is presented. It is pointed out that the conflict between quantum mechanics and special relativity (and the existence of EPR correlation) has nothing to do with in metaphysics, and that the word realism in experimental tests of Bell's and Leggett's inequalities does not directly equate with in metaphysics.

Adam Bednorz

Abstract Local realism is in conflict with special quantum Bell-type models. Recently, several experiments have demonstrated violation of local realism if we trust their setup assuming special relativity valid. In this paper we question the assumption of relativity, point out not commented anomalies and show that the experiments have not closed objectivity loophole because clonability of the result has not been demonstrated. We propose several improvements in further experimental tests of local realism make the violation more convincing.

Euan J. Squires

Tenzin Trepp

We challenge the common view that relativity and quantum formalisms compel a static block-universe ontology. Instead, we show that Existential Realism (ER) – can be formulated as an ontological extension of the specific physical models studied here, leaving empirical predictions unchanged so long as the added ER structure remains empirically idle. First, we clarify that the mathematical formalism of physics is neutral: one can impose a preferred foliation or an existence predicate without changing the equations. Second, we explicitly construct ER-compatible models for Minkowski spacetime (special relativity) and a finite-dimensional quantum system. In these Minkowski-spacetime and finite-dimensional quantum toy models, we show that the standard relativistic dynamical laws, Born-rule calculations, and unitary evolution between measurements are preserved, while the ER additions remain extra ontological structure. More precisely, we have constructed models that are empirically equivalent and dynamically identical while differing in their ontological assignments, thereby demonstrating underdetermination in a model-theoretic sense. We conclude that relativity and quantum theory, in the model presented here, do not logically force eternalism, leaving ER as a viable alternative ontology.

Y. S. Kim, Marilyn E. Noz