The uncertainty principle and the Bohr theory

Yatendra Pal Varshni

Ralph Klingbeil

Richard Hughes

The Bohr–Einstein debate over the ‘‘weighing of energy’’ and the validity of the time–energy uncertainty relation is reexamined in the context of gravitation theories that do not respect the equivalence principle. Bohr’s use of the equivalence principle is shown to be sufficient, but not necessary, to establish the validity of this uncertainty relation in Einstein’s ‘‘weighing-of-energy’’ gedanken experiment. The uncertainty relation is shown to hold in any energy-conserving theory of gravity, and so a failure of the equivalence principle does not engender a failure of quantum mechanics. The relationship between the gravitational redshift and the equivalence principle is reviewed.

C. G. DARWIN

Abstract 1. In the general synthesis of classical dynamics with the quantum theory, the Uncertainty Principle plays a most useful part. It is of course only one aspect of the new mechanics, but it is a very helpful one since by its means it becomes easy to see where the old classical ideas broke down. The state of affairs in the quantum theory is not unlike that of the early days of relativity, when most of those who studied the subject felt the need of supporting the formal theory by seeing how the old ideas failed in specific cases. Here the formal theory is very abstract and is not easy to follow intuitively, and the Uncertainty Principle plays much the same rôle as did the examples of clocks and rods in relativity theory. For this reason it is more appropriate for illustrative examples, than for any extreme generality, and though a number of examples have been already given by Heisenberg and Bohr, it may not be amiss to have some more. There are probably some who will have shared my experience that it is often by no means easy to detect how the uncertainty enters into a given experiment, though once detected the arguments are usually very simple. In a recent conversation Professor Bohr criticised some rather careless remarks that I had made, and the present work was undertaken to clear matters up. It may be shortly described as a study of the Uncertainty Principle in connection with electrometers and magnetometers. It may be of interest to point out that the Uncertainty Principle can be regarded from a rather different aspect. The "resolving power" of optical instruments was discussed very fully by Rayleigh on wave principles, but as long as matter was regarded in the classical manner, a mechanical instrument could be considered as capable of measuring quantities with absolute accuracy. Now that we know that matter also has wave properties, there is need of a theory of the resolving power of mechanical instruments, and this is exactly what the Uncertainty Principle supplies.

O. Costa de Beauregard

Dugald R. Murdoch