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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics Letters

On the maximum admissible error and key compression degree in quantum cryptography on two nonorthogonal states

S. N. Molotkov

Published Jun 1, 2005• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The extreme admissible error probability at the receiving end to which the secure key distribution is possible has been found. This result takes into account all possible attacks on the distributed key, including those that involve large quantum memory and the capability of an eavesdropper to perform collective measurements simultaneously over the entire transmitted sequence of quantum states. The critical error is independent of the parameters of a particular attack and is determined only in terms of the overlapping degree ε = |〈u 1|u 0〉¦ of information states and the fundamental functions of classical and quantum information theories. The latter functions are the capacity H(Q) of a classical binary communication channel and classical capacity $$\bar C(\varepsilon )$$ of a binary quantum communication channel. The key compression degree after error correction is also expressed in terms of only the classical capacity $$\bar C(\varepsilon )$$ of the quantum communication channel.

DOI
10.1134/1.2029953

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The extreme admissible error probability at the receiving end to which the secure key distribution is possible has been found. This result takes into account all possible attacks on the distributed key, including those that involve large quantum memory and the capability of an eavesdropper to perform collective measurements simultaneously over the entire transmitted sequence of quantum states. The critical error is independent of the parameters of a particular attack and is determined only in terms of the overlapping degree ε = |〈u 1|u 0〉¦ of information states and the fundamental functions of classical and quantum information theories. The latter functions are the capacity H(Q) of a classical binary communication channel and classical capacity Cˉ(ε)\bar C(\varepsilon )Cˉ(ε) of a binary quantum communication channel. The key compression degree after error correction is also expressed in terms of only the classical capacity Cˉ(ε)\bar C(\varepsilon )Cˉ(ε) of the quantum communication channel.
An explicit attack on the distributed key is presented for the BB84 quantum cryptography protocol. In this attack, the theoretical maximum of the eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) information on the key is reached at the minimum possible error Q at the receiver end. Eve’s maximum information is reached in collective measurements, which are constructed in the explicit form and are performed by Eve at the very end of the protocol. The situation in the critical error range 11% < Q c < 15% is determined.
One of the basic results of classical information theory is that error-free information transmission is possible even through an imperfect binary communication channel with noise up to an error of Q c = 1/2. There is a fundamental and applied question of whether quantum-mechanical constraints can ensure error-free classical-information transmission with quantum states and, moreover, guarantee the security of distributed keys up to the theoretical limit in the error Q c. It has been shown that the secure key distribution is possible up to the error Q c in the asymptotic limit of a large number of bases.
An attempt to eavesdrop a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, both in the two-state B92 and the four-state BB84 quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently form other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are included. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob. This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.
In quantum cryptography, in addition to attacks on transmitted quantum states, states in side channels of information leakage can be detected. The security of keys in real quantum cryptography systems cannot be analyzed without the inclusion of information leakage through side channels. A quantum-mechanical method has been proposed in this work to take into account key information leakage through side channels. This method is based on the detection of side electromagnetic radiation, active probing of a phase modulator at the transmitter station, and re-emission of avalanche detectors at the receiver side. The method takes into account joint collective measurements of quantum states in all channels of information leakage and operates at any intensity and structure of states in side channels. The choice of special prolate spheroidal functions makes it possible to “match” the quantum and classical descriptions of signals in side channels. A relation has been found between information leakage and the fundamental Holevo quantity. A transparent and intuitively clear physical interpretation of the results has been given.