It has been shown that the criticism of Pauli as well as of Susskind and Glogover may be avoided if the standard quantum-mechanical mathematical model has been suitably extended. There is not more any reason for Einstein's citicism, either, if in addition to some new results concerning Bell's inequalities and Belifante's argument are taken into account. The ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (or the hidden-variable theory) should be preferred, which is also supported by the already published results of experiments with three polarizers. Greater space in the text has been devoted also to the discussion of epistemological problems and some philosophical consequences.
It has been shown that the criticism of Pauli as well as of Susskind and Glogover may be avoided if the standard quantum-mechanical mathematical model has been suitably extended. There is not more any reason for Einstein's citicism, either, if in addition to some new results concerning Bell's inequalities and Belifante's argument are taken into account. The ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (or the hidden-variable theory) should be preferred, which is also supported by the already published results of experiments with three polarizers. Greater space in the text has been devoted also to the discussion of epistemological problems and some philosophical consequences.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
The support of Copenhagen quantum mechanics in the discussion concerning EPR experiments has been based fundamentally on two mistakes. First, quantum mechanics as well as hidden-variable theory give the same predictions; the statement of Belinfante from 1973 about the significant difference must be denoted as mistake. Secondly, the experimental violation of Bell's inequalities has been erroneously interpreted as excluding the hidden-variable alternative, while they have been based on assumption corresponding to classical physics. The EPR experiments cannot bring, therefore, any decision in the controversy between Einstein and Bohr. However, the view of Einstein is strongly supported by experimental results concerning the light transmission through three polarizers.
It is not easy for practicing physicists to keep track of the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the "reality'' of the entities they manipulate or the "objective validity'' of the results of their work. In addition, the role of the observer and the theory of the measuring process seem to be themselves controversial. Therefore it may be appropriate to present an interpretation of quantum mechanics which corresponds to the perspective of most practicing physicists, although the author makes no claim to possessing any particular knowledge of the literature in this domain. The final four sections present some more specific descriptions of the concepts used, so that they may also serve for more philosophical discussions.
The Italian Debate on Quantum Paradoxes.- 1. The Epistemological Roots of Quantum Paradoxes.- Waves, Particles and Complementarity.- Chance: Chaos or Logic?.- Some Critical Considerations on the Present Epistemological and Scientific Debate on Quantum Mechanics.- 2. Einstein Locauty, Separable Reality, and Quantum Correlations.- Physical Consequences of Reality Criteria for Quantum Phenomena.- Possible Link Between EPR Paradox and Waves.- A Criticism of Some Recently Proposed Models that Violate the Bell Inequality.- A Phenomenological Analysis of the EPR Argument.- 3. Causal and Deterministic Interpretations of Quantum Formausm.- Causal versus Orthodox Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.- Perspectives of Physical Determinism.- Determinism, Separability, and Quantum Mechanics.- 4. Quantum Theory and Gravitation.- Can Singularities and Multidimensional Spaces Influence the Evolution of Quantum Mechanical Systems?.- Subquantum Mechanics and Graviton Blas.- 5. Logic and Probability in Quantum Mechanics.- Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. A Quantum Probabilistic Approach.- On the Adequacy of a Nonclassical Logic for Quantum Theory.- Remarks on the Hypothesis of Hidden Variables.- 6. Historical Developments of the Einstein-Bohr Controversy.- Historical Considerations on the Conceptual Experiment by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.- Continuity and Discontinuity: The Einstein-Bohr Conflict of Ideas and the Bohr-Fock Discussion.- How Italian Philosophy Reacted to the Advent of Quantum Mechanics in the Thirties.- Italian Studies in the Foundations of Quantum Physics. A Bibliography (1965-1985).
Bohr is said to have remarked that anybody who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it. No physicist, however, challenges its practical usefulness in predicting experimental results and providing an explanatory framework for an enormous range of study. Nevertheless, more thoughtful physicists have been astonished and disturbed by what is implied when attempts are made to interpret its meaning. As a result a variety of ingenious, and sometimes bizarre, schemes have been devised since its inception in order to make these implications more acceptable to the scientific mind. Some of these schemes have resulted in proposals which appear stranger than the problems they have been designed to resolve. After some sixty years there is no consensus of opinion upon the solution of the epistemological problems posed. Indeed the debate keeps on resurfacing in the scientific literature and continues to generate library shelves of books. Some progress, however, has been made and the late John Bell himself and the experimental work of Alain Aspect have demonstrated that some epistemological positions cannot be sustained.
The new physics just described was still based largely on Newtonian ideas. Indeed, in its theoretical aspects, it might not unfairly be described as a final attempt to explain the world in materialistic terms—as particles being pushed and pulled about in space and time. Nevertheless, the new physics had found it necessary to abolish most of the forces of pushing and pulling, replacing the gradual changes of motion of the particles under these forces by sudden and unpredictable jumps. These appeared to involve violations of the law of causality, both in the disintegration of radioactive atoms and also in the internal changes of ordinary atoms. We seemed to see Fate defying this law as she picked out certain atoms for disintegration or collapse and, by her apparently capricious acts, sent the universe along one path or another according to her whim. On such lines the new physics had explained many phenomena which had hitherto seemed inexplicable, but it had by no means met with complete success. For instance, while it gave a perfect interpretation of the simplest spectrum of all, namely that of the hydrogen atom, it failed with more complex spectra. This was not necessarily a fatal objection; a few emendations and possibly a few new ad hoc assumptions might have effected a complete reconciliation, although this seems improbable.