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International Conference on Wireless Communications and Signal Processing (WCSP)

Security game between source and friendly relay

Zhang Maorui, Baoyun Wang

Published Nov 1, 2011• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate a four terminal Gaussian network which is composed of a destination, a source, an eavesdropper and a friendly relay which helps the source to increase the secrecy capacity. We introduce a game theoretic approach in which the source pays the relay for increasing the secrecy capacity. The relay charges the source with a certain price, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If the price is too high, the source would not buy the "service", but if the price is too low the profit of the relay is low. In modeling the outcome of the above games we use Stackelberg type of game. In our work we prove the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. Simulation results and analysis show the effectiveness of the relay and the tradeoff of the price.

DOI
10.1109/wcsp.2011.6096878

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In this paper, we investigate a four terminal Gaussian network which is composed of a destination, a source, an eavesdropper and a friendly relay which helps the source to increase the secrecy capacity. We introduce a game theoretic approach in which the source pays the relay for increasing the secrecy capacity. The relay charges the source with a certain price, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If the price is too high, the source would not buy the "service", but if the price is too low the profit of the relay is low. In modeling the outcome of the above games we use Stackelberg type of game. In our work we prove the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. Simulation results and analysis show the effectiveness of the relay and the tradeoff of the price.
In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.
In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.
Physical layer security is an emerging security area that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between intended network nodes, while malicious nodes that eavesdrop the communication obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdroppers. We investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the useful data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "masking" the eavesdropper. To obtain distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined such that the source pays the jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, therefore, increasing the secrecy capacity. The friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for the jamming, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we investigate a Stackelburg type of game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The distributed game solution is shown to have similar performances to those of the centralized one.
In this paper, we consider a two-way relay system where the two sources can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay and investigate the physical layer security issue in this two-way untrusted relay scenario. Specifically, we regard the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept confidential, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first indicate that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way untrusted relay system even without the help of external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulation results verify the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme.
In this work, a four-terminal complex Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper, and a jammer relay is studied under two different set of assumptions: 1) The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission, and 2) The jammer relay is causally given the source message. In both cases, the jammer relay assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase it. To help the eavesdropper, the jammer relay can use pure relaying and/or send interference. Each of the problems is formulated as a two-player, noncooperative, zero-sum continuous game. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay in the first problem, the Nash equilibrium is found and shown to be achieved with mixed strategies in general. The optimal cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the Nash equilibrium secrecy rate, are found. For the second problem, the Nash equilibrium solution is found and the results are compared to the case when the jammer relay is not informed about the source message.