The human mind understands logical processes and causality and formulates theories based on logical descriptions of empirical evidence. The Principles of Causal Conspiracy is based on defining information as logical charges similar to electric charges. Such information charges can be modeled in the vacuum of a quantum probability firmament as symmetry of quantum charges with a zero net charge. Observation of a state lifts one of these charges in a Möbius transformation from a multipolar field of possibilities that maximizes a local monopole field that is observable. In the first of several papers, I introduce new and profound principles, the Principles of Causal Conspiracy, to provide a consistent epistemology for quantum theory, relativity theory and all the known sciences.
The human mind understands logical processes and causality and formulates theories based on logical descriptions of empirical evidence. The Principles of Causal Conspiracy is based on defining information as logical charges similar to electric charges. Such information charges can be modeled in the vacuum of a quantum probability firmament as symmetry of quantum charges with a zero net charge. Observation of a state lifts one of these charges in a Möbius transformation from a multipolar field of possibilities that maximizes a local monopole field that is observable. In the first of several papers, I introduce new and profound principles, the Principles of Causal Conspiracy, to provide a consistent epistemology for quantum theory, relativity theory and all the known sciences.
It has long been recognized that a local hidden variable theory of quantum mechanics can in principle be constructed, provided one is willing to countenance pre-measurement correlations between the properties of measured systems and measuring devices. However, this ‘conspiratorial’ approach is typically dismissed out of hand. In this article I examine the justification for dismissing conspiracy theories of quantum mechanics. I consider the existing arguments against such theories, and find them to be less than conclusive. I suggest a more powerful argument against the leading strategy for constructing a conspiracy theory. Finally, I outline two alternative strategies for constructing conspiracy theories, both of which are immune to these arguments, but require one to either modify or reject the common cause principle. 1. Introduction 2. The incompleteness of quantum mechanics 3. Hidden variables 4. Hidden mechanism conspiracy theories 5. Existing arguments against hidden mechanisms 6. A new argument against hidden mechanisms 7. Backwards-causal conspiracy theories 8. Acausal conspiracy theories 9. Conclusion
In this chapter we introduce the postulate of causality, and derive the mathematical structure of a causal OPT. We show how the present definition of causality is equivalent to the Einsteinian one, and argue that it is the only possible notion once it is stripped from its spurious deterministic connotation. In addition, the notion of causality used here is compliant with the historical philosophical concept since David Hume, and with the idea used in common reasoning, inference, and modeling in human sciences. In brief, the present notion of causality can be stated as the requirement of no signaling from the future . This is also the only requisite for an OPT in order to satisfy the principle of no signaling without interaction . In mathematical terms in an OPT the causality postulate is equivalent to the uniqueness of the deterministic effect, which in turn is equivalent to the ability to normalize states. The notion of causality is so naturally embedded in our understanding of reality that it often remains unconsciously implicit in foundational research, even in recent axiomatizations. Causality: From Cinderella to Principle Causality has been the object of a very extensive literature encompassing hundreds of books and technical articles in a wide spectrum of disciplines, ranging from pure philosophy to economics, law, natural sciences, and obviously, physics. Also due to its involvement in such heterogeneous blend of disciplines, causality has long been a vexed notion. Perhaps the most natural connection between concepts of causality in different branches of knowledge is the one at the borderline between physics and philosophy, since the early work of Aristotle, up to the cornerstone of Renée Descartes, who broke the ground for the modern view of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, through to contemporary works on physical causation. Causality has always remained in the realm of philosophy, staying only in the background of physics, without the status of a “law” or the rank of a “principle.” Most of the time causality creeps into physical theories in the form of ad hoc assumptions based on empirical evidences, as when we discard advanced potentials in electrodynamics or when we motivate the Kramers–Kronig relations. In other cases, causality is embodied in the “interpretation” of the theory, as for the Special Relativity of Einstein.
How is mind related to matter? This ancient question in philosophy is rapidly becoming a core problem in science, perhaps the most important of all because it probes the essential nature of man himself. The origin of the problem is a conflict between the mechanical conception of human beings that arises from the precepts of classical physical theory and the very different idea that arises from our intuition: the former reduces each of us to an automaton, while the latter allows our thoughts to guide our actions. The dominant contemporary approaches to the problem attempt to resolve this conflict by clinging to the classical concepts, and trying to explain away our misleading intuition. But a detailed argument given here shows why, in a scientific approach to this problem, it is necessary to use the more basic principles of quantum physics, which bring the observer into the dynamics, rather than to accept classical precepts that are profoundly incorrect precisely at the crucial point of the role of human consciousness in the dynamics of human brains. Adherence to the quantum principles yields a dynamical theory of the mind/brain/body system that is in close accord with our intuitive idea of what we are. In particular, the need for a self-observing quantum system to pose certain questions creates a causal opening that allows mind/brain dynamics to have three distinguishable but interlocked causal processes, one micro-local, one stochastic, and the third experiential. Passing to the classical limit in which the critical difference between zero and the finite actual value of Planck's constant is ignored not only eliminates the chemical processes that are absolutely crucial to the functioning of actual brains, it simultaneously blinds the resulting theoretical construct to the physical fine structure wherein the effect of mind on matter lies: the use of this limit in this context is totally unjustified from a physics perspective.
Western philosophy and science have a strongly dualistic tradition regarding the mental and physical aspects of reality, which makes it difficult to understand their possible causal relations. In recent debates in cognitive neuroscience it has been common to claim on the basis of neural experiments that conscious experiences are causally inefficacious. At the same time there is much evidence that consciousness does play an important role in guiding behavior. The author explores whether a new way of understanding the causal role of mental states and consciousness could be provided by the ontological interpretation of the quantum theory (Bohm and Hiley, Phys. Rep. 144:323–348, 1987; Bohm and Hiley, The undivided universe: An ontological interpretation of quantum theory. Routledge: London, 1993). This interpretation radically changes our notion of matter by suggesting that a new type of active information plays a causal role at the quantum level of reality. The author thus considers to what extent the alleged causal powers of consciousness involve information, and then moves on to consider whether information in (conscious) mental states can be connected to the information at the level of quantum physics. In this way he sketches how quantum theory might help to throw light upon one of the grand challenges facing the social sciences and the humanities, namely the question of whether consciousness plays any genuine causal role in the physical world.
Quantum theory describes our universe incredibly successfully. To our classically-inclined brains, however, it is a bizarre description that requires a reimagining of what fundamental reality, or “ontology”, could look like. This thesis examines different ontological features in light of the success of quantum theory, what it requires, and what it rules out. While these investigations are primarily foundational, they also have relevance to quantum information, quantum communication, and experiments on quantum systems. The way that quantum theory describes the state of a system is one of its most unintuitive features. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether a similarly strange description of states is required on an ontological level. This thesis proves that almost all quantum superposition states for d > 3 dimensions must be real—that is, present in the ontology in a well-defined sense. This is a strong requirement which prevents intuitive explanations of the many quantum phenomena which are based on superpositions. A new theorem is also presented showing that quantum theory is incompatible with macro-realist ontologies, where certain physical quantities must always have definite values. This improves on the Leggett-Garg argument, which also aims to prove incompatibility with macro-realism but contains loopholes. Variations on both of these results that are error-tolerant (and therefore amenable to experimentation) are presented, as well as numerous related theorems showing that the ontology of quantum states must be somewhat similar to the quantum states themselves in various specific ways. Extending these same methods to quantum communication, a simple proof is found showing that an exponential number of classical bits are required to communicate a linear number of qubits. That is, classical systems are exponentially bad at storing quantum data. Causal influences are another part of ontology where quantum theory demands a revision of our classical notions. This follows from the outcomes of Bell experiments, as rigorously shown in recent analyses. Here, the task of constructing a native quantum framework for reasoning about causal influences is tackled. This is done by first analysing the simple example of a common cause, from which a quantum version of Reichenbach’s principle is identified. This quantum principle relies on an identification of quantum conditional independence which can be defined in four ways, each naturally generalising a corresponding definition for classical conditional independence. Not only does this allow one to reason about common causes in a quantum experiments, but it can also be generalised to a full framework of quantum causal models (mirroring how classical causal models generalise Reichenbach’s principle). This new definition of quantum causal models is illustrated by examples and strengthened by it’s foundation on a robust quantum Reichenbach’s principle. An unusual, but surprisingly fruitful, setting for considering quantum ontology is found by considering time travel to the past. This provides a testbed for different ontological concepts in quantum theory and new ways to compare classical and quantum frameworks. It is especially useful for comparing computational properties. In particular, time travel introduces non-linearity to quantum theory, which brings (sometimes implicit) ontological assumptions to the fore while introducing strange new abilities. Here, a model for quantum time travel is presented which arguably has fewer objectionable features than previous attempts, while remaining similarly well-motivated. This model is discussed and compared with previous quantum models, as well as with the classical case. Together, these threads of investigation develop a better understanding of how quantum theory affects possible ontologies and how ontological prejudices influence quantum theory.
A key aim of quantum foundations is to characterize the sense in which nature goes beyond classical physics. Understanding nonclassicality is one of our best avenues towards finding a satisfactory interpretation of quantum theory. By determining which classical principles cannot be satisfied in any empirically adequate physical theory, we begin to see which principles can be preserved, which in turn gives us insight into the ontology of the world. These insights then guide us in determining which questions to ask and which experiments to perform next. Furthermore, it is these nonclassical aspects of nature that give rise to new technologies such as the speed-ups of quantum computation or the security of quantum key distribution. \n \nThe gold standard for establishing that a phenomenon is truly nonclassical is to prove that it violates the principle of local causality or the principle of noncontextuality. Much of this thesis reports on my research relating to these two principles. This research primarily involves (i) finding new justifications for our notions of nonclassicality; (ii) refining their fundamental definitions; (iii) quantifying and characterizing their various manifestations; and (iv) finding applications where nonclassical phenomena act as resources for information processing. \n \nUltimately, all of this work on nonclassicality is woven together into a novel framework for physical theories introduced by myself, John Selby, and Rob Spekkens. Its main advantage over preexisting frameworks is that it maintains a clear distinction between which elements of a given physical theory directly describe causal processes, and which refer only to one’s inferences about causal processes. This clarifies a number of confusions in the literature which arose precisely because previous frameworks scrambled causal and inferential concepts. Furthermore, local causality and noncontextuality emerge in this framework as the assumptions that the causal and inferential structures (respectively) that are operationally observed must be respected in the underlying ontology. This work constitutes a first step in developing a new interpretation of quantum theory—the first interpretation designed to satisfy the spirit of both local causality and noncontextuality.