In this paper, epistemology and ontology of quantum states are discussed based on a completely new way of founding quantum theory. The fundamental notions are conceptual variables in the mind of an observer or in the joint minds of a group of observers. These conceptual variables are very often accessible, that is, it is possible to find values of the variables by doing experiments or by making measurements. An important notion is that of maximal accessibility. It is shown here that this new machinery may facilitate the discussion of when a specific quantum state can be given an ontological interpretation, and also the more speculative question whether all states can be given such an interpretation. The discussion here is general, and has implications for the basic problem of how one should look upon information from experiments and measurement, in particularly the question concerning when this information may reflect properties of the real world.
In this paper, epistemology and ontology of quantum states are discussed based on a completely new way of founding quantum theory. The fundamental notions are conceptual variables in the mind of an observer or in the joint minds of a group of observers. These conceptual variables are very often accessible, that is, it is possible to find values of the variables by doing experiments or by making measurements. An important notion is that of maximal accessibility. It is shown here that this new machinery may facilitate the discussion of when a specific quantum state can be given an ontological interpretation, and also the more speculative question whether all states can be given such an interpretation. The discussion here is general, and has implications for the basic problem of how one should look upon information from experiments and measurement, in particularly the question concerning when this information may reflect properties of the real world.
What does quantum physics tell us about the nature of reality, specifically the parts of reality we do not directly perceive called hidden variables? One may think it could tell us a lot because of our enhanced technological sensing abilities that delve into the realms that quantum physics covers so well. Surprisingly, it seems to surround us in a deeper mystery rather than reveal more of nature's secrets. It seems that we cannot escape from philosophical consideration when dealing with what is hidden in quantum physics. In Part I we will look at how Epistemology and Ontology bear upon Hidden Variables. In Part II we will consider Hidden Variables in the light of Contextuality, and Non-Classicality. Inevitably questions of subjectivity and objectivity arise in dealing with states of observation. How should we think about these states? Perhaps it is a question of the meaning associated with our knowledge of a state-that is, a question of ontology or epistemology. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering hidden variables in quantum physics because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how reality is constructed; if it is constructed or not. It also raises the question of what attributes we are able to observe simultaneously and that brings contextuality into the discussion. If it turns out that reality is constructed contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? If on the other hand reality is constructed non-contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? Many implications can arise when considering these questions from a quantum physical point of view. In this paper I shall discuss how quantum physics provides some answers to these questions by considering quantum physical states and their measurements.
In [1] the general problem of deriving the Hilbert space formulation in quantum theory is discussed from the point of view of conceptual variables. A conceptual variable is any variable defined by a person or by a group of persons. These variables may be inaccessible, i.e., impossible to assign numerical value to either by experiments or by other means, or accessible. As one basic assumption, a group K of actions on a space of an inaccessible variable is defined, and accessible functions of this variable are introduced. When such a function is permissible, a term that is precisely defined here, a group of actions G can be introduced on the range of the function. In general in this paper only the existence of the group G is assumed. By using group representation theory on the groups defined on a class of accessible variables, basic Hilbert space formalism is restored under the assumption that the observator or the set of observators has two maximally accessible variables in his (their) mind(s). Operators are connected to each variable, and in the discrete case the possible values of the variables are given by the eigenvalues of the operators. The entire approach may be connected to a general epistemic interpretation of quantum theory. In this paper the main results from [1] are made more precise and more general. It turns out that the conditions of the main theorem there can be weakened in two essential ways: 1) No measurements need to be assumed, so the result is also applicable to general decision situations; 2) States can have arbitrary phase factors. Some consequences of the main result are also briefly discussed here.
A different approach towards quantum theory is proposed in this paper. The basis is taken to be conceptual variables, physical variables that may be accessible or inaccessible, i.e., it may be possible or impossible to assign numerical values to them. In an epistemic process, the accessible variables are just ideal observations as observed by an actor or by some communicating actors. Group actions are defined on these variables, and using group representation theory this is the basis for developing the Hilbert space formalism here. Operators corresponding to accessible conceptual variables are derived as a result of the formalism, and in the discrete case it is argued that the possible physical values are the eigenvalues of these operators. The Born formula is derived under specific assumptions. The whole discussion here is a supplement to the author's book [1]. The interpretation of quantum states (or eigenvector spaces) implied by this approach is as focused questions to nature together with sharp answers to those questions. Resolutions if the identity are then connected to the questions themselves; these may be complementary in the sense defined by Bohr. This interpretation may be called a general epistemic interpretation of quantum theory. It is similar to Zwirn's recent Convival Solipsism, and also to QBism, and more generally, can be seen as a concrete implementation of Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics. The focus in the present paper is, however, as much on foundation as on interpretation. But the simple consequences of an epistemic interpretation for some so called quantum paradoxes are discussed. Connections to statistical inference theory are discussed in a preliminary way, both through an example and through a brief discussion of quantum measurement theory.
Abstract In the book Helland (2021) the general problem of reconstructing the Hilbert space formulation in quantum theory is discussed from the point of view of what I called conceptual variables, any variables defined by a person or by a group of persons. These variables may be inaccessible, i.e., impossible to assign numerical value to by experiments or by measurements, or accessible. One basic assumption in Helland (2021) and here is that group actions g ∈ G are defined on a space where some maximally accessible variable varies, and then accessible functions of these maximal variables are introduced. By using group representation theory the basic Hilbert space formalism is restored under the assumption that the observator or the set of observators has two related maximally accessible variables in his (their) mind(s). The notion of relationship is precisely defined here. Symmetric (self-adjoint) operators are connected to each variable, and in the discrete case the possible values of the variables are given by the eigenvalues of the operators. In this paper the main results from Helland (2021) are made more precise and more general. It turns out that the conditions of the main theorem there can be weakened in two essential ways: 1) No measurements need to be assumed, so the result is also applicable to general decision situations; 2) States can have arbitrary phase factors. Some consequences of this approach towards quantum theory are also discussed here.
What is a physical object according to the theory of quantum mechanics? The first answer to be considered is that given by Bohr in terms of the concept of complementarity. This interpretation is illustrated by way of an example, the two slit experiment, which highlights some of the associated problems of ontology. One such problem is the so-called problem of measurement or observation. Various interpretations of measurement in Quantum Theory, including those of Heisenberg, von Neumann, Everett and Bohr, are compared and contrasted. A second problem concerns whether or not QT can be considered complete and therefore satisfactory as a basis for physics. Various attempts to complete QT by means of the addition of ‘hidden variables’ to the quantum mechanical state function are considered and their aims and achievements assessed. Finally, we investigate some of the characteristic ontological problems for the orthodox interpretation of Relativistic Quantum Theory.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003