Classical and quantum message authentication protocols were studied. A classical message authenticated encryption protocol based on quantum one-way functions was proposed. It was demonstrated that the proposed protocol was not only a secure encryption scheme, but also a secure authentication scheme. Using the authenticated encryption protocol as a sub-protocol, a quantum message authentication scheme was addressed. Compared with the scheme addressed by BARNUM et al, this protocol economizes the keys shared between two communication parties. The security of the quantum message authentication scheme is also shown.
Classical and quantum message authentication protocols were studied. A classical message authenticated encryption protocol based on quantum one-way functions was proposed. It was demonstrated that the proposed protocol was not only a secure encryption scheme, but also a secure authentication scheme. Using the authenticated encryption protocol as a sub-protocol, a quantum message authentication scheme was addressed. Compared with the scheme addressed by BARNUM et al, this protocol economizes the keys shared between two communication parties. The security of the quantum message authentication scheme is also shown.
Privacy and authenticity are two main tasks for secure communication. In this paper, a quantum authenticated encryption scheme is proposed. This scheme is devised to encrypt and authenticate classical information using quantum states. We assume that Alice and Bob share a classical bits string y as their private key. Alice generates quantum cipher text and authentication tag using her secret key. Bob can decrypt and verify the authenticity of the received message. Security analysis shows that the proposed protocol is a computationally secure encryption and statistically secure authentication scheme.
Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m+s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m+O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.
Classical messages can be authenticated by traditional authentication protocols based on hash functions.The security of these protocols depends on long authentication keys, the selection of appropriate hash functions and some assumptions concerning the computational complexity of some algorithms.In this paper, by encoding the classical binary messages and binary keys as nonorthogonal quantum messages and nonorthogonal sets of states, respectively, and using quantum encrypting scheme, a new quantum authentication protocol is proposed.In our protocol, instead of entangled quantum states, the traditional binary bits, which can be easily saved, are encoded as quantum keys.Because the quantum messages are nonorthogonal, any forgery or measurement on the quantum messages will be detected with a certain probability.Our protocol allows the authentication of binary classical messages in a secure manner.
Message authentication is a cryptographic task that allows the receiver to reject a message that is forged or has been tampered with. A protocol to authenticate quantum messages was proposed by Barnum, Crépeau, Gottesman, Tapp, and Smith [1] and stand-alone security was proved. Here, we are concerned with universal composable security (which requires a protocol to be essentially indistinguishable from the ideal functionality and ensures overall security when the protocol is part of any larger scheme). We show that the protocol in [1] is universal composably secure, and that most of the required key can be reused with universal composable security.
In this review, we survey the cryptographic task of authentication from the perspective of quantum communication. We review three main flavours of authentication that are often conflated in the literature: authentication of classical messages, authentication of quantum messages, and entity authentication, also covering recent hardware-assisted approaches. We compare representative protocols for each functionality in terms of their security assumptions, set-up requirements, composability, and scalability in large or dynamic networks, and use these criteria to identify and recommend suitable candidates. Finally, applications are surveyed: we provide a detailed case study of authentication and quantum key distribution (QKD), then extend the discussion to protocols beyond QKD, where the role of authentication is more complex. Our take-home message is that an authentication requirement is not an intrinsic limitation of quantum networks: as with all secure communication, each protocol relies on a particular authentication resource, and the security claim of that protocol is meaningful only once the authentication resource and its deployment assumptions are made explicit. At the same time, the existing classical and quantum literature already offers a range of quantum-secure authentication schemes, which can support different applications when carefully matched to the required functionality, assumptions, and security guarantees.
Public-key cryptosystems for quantum messages are considered from two aspects: public-key encryption and public-key authentication. Firstly, we propose a general construction of quantum public-key encryption scheme, and then construct an information-theoretic secure instance. Then, we propose a quantum public-key authentication scheme, which can protect the integrity of quantum messages. This scheme can both encrypt and authenticate quantum messages. It is information-theoretic secure with regard to encryption, and the success probability of tampering decreases exponentially with the security parameter with regard to authentication. Compared with classical public-key cryptosystems, one private-key in our schemes corresponds to an exponential number of public-keys, and every quantum public-key used by the sender is an unknown quantum state to the sender.