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Foundations of Physics

Quantum mechanics is compatible with realism

María Esther Burgos

Published Aug 1, 1987• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00733269

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How are quantum mechanics and realism related? This paper will discuss whether or not the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the doctrine of philosophical realism are compatible. To answer this question, this paper will first introduce quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation in terms of the particle in the box experiment. Then, philosophical realism will be introduced and defined. Finally, the relationship between the Copenhagen Interpretation and philosophical realism will be evaluated. Several points of the Copenhagen Interpretation appear to contradict philosophical realism; thus, it can be concluded that the Copenhagen Interpretation is not compatible with philosophical realism.
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.