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The Monist

Two Kinds of Reality

Eugene Paul Wigner

Published Jan 1, 1964• 43 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The present discussion arose from the desire to explain, to an audience of non-physicists,i the epistemology to which one is forced if one pursues the quantum mechanical theory of observation to its ultimate consequences. However, the con-clusions will not be derived from the aforementioned theory but obtained on the basis of a rather general analysis of what we mean by real. Quantum theory will form the background but not the basis for the analysis. The concept of the real to be arrived at shows considerable similarity to that of the idealist. As the title indicates, it is formulated as a dualism. It is quite possible that it will soon be rejected not only by the community of the philosophers but also by that of the scientists. If this should be the case, the attempt to derive an epistemology from physics will prove to have been premature. Naturally, the author hopes that this will not be the case because, quite apart from the quantum theoretical background, the concepts to be presented ap-pear natural also as an outgrowth of common sense considerations. They have been arrived at by many (including Schrodinger) who did not accept the epistemology of quantum mechanics. Disclaimer of Authority The problems of the present inquiry have been grappled with by the keenest minds, and for much longer periods than the present writer has devoted to them. His only qualification for speaking about them is that he believes to represent the views at which most physicists would arrive if they were suffi-ciently pressed for their opinions on the subject. He realizes the profundity of his ignorance of the thinking of some of the greatest philosophers and is under no illusion that the views to be presented will be very novel. His hope is that they will ap-pear sensible. by guest on A

DOI
10.5840/monist196448214

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The present discussion arose from the desire to explain, to an audience of non-physicists,i the epistemology to which one is forced if one pursues the quantum mechanical theory of observation to its ultimate consequences. However, the con-clusions will not be derived from the aforementioned theory but obtained on the basis of a rather general analysis of what we mean by real. Quantum theory will form the background but not the basis for the analysis. The concept of the real to be arrived at shows considerable similarity to that of the idealist. As the title indicates, it is formulated as a dualism. It is quite possible that it will soon be rejected not only by the community of the philosophers but also by that of the scientists. If this should be the case, the attempt to derive an epistemology from physics will prove to have been premature. Naturally, the author hopes that this will not be the case because, quite apart from the quantum theoretical background, the concepts to be presented ap-pear natural also as an outgrowth of common sense considerations. They have been arrived at by many (including Schrodinger) who did not accept the epistemology of quantum mechanics. Disclaimer of Authority The problems of the present inquiry have been grappled with by the keenest minds, and for much longer periods than the present writer has devoted to them. His only qualification for speaking about them is that he believes to represent the views at which most physicists would arrive if they were suffi-ciently pressed for their opinions on the subject. He realizes the profundity of his ignorance of the thinking of some of the greatest philosophers and is under no illusion that the views to be presented will be very novel. His hope is that they will ap-pear sensible. by guest on A
The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .
In its core, the non-locality–locality debate is a discussion about the concept of the physical reality. The difference between the measurement bases of classical and quantum mechanics is often interpreted as a loss of reality arising in quantum mechanics. In this paper it is shown that this apparent loss occurs only if one believes that everyday experience determines the Euclidean space, instead of considering this space, both in classical and quantum mechanics, as a theoretical construction needed for measurement and representing one part of a dualistic space conception. From this point of view, Einstein's program of a unified field theory can be interpreted as the attempt to find a physical theory that is less dualistic. However, if one regards this dualism as resulting from the requirements of measurements, one can hope for a weakening of the dualism but not expect to remove it completely. Further, it follows from the requirements of measurements that the Heisenberg cut cannot be arbitrarily far moved towards the observer. Epistemological discussions on quantum mechanics yield two insights: (i) To acquire physical knowledge, means of cognition are always necessary, and measurement provides this means. (ii) The space of measurement and the space of the representation of physical dynamics must be distinguished conceptually; both coincide factually in classical physics, but not so in quantum mechanics.
It is not easy for practicing physicists to keep track of the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the "reality'' of the entities they manipulate or the "objective validity'' of the results of their work. In addition, the role of the observer and the theory of the measuring process seem to be themselves controversial. Therefore it may be appropriate to present an interpretation of quantum mechanics which corresponds to the perspective of most practicing physicists, although the author makes no claim to possessing any particular knowledge of the literature in this domain. The final four sections present some more specific descriptions of the concepts used, so that they may also serve for more philosophical discussions.
It has been shown that the criticism of Pauli as well as of Susskind and Glogover may be avoided if the standard quantum-mechanical mathematical model has been suitably extended. There is not more any reason for Einstein's citicism, either, if in addition to some new results concerning Bell's inequalities and Belifante's argument are taken into account. The ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (or the hidden-variable theory) should be preferred, which is also supported by the already published results of experiments with three polarizers. Greater space in the text has been devoted also to the discussion of epistemological problems and some philosophical consequences.
THE GREAT CHAIN OF QUANTUM BEING: WHAT THE PHYSICISTS ARE TELLING US / Louis Gallo listen: there's a hell of a good universe next door; let's go —cummings Max Planck's announcement in 1900 that energy flows in discrete bundles rather than uniformly, as energy "should," did not instantly destroy the foundations of a classical world view that had prevailed since Newton's day. It took physicists nearly a quarter of a century to grasp the full significance of quantum theory. But 1900 is too convenient a date to ignore, and without distorting the history of ideas unduly we can refer to it as the point in time when science launched its relentless assault upon reason and common sense, an assault that continues to this day. This is nothing new, of course. Everyone knows how weird quantum theory is, how it toppled the Newtonian clockwork and so on. The purpose of this essay is to explain in ordinary language, if such a thing can be done, why physicists are saying some of the outrageous things we read about in the popular media. Because new particles, along with new theories to account for them, are being created at such a prodigious rate today, it has become extraordinarily difficult for non-scientists to keep up with the latest breakthroughs. The deluge of popular books on black holes and particle physics, outmoded before they go to press, reflects this information gap. I can hardly expect to beat the popularizers at their own game, but my intention is nevertheless to present a non-technical overview of the great chain of quantum being according to current theory. It can be suggested by way of preliminary assessment that the Theater of the Absurd did not die at some point in the early 1970s; its greatest production is and may always have been our meditations on the cosmos itself. We begin, however, with some thoughts on common sense rather than absurdity. Physicists have traditionally linked common sense with the twin doctrines of causality and determinism. Given thorough enough information about prior conditions, causality guarantees the predictability of all events and states ofbeing. French mathematician Pierre Laplace actually believed that such knowledge could be used to chart the entire history of the universe. Causality, then, is a way of thinking about individual events; determinism, a way of thinking about events 264 · The Missouri Review cumulatively. Both doctrines presume the existence of an objective, quantifiable external world populated by observers (ourselves). One cannot overemphasize the importance of the term "objective." It haunts modern physics at every turn. Indeed, the crucial difference between classical and quantum physics lies in their respective acceptance or rejection of objective reality. The early giants of quantum physics had a hard time accepting the implications of their own mathematics. Max Planck and Einstein—who is not, strictly speaking, a quantum physicist but who contributed much to the theory—refused to accept them. Yet the fate of objectivity may be traced by moving from Planck's position on the subject to that of Erwin Schrödinger, whose work culminated in the late 1920s. This chronology roughly reflects the order in which quantum theory emerged. Here is what Planck had to say in his book The New Science: "A science that starts off by predicating the denial of objectivity has already passed sentence on itself"; and "the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality." Einstein spent most of his life searching for that "exact expression" and failed. Werner Heisenberg offered a similar but highly qualified version of Planck's statement. In Across the Frontiers Heisenberg says that quantum measurements do in fact measure objective states but also intrude upon those states. "It is," he writes, "no longer the objective states but rather the probabilities for the occurrence of certain events that can be stated in mathematical formulae." Schrödinger, in Mind and Matter, comes right out with it: "Mind has erected the objective outside world of the natural philosophers out of its own stuff." He means this literally, and the equations he contributed to quantum theory imply as much. Bohr...
One way of reading this book is as an epilogue-or (more precisely) as a denouement-to a book I wrote more than thirty years ago, which was called Quantum Mechanics and Experience.That earlier book was meant to do two things:1) To introduce its readers to the elementary nuts and bolts of the foundations of quantum mechanics-the idea of superposition, the basics of the standard mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, the argument of Einstein and Podolsky and Rosen to the effect that that formalism, considered as a description of the fundamental real ity of the world, must be somehow incomplete, Bell's extension of that argument into a general and power ful theorem about locality, the elaboration (by figures like Erwin Schrödinger, and John von Neumann, and Eugene Wigner) of the quantum-mechanical mea surement prob lem, and vari ous proposals (theories of the spontaneous collapse of the wave-function, Bohmian mechanics, the so-called many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics, and so on) for solving it.2) To show how the above-mentioned proposals for solving the mea sure ment prob lem, taken together, amount to a