Strong light signals are detected reliably on a time scale of a nanosecond; however, known detectors of weak light signals used in quantum key distribution (QKD) are much slower; they involve pulse-shaping arbiters based on flip-flops that take many nanoseconds to produce a stable output. Based on a recently shown logical independence of quantum particles from the devices that they are employed to explain, we make use of quantum mechanics fine-tuned so that particles serve not as rigid foundations but as improvised hypotheses useful in models that describe the recorded behavior of devices. On the experimental side, we augment the arbitrating flip-flop of a detector so that it fans out to a matched pair of auxiliary flip-flops, and show how this imparts to a detector a "self-awareness" of its own teetering, as announced by disagreements between the auxiliary flip-flops. We introduce a quantum model of this arrangement, invoking a pair of probe particles, and show this model corresponds well to an experiment. The matched pair of auxiliary flip-flops not only confirms the model of hesitation in a detector, but serves as an instrument, both conceptual and practical, that gives an added dimension to the characterization of signal sources.
Strong light signals are detected reliably on a time scale of a nanosecond; however, known detectors of weak light signals used in quantum key distribution (QKD) are much slower; they involve pulse-shaping arbiters based on flip-flops that take many nanoseconds to produce a stable output. Based on a recently shown logical independence of quantum particles from the devices that they are employed to explain, we make use of quantum mechanics fine-tuned so that particles serve not as rigid foundations but as improvised hypotheses useful in models that describe the recorded behavior of devices. On the experimental side, we augment the arbitrating flip-flop of a detector so that it fans out to a matched pair of auxiliary flip-flops, and show how this imparts to a detector a "self-awareness" of its own teetering, as announced by disagreements between the auxiliary flip-flops. We introduce a quantum model of this arrangement, invoking a pair of probe particles, and show this model corresponds well to an experiment. The matched pair of auxiliary flip-flops not only confirms the model of hesitation in a detector, but serves as an instrument, both conceptual and practical, that gives an added dimension to the characterization of signal sources.
With the recognition of a logical gap between experiments and equations of quantum mechanics comes: (1) a chance to clarify such purely mathematical entities as probabilities, density operators, and partial traces-separated out from the choices and judgments necessary to apply them to describing experiments with devices, and (2) an added freedom to invent equations by which to model devices, stemming from the corresponding freedom in interpreting how these equations connect to experiments. Here I apply a few of these clarifications and freedoms to model polarization-entangled light pulses called for in quantum key distribution (QKD). Available light pulses are entangled not only in polarization but also in frequency. Although absent from the simplified models that initiated QKD, the degree of frequency entanglement of polarization-entangled light pulses is shown to affect the amount of key that can be distilled from raw light signals, in one case by a factor of 4/3. Open questions remain, because QKD brings concepts of quantum decision theory, such as measures of distinguishability, mostly worked out in the context of finite-dimensional vector spaces, into contact with infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces needed to give expression to optical frequency spectra.
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD) applies fundamental laws of quantum physics to guarantee secure communication. The security of quantum cryptography was proven in the last decade. Many security analyses are based on the assumption that QKD system components are idealized. In practice, inevitable device imperfections may compromise security unless these imperfections are well investigated.\n\nA highly attenuated laser pulse which gives a weak coherent state is widely used in QKD experiments. A weak coherent state has multi-photon components, which opens up a security loophole to the sophisticated eavesdropper. With a small adjustment of the hardware, we will prove that the decoy state method can close this loophole and substantially improve the QKD performance. We also propose a few practical decoy state protocols, study statistical fluctuations and perform experimental demonstrations. Moreover, we will apply the methods from entanglement distillation protocols based on two-way classical communication to improve the decoy state QKD performance. Furthermore, we study the decoy state methods for other single photon sources, such as triggering parametric down-conversion (PDC) source. Note that our work, decoy state protocol, has attracted a lot of scientific and media interest. The decoy state QKD becomes a standard technique for prepare-and-measure QKD schemes.\n\nAside from single-photon-based QKD schemes, there is another type of scheme based on entangled photon sources. A PDC source is commonly used as an entangled photon source. We propose a model and post-processing scheme for the entanglement-based QKD with a PDC source. Although the model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source. By simulating a real PDC experiment, we show that the entanglement-based QKD can achieve longer maximal secure distance than the single-photon-based QKD schemes.\n\nWe propose a time-shift attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors in a QKD system. This eavesdropping strategy can be realized by current technology. We will also discuss counter measures against the attack and study the security of a QKD system with efficiency mismatch detectors.
Cryptography is essential for secure communication in the digital era. Today, public-key cryptography is widely employed, and has provided an efficient method for encrypting content and ensuring both confidentiality and authenticity of electronic communications. However, the security of these systems is based on assumptions of computational hardness within the constraints of current computing capability. Thus, as quantum computing becomes a reality, public-key algorithms will be genuinely vulnerable to attack. By contrast, quantum cryptography, which is based on quantum physics instead of mathematical assumptions, is able to achieve information-theoretic security. \n \nAdvances in practical quantum cryptographic systems have not kept pace with theory, where an eavesdropper can relatively easily exploit loopholes in practical implementations to compromise theory-proved security. Bridging the gap between perfect theory and imperfect practice has become a priority for the growing field of quantum key distribution (QKD), which has strived to strengthen the practical security of QKD systems. Among all the countermeasures against quantum hacking, the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocol is promising because it is immune to all side-channel attacks on measurement devices. However, the MDI QKD protocol has some limitations that critically restrict its practical usefulness. Technically, the MDI scheme is not compatible with existing QKD systems, and produces a low key rate. In addition, the theory underlying MDI QKD security is based on the use of trusted source stations. Thus, this protocol is not a universal solution. This thesis further investigates the practical security of quantum cryptography in and beyond MDI quantum cryptography. \n \nTo overcome the technical limitations of MDI QKD, we first evaluate two other countermeasures against imperfect detections. The first is an industrial patch based on random detection efficiency, recently implemented by ID Quantique in the commercial Clavis2 QKD system. While powerful, experimental testing shows that this countermeasure is not sufficient to defeat the detector blinding attack. The second countermeasure aims to achieve a higher key rate than MDI QKD while maintaining the same security properties. However, our research shows that detector-device-independent (DDI) QKD security is not equivalent to that of MDI QKD and, further, that DDI QKD is insecure against detector side-channel attacks. \n \nWhile this initial work points to the superior performance of MDI QKD systems, core challenges remain. The fundamental security assumption adopted for MDI QKD systems, regarding the exclusive use of trustable source stations, cannot always be satisfied in practice. Our study revealed several side channels of source devices. The first is disclosed from the implementation of a decoy-state protocol, which is widely used in QKD systems with weak coherent sources. The pump-current-modulated intensities result in a timing mismatch between the signal and decoy states, violating the key assumption in the decoy-state QKD protocol. Moreover, an active Eve can break the basic assumption about photon numbers in the QKD system. In this work, we experimentally demonstrate a laser seeding attack on the laser source, which shows that Eve can increase the emission power of the laser diode. Furthermore, by shining a high-power laser into an optical attenuator, Eve can decrease the attenuation values. The increase in laser emission power and the decrease in attenuation leads to an increase in mean photon numbers. \n \nIn summary, MDI QKD is a milestone in quantum cryptography. However, this thesis indicates the importance of continued investigations into the practical security of MDI QKD. The analysis of practical security should be extended to other countermeasures against side-channel attacks and the source stations in MDI QKD systems. Practical quantum hacking and security analysis promote the development of quantum cryptographic systems, which will eventually achieve the unconditional security claimed in theory.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with threshold detectors are driving high-performance QKD demonstrations.The corresponding security proofs usually assume that all physical detectors have the same detection efficiency.However, the efficiencies of the detectors used in practice might show a mismatch depending on the manufacturing and setup of these detectors.A mismatch can also be induced as the different spatialtemporal modes of an incoming signal might couple differently to a detector.Here we develop a method that allows to provide security proofs without the usual assumption.Our method can take the detection-efficiency mismatch into account without having to restrict the attack strategy of the adversary.Especially, we do not rely on any photon-number cutoff of incoming signals such that our security proof is directly applicable to practical situations.We illustrate our method for a receiver that is designed for polarization encoding and is sensitive to a number of spatial-temporal modes.In our detector model, the absence of quantum interference between any pair of spatial-temporal modes is assumed.For a QKD protocol with this detector model, we can perform a security proof with characterized efficiency mismatch and without photon-number cutoff assumption.Our method also shows that in the absence of efficiency mismatch in our detector model, the key rate increases if the loss due to detection inefficiency is assumed to be outside of the adversary's control, as compared to the view where for a security proof this loss is attributed to the action of the adversary.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.
We developed a SPAD detector implementing an array structure to achieve short deadtime and high detection efficiency, to be employed in ground-based optical receivers for enhancing key rates in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) channels at 800 nm. The device detects over 2 billion photons per second, thus enabling transmission rates beyond 2 GHz. The detector features two 8 × 8 SPAD arrays, named Trial A and Trial B, sharing 4 outputs. Trial A combines its 64 SPADs’ outputs in an OR-tree connected to a frequency divider, distributing the pulses to the 4 outputs. Trial B has 4 independent quadrants, each with its own OR-tree feeding a toggle flip-flop and connected to a single output. A pulse shrinker reduces the pile-up effect. The detector exhibits a Photon Detection Efficiency (PDE) of 39.6% at 800 nm, a median Dark Count Rate (DCR) of 300 cps/pixel, afterpulsing probability below 0.1% and a 230 ps Full-Width at Half-Maximum (FWHM) jitter per SPAD.