The Bell 1964 theorem states that nonlocality is a necessary feature of hidden variable theories that reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. In view of the no-go theorems for non-contextual hidden variable theories already existing up to 1964, and due to Gleason and Bell, one is forced to acknowledge the contextual character of the hidden variable theory which the Bell 1964 theorem refers to. Both the mathematical and the physical justifications of this contextualism are reconsidered. Consequently, the role of contextualism in recent no-hidden-variables proofs and the import of these proofs are investigated. With reference to the physical intuition underlying contextualism, the possibility is considered whether a context-dependence of individual measurement results is compatible with context-independence of the statistics of measurement results.
The Bell 1964 theorem states that nonlocality is a necessary feature of hidden variable theories that reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. In view of the no-go theorems for non-contextual hidden variable theories already existing up to 1964, and due to Gleason and Bell, one is forced to acknowledge the contextual character of the hidden variable theory which the Bell 1964 theorem refers to. Both the mathematical and the physical justifications of this contextualism are reconsidered. Consequently, the role of contextualism in recent no-hidden-variables proofs and the import of these proofs are investigated. With reference to the physical intuition underlying contextualism, the possibility is considered whether a context-dependence of individual measurement results is compatible with context-independence of the statistics of measurement results.
Nonlocality was discovered by John Bell in 1964, in the context of the debates about quantum theory, but is a phenomenon that can be studied in its own right. Its observation proves that measurements are not revealing pre-determined values, falsifying the idea of “local hidden variables” suggested by Einstein and others. One is then forced to make some radical choice: either nature is intrinsically statistical and individual events are unspeakable, or our familiar space-time cannot be the setting for the whole of physics. As phenomena, nonlocality and its consequences will have to be predicted by any future theory, and may possibly play the role of foundational principles in these developments. But nonlocality has found a role in applied physics too: it can be used for “device-independent” certification of the correct functioning of random number generators and other devices. After a self-contained introduction to the topic, this monograph on nonlocality presents the main tools and results following a logical, rather than a chronological, order.
Abstract Nonlocality was discovered by John Bell in 1964, in the context of the debates about quantum theory, but is a phenomenon that can be studied in its own right. Its observation proves that measurements are not revealing pre-determined values, falsifying the idea of “local hidden variables” suggested by Einstein and others. One is then forced to make some radical choice: either nature is intrinsically statistical and individual events are unspeakable, or our familiar space-time cannot be the setting for the whole of physics. As phenomena, nonlocality and its consequences will have to be predicted by any future theory, and may possibly play the role of foundational principles in these developments. But nonlocality has found a role in applied physics too: it can be used for “device-independent” certification of the correct functioning of random number generators and other devices. After a self-contained introduction to the topic, this monograph on nonlocality presents the main tools and results following a logical, rather than a chronological, order.
Noncontextual hidden variables theories, assigning simultaneous values to all quantum mechanical observables, are inconsistent by theorems of Gleason and others. These theorems do not exclude contextual hidden variables theories, in which a complete state assigns values to physical quantities only relative to contexts. However, any contextual theory obeying a certain factorisability conditions implies one of Bell's Inequalities, thereby precluding complete agreement with quantum mechanical predictions. The present paper distinguishes two kinds of contextual theories, ‘algebraic’ and ‘environmental’, and investigates when factorisability is reasonable. Some statements by Fine about the philosophical significance of Bell's Inequalities are then assessed.
Noncontextual hidden variables theories, assigning simultaneous values to all quantum mechanical observables, are inconsistent by theorems of Gleason and others. These theorems do not exclude contextual hidden variables theories, in which a complete state assigns values to physical quantities only relative to contexts. However, any contextual theory obeying a certain factorisability condition implies one of Bell's Inequalities, thereby precluding complete agreement with quantum mechanical predictions. The present paper distinguishes two kinds of contextual theories, ‘algebraic’ and ‘environmental’, and investigates when factorisability is reasonable. Some statements by Fine about the philosophical significance of Bell's Inequalities are then assessed. INTRODUCTION In most of the discussions of Bell's Inequalities little notice is taken of the historical circumstances of their discovery. J. S. Bell was told by J. Jauch of the work of A. Gleason [1957] which showed that simultaneous values cannot be assigned to all observables of a quantum mechanical system in a way that respects their algebraic structure (except in the simple case in which the relevant Hilbert space has dimension less than three). Gleason's theorem thus precludes a type of hidden variables theory that has come to be called ‘noncontextual’. The question of agreement between the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics and those of a noncontextual hidden variables theory does not even arise, since such a theory cannot be consistently formulated.
This paper examines no-hidden-variables theorems in quantum mechanics from the point of view of statistical mechanics. It presents a general analysis of the measurement process in the Boltzmannian framework that leads to a characterization of (in)compatible measurements and reproduces several features of quantum probabilities often described as “non-classical”. The analysis is applied to versions of the Kochen–Specker and Bell theorems to shed more light on their implications. It is shown how, once the measurement device and the active role of the measurement process are taken into account, contextuality appears as a natural feature of random variables. This corroborates Bell’s criticism that no-go results of the Kochen–Specker type are based on gratuitous assumptions. In contrast, Bell-type theorems are much more profound, but should be understood as nonlocality theorems rather than no-hidden-variables theorems. Finally, the paper addresses misunderstandings and misleading terminology that have confused the debate about hidden variables in quantum mechanics.
In this paper, we show that Erwin Schroedinger's generalization of the Einstein Podolsky Rosen argument can be connected to certain mathematical theorems - Gleason's and also Kochen and Specker's - in a manner analogous to the relation of EPR itself with Bell's theorem. In both cases, the conclusion is quantum nonlocality, as we discuss. The "Schroedinger nonlocality" proofs share some features with the Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger quantum-nonlocality work, yet also differ in significant ways. For clarity and completeness, we begin with a detailed discussion of the topic of hidden variable theorems. We argue, in agreement with John S. Bell, that 'impossibility' does not follow.