The usual interpretative rules of quantum mechanics are presented and are shown to be too weak. The reason is that they do not include the intuitive requirement of randomness of the outcome sequence obtained from an infinite repetition of measuring an observable on a state. A strengthening of the rules is proposed which includes, in essence, a precise definition of randomness. The resultant rule is seen to be intuitively more satisfying than the usual rules and to include the expectation value rule and to include essentially all of the spectrum rule of the usual rules. It also suggests that the relationship between the foundations of mathematics and quantum mechanics may be quite deep and complex.
The usual interpretative rules of quantum mechanics are presented and are shown to be too weak. The reason is that they do not include the intuitive requirement of randomness of the outcome sequence obtained from an infinite repetition of measuring an observable on a state. A strengthening of the rules is proposed which includes, in essence, a precise definition of randomness. The resultant rule is seen to be intuitively more satisfying than the usual rules and to include the expectation value rule and to include essentially all of the spectrum rule of the usual rules. It also suggests that the relationship between the foundations of mathematics and quantum mechanics may be quite deep and complex.
In this paper some consequences of the strengthened interpretative rules of quantum mechanics, which were proposed in an earlier paper, are obtained. It is also seen that, in general, the usual interpretative rules are too weak to obtain these results. For example, it is proved from the strengthened rules that if f:R → R is a Borel function which is also τ-definable, then for each observable A the procedure ``measure A and compute f(A outcome)'' is an f(A) measurement procedure. It is also shown that there exist Borel f and observables A such that the above procedure is not an f(A) measurement procedure. Two methods of measuring the sum A + B of two observables are then considered: The measurement of A and B on different systems followed by addition of the results and (if A and B commute) the simultaneous measurement of A and B on the same system followed by addition. It is proved from the strengthened rules that the first method is not a valid measurement procedure and the second is valid. Besides these, other processes such as procedures for preparing mixtures of different states, and the empirical generation of probability measures from outcome sequences are considered.
The best mathematical arguments against a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics - that gives definite but partially unknown values to all observables - are analysed and shown to be based on reasoning that is not compelling. This opens the door for an interpretation that, while respecting the indeterministic nature of quantum mechanics, allows to speak of definite values for all observables at any time that are, however, only partially measurable. The analysis also suggests new ways to test the foundations of quantum theory.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
Quantum mechanics has several deficiencies as a complete theoretical description of the measurement process. Among them is the fact that the quantum mechanical description of correlations between the single measurements of a sequence is quite problematic. A single measurement is defined to be a preparation followed by an observation. In particular, one feels that an infinite sequence of such single measurements which corresponds to the measurement of a question O on a state η where η does not lie entirely in an eigenspace of O should generate a random output sequence. However, quantum mechanics seems to say nothing about this. In this paper, physical theories are defined in such a manner that correlations between single measurements are explicitly included. In particular, a physical theory is considered to be a mapping U, with domain in the set [Qsτ] of infinite instruction strings for carrying out infinite sequences of single measurements and range in the set of probability measures defined on A, the usual σ algebra of subsets of Ω. Ω is the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. A fundamental property which any valid physical theory must satisfy is that it agrees with experiment. It is proposed and discussed here that much of the intuitive meaning of agreement between a theory U and experiment with respect to H is given by the statement ∀Qsτ [U(Qsτ) defined⇒E(H,U(Qsτ),ψQsτ)],where U(Qsτ) is the probability measure U associates with the infinite instruction string Qsτ and ψQsτ is the outcome sequence obtained by carrying out Qsτ. E(H, U(Qsτ),ψQsτ) is the statement that all formulas in H with one free sequence variable which are true on Ω almost everywhere with respect to U(Qsτ) are true for ψQsτ. H is a subclass of the class of all formulas in a formal language L. A theorem is proved which states that, if U(Qsτ) corresponds to a nontrivial product probability measure and U H-agrees with experiment, then the outcome sequence ψQsτ is H-random. H-randomness is defined here in terms of the statement E(H, P, φ). Another property of a valid physical theory, which is defined here, is that, for some Qsτ, U(Qsτ) must be determinable on much of AH from ψQsτ. Sufficient conditions for this property to hold are given. AH is the class of all H definable subsets of Ω. Some properties of the statement E(H, P, φ) are given. Among other things, it is proved that, if E(H, P, φ) holds and P is a nontrivial probability measure on A, then φ is not definable in H.
This paper is a first attempt to explore the relationship between physics and mathematics ’’in the large.’’ In particular, the use of different Zermelo Frankel model universes of sets (ZFC models) as carriers for the mathematics of quantum mechanics is discussed. It is proved that given a standard transitive ZFC model M, if, inside M, B (ℋM) is the algebra of all bounded linear operators over a Hilbert space ℋM, there exists, outside M, a Hilbert space ℋ and an algebra B (ℋ), along with isometric monomorphisms UM and VM from ℋM into ℋ and from B (ℋM) into B (ℋ). UM and VM are used to relate quantum mechanics based on M to quantum mechanics based on the usual ZFC model. It is then shown that, contrary to what one would expect, all ZFC models may not be equivalent as carriers for the mathematics of physics. In particular, it is proved that if one requires that an outcome sequence, associated with an infinite repetition of measuring a question observable on a system prepared in some state, be random, and if a strong definition of randomness is used, then the minimal standard ZFC model cannot be a carrier for the mathematics of quantum mechanics.
Standard quantum mechanics—the theory that is made use of in practice and is, because of this, taught in university courses— is a theory that is weakly objective only. For this reason it is most conveniently and neatly expressed by means of a set of basic rules of calculation that enable physicists to make predictions concerning what will be observed. Classical and quantum physics both make considerable use of the expressions "physical system" and "state of a physical system." Quantum mechanics is essentially a probabilistic theory. Except in special cases it makes no predictions that bear on individual systems. Rather, it predicts statistical frequencies. In other words, it predicts, as a rule, the number n of times that a given event will be observed when a large number N of physical systems of the same type and satisfying specified conditions are subjected to a measurement process.