arXiv:quant-ph/0111097 · Physical Review A

Proposal for founding mistrustful quantum cryptography on coin tossing

Adrian Kent

Published Jul 15, 2003• 3 citations

Abstract

A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which arise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process, or exchange information. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general secure multiparty computations can be built. The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems, which rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for oblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems apply even to protocols which take relativistic signaling constraints into account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols which are computationally secure against quantum attack. Here a method is described for building a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin-tossing protocol. No security proof is attempted, but reasons are sketched why these protocols might resist quantum computational attack.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.68.012312

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