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Journal of Computer Research and Development

Founding Computationally Secure Quantum Cryptography Protocols Based on Bit Commitment

Xin Lü

Published Jan 1, 2005• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1360/crad20051113

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A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which arise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process, or exchange information. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general secure multiparty computations can be built. The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems, which rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for oblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems apply even to protocols which take relativistic signaling constraints into account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols which are computationally secure against quantum attack. Here a method is described for building a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin-tossing protocol. No security proof is attempted, but reasons are sketched why these protocols might resist quantum computational attack.
A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which arise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process or exchange information. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general secure multi-party computations can be built. The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems, which rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for oblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems apply even to protocols which take relativistic signalling constraints into account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols computationally secure against quantum attack. I describe here a method for building a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin tossing protocol. No security proof is attempted, but I sketch reasons why these protocols might resist quantum computational attack.
A cryptographic security scheme is proposed for a subsystem of the integrated computer-aided system that is intended for holding elections and counting the election returns. The main idea is to use two modern quantum cryptographic technologies: quantum bit commitment and quantum secret sharing. The scheme of information security of vote count procedure, and also the quantum bit commitment protocol and the quantum secret sharing protocol, are described. Using the protocols of quantum cryptography increases security of the computer-aided voting system on comparison with protocols of usual classical cryptography.