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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics Letters

On a collective attack on the key in quantum cryptography on two nonorthogonal states

S. N. Molotkov

Published Oct 1, 2004• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A “collective” attack on the key is considered, and its connection with the classical capacity of a quantum communication channel is analyzed. It has been shown that the allowable error probability for legitimate users to which the secure key can be extracted is less than half the value for “translucent” eavesdropping and individual measurements.

DOI
10.1134/1.1846120

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A “collective” attack on the key is considered, and its connection with the classical capacity of a quantum communication channel is analyzed. It has been shown that the allowable error probability for legitimate users to which the secure key can be extracted is less than half the value for “translucent” eavesdropping and individual measurements.
The extreme admissible error probability at the receiving end to which the secure key distribution is possible has been found. This result takes into account all possible attacks on the distributed key, including those that involve large quantum memory and the capability of an eavesdropper to perform collective measurements simultaneously over the entire transmitted sequence of quantum states. The critical error is independent of the parameters of a particular attack and is determined only in terms of the overlapping degree ε = |〈u 1|u 0〉¦ of information states and the fundamental functions of classical and quantum information theories. The latter functions are the capacity H(Q) of a classical binary communication channel and classical capacity Cˉ(ε)\bar C(\varepsilon )Cˉ(ε) of a binary quantum communication channel. The key compression degree after error correction is also expressed in terms of only the classical capacity Cˉ(ε)\bar C(\varepsilon )Cˉ(ε) of the quantum communication channel.
Quantum cryptography cannot prevent eavesdropping, but any eavesdropping attempt can be detected by the legitimate users of the communication channel. This is because eavesdropping affects the quantum state of the information carriers and results in an abnormal error rate. In this paper, we analyze various eavesdropping techniques, which may be either translucent or opaque to the transmitted photons, and we estimate the error rate above which the key distribution is deemed unsafe and should be abandoned.
We investigate the security against collective attacks of a continuous variable quantum key distribution scheme in the asymptotic key limit for a realistic setting. The quantum channel connecting the two honest parties is assumed to be lossy and imposes Gaussian noise on the observed quadrature distributions. Secret key rates are given for direct and reverse reconciliation schemes including post-selection in the collective attack scenario. The effect of a nonideal error correction and two-way communication in the classical post-processing step is also taken into account.
An attempt to eavesdrop a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, both in the two-state B92 and the four-state BB84 quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently form other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are included. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob. This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.
An attempt to eavesdrop on a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, in both the two-state B92 [B92 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)] and the four-state BB84 [BB84 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175--179] quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently from other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are covered. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi (rather than Shannon) information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob (rather than all bits). This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.