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Physics of Particles and Nuclei Letters

Simulation on quantum authentication

Miroslav Dobšíček

Published Mar 1, 2007• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper divides into two main parts. The first one discusses authentication of quantum messages. The protocol proposed in [1] for one qubit message-length case is especially considered. The protocol uses a shared EPR pair as a secret key. In the second part, it is shown how such a protocol can be simulated using the Quantum-Octave package. Quantum-Octave is a set of functions for a Matlab-like numerical environment allowing calculations with general density matrices.

DOI
10.1134/s1547477107020148

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This paper divides into two main parts. The first one discusses authentication of quantum messages. The protocol proposed in [1] for one qubit message-length case is especially considered. The protocol uses a shared EPR pair as a secret key. In the second part, it is shown how such a protocol can be simulated using the Quantum-Octave package. Quantum-Octave is a set of functions for a Matlab-like numerical environment allowing calculations with general density matrices.
Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m+s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m+O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.
Most of the quantum authentication protocols are used to authenticate quantum messages.In this paper, by using a pair of non-entangled qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed.In the pair of qubits, the first one is used to carry a bit message, and the second one is used as a tag to authenticate the classical message.In our protocol, a bit string instead of a sequence of maximally entangled states is used directly as an authentication key, so the authentication key can be easily stored offline.On the other hand, in our protocol, a unitary operation UA is chosen to encrypt the qubits so that the successful probability of all attacks analyzed is less than one.Our quantum authentication protocol is secure against various attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.
A quantum authentication protocol is presented in this paper. It is based on the correlations of the EPR(Einstain- Podolski-Rosen) pair which is a two-qubit system in one of the four Bell states. The two parties share a sequence of EPR pairs as the authentication key. To authenticate each other, they need to create auxiliary particles and make them interact with the authentication key. Then one can affirm the other's identity by performing the Bell states measure- ment. No one without the authentication key can pass the authentication process. So the protocol is secure. No clas- sical channel and classical information exchange is needed in the authentication process. After the authentication pro- cess, the authentication key can be turned into the origin state. So the authentication key can be reused.
This paper presents a simple, but efficient class of non-interactive protocols for quantum authentication of mmm-length clas sical messages. The message is encoded using a classical linear algebraic code C[n,m,t]C[n,m,t]C[n,m,t]. We assume that Alice and Bob share a classical secret key, xABx_{AB}xAB​, of nnn bits. Alice creates nnn qubits based on the code word and the key, that indicates the bases used to create each qubit. The quantum states are sent to Bob through a noiseless quantum channel. We calculate the failure probability of the protocol considering several types of attacks.
Abstract: In this paper we provide a quantum authentication protocol. The two parties share a sequence of EPR(Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) pairs as the authentication key. To authenticate each other, one party creates aux-iliary qubits and make them interact with the authentication key. After measurement in selected basis, he or she affirm the other’s identity. We shown that no one without the authentication key can pass the authentication process. So the protocol is secure. The authentication key is reusable if there are no eavesdroppers and errors in transmis-sion.
Classical and quantum message authentication protocols were studied. A classical message authenticated encryption protocol based on quantum one-way functions was proposed. It was demonstrated that the proposed protocol was not only a secure encryption scheme, but also a secure authentication scheme. Using the authenticated encryption protocol as a sub-protocol, a quantum message authentication scheme was addressed. Compared with the scheme addressed by BARNUM et al, this protocol economizes the keys shared between two communication parties. The security of the quantum message authentication scheme is also shown.