Two principle concerns prompt some theorists to link quantum mechanics and theories of mind or theories of consciousness. On the one hand, it is commonly thought that conscious minds play some important role in processes of quantum measurement and that any good theory of mind ought to explain how a mind can play such a role. On the other hand, a few people think that the framework of classical physics is not, by itself, sufficiently powerful to explain the myriad remarkable properties of minds and that a good explanation must rely on some special features of quantum mechanics. Usually, these features include either state vector reduction-the collapse of the wave function-or special capabilities, often computational or super-computational ones, allegedly displayed by physical substrates while existing in hypothesised coherent states of linear superposition. Two questions summarise the author's misgivings about both the above motivations for linking quantum mechanics and theories of mind. First, does the process of quantum measurement really require a conscious observer? Second, does quantum mechanics underwrite any special effects in, say, intraneuronal protein lattices, which could play a role in instantiating consciousness in biological systems? It turns out that the particular character of the negative answer suggested for the first question also prompts a negative answer for the second. He summarises these negative answers after describing briefly some popular attempts to forge quantum theories of mind.
In this paper, epistemology and ontology of quantum states are discussed based on a completely new way of founding quantum theory. The fundamental notions are conceptual variables in the mind of an observer or in the joint minds of a group of observers. These conceptual variables are very often accessible, that is, it is possible to find values of the variables by doing experiments or by making measurements. An important notion is that of maximal accessibility. It is shown here that this new machinery may facilitate the discussion of when a specific quantum state can be given an ontological interpretation, and also the more speculative question whether all states can be given such an interpretation. The discussion here is general, and has implications for the basic problem of how one should look upon information from experiments and measurement, in particularly the question concerning when this information may reflect properties of the real world.
Comparatively recent advances in quantum measurement theory suggest that the decades-old flirtation between quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind is about to end. Various approaches to what I have elsewhere dubbed 'interactive decoherence' promise to remove the conscious observer from the phenomenon of state vector reduction. The mechanisms whereby decoherence occurs suggest, on the one hand, that consciousness per se has no role in explaining the outcomes of quantum events and, on the other, that perhaps apart from questions about the very lowest level properties of minds' instantiating hardware or wetware, the unique features of quantum mechanics are utterly irrelevant to the philosophy of mind. Here we explore a better account of interactive decoherence than I have offered elsewhere, make explicit the argument for irrelevance, and address some unanswered questions and an interesting objection against the formulation of decoherence on which our discussion is based.