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Physics Today

Quantum Theory Needs No ‘Interpretation’

Christopher A. Fuchs, Asher Peres

Published Mar 1, 2000• 348 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Purpose of this article is to stress the fact that Quantum Theory does not need an interpretation other than being an algorithm for computing probabilities associated with macroscopic phenomena and measurements. It does not ''describ'' reality, and the wave function is not objective entity, it only gives the evolution of our probabilities for the outcomes potential experiments. (AIP) (c)

DOI
10.1063/1.883004

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Purpose of this article is to stress the fact that Quantum Theory does not need an interpretation other than being an algorithm for computing probabilities associated with macroscopic phenomena and measurements. It does not ''describ'' reality, and the wave function is not objective entity, it only gives the evolution of our probabilities for the outcomes potential experiments. (AIP) (c)
We argue that quantum mechanics makes sense without such controversial postulates as the wave function collapse, the quantum probability rule and the observable postulate. We only need the existence of a wave function as a representation of a state, its dynamical evolution rule and another rather trivial postulate proposed here (Read-Off Postulate). The wave function collapse and the probability rule are replaced with intrinsic properties of the theory, i.e. decoherence and relative frequency, respectively. Interpretation of the wave function as a faithful representation of the reality naturally emerges, although quantum reality has a peculiar feature which distinguishes it from classical reality.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.
In this article we discuss the problem of finding an interpretation of quantum mechanics which provides an objective account of physical reality. In the first place we discuss the problem of interpretation and analyze the importance of such an objective account in physics. In this context we present the problems which arise when interpreting the quantum wave function within the orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics. In connection to this critic, we expose the concept of 'entity' as an epistemological obstruction. In the second part of this paper we discuss the relation between actuality and potentiality in classical and quantum physics, and continue to present the concept of 'ontological potentiality' which is distinguished from the generic Aristotelian notion of potentiality in terms of 'becoming actual'. In this paper our main aim is to provide an objective interpretation of quantum mechanics which allows us to discuss the meaning of physical reality according to the theory. For this specific propose we present the concept of 'faculty' in place of the concept of 'entity'. Within our theory of faculties, we continue to discuss and interpret two paradigmatic experiments of quantum mechanics such as the double-slit and Schrodinger's cat.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics (QM) is related to the inability to include learning about the properties of a quantum system by an agent in the formalism of quantum theory. It includes questions about the physical processes behind the measurement, uniqueness, and randomness of obtained outcomes and an ontic or epistemic role of the state. These issues have triggered various interpretations of quantum theory. They vary from refusing any connection between physical reality and a measurement process to insisting that a collapse of the wave-function is real and possibly involves consciousness. On the other hand, the actual mechanism of a measurement is not extensively discussed in these interpretations. This essay attempts to investigate the quantum measurement problem from the position of the scientific consensus. We begin with a short overview of the development of sensing in living organisms. This is performed for the purpose of stressing the relation between reality and our experience. We then briefly present different approaches to the measurement problem in chosen interpretations. We then state three philosophical assumptions for further consideration and present a decomposition of the measurement act into four stages: transformation, conversion, amplification and broadcasting, and, finally, perception. Each of these stages provides an intuition about the physical processes contributing to it. These conclusions are then used in a discussion about, e.g., objectivity, the implausibility of reversing a measurement, or the epistemic status of the wave-function. Finally, we argue that those in favor of some of the most popular interpretations can find an overlap between their beliefs and the consequences of considerations presented here.
Introduction Despite its extraordinary predictive successes, quantum mechanics has, since its inception some seventy years ago, been plagued by conceptual difficulties. The basic problem, plainly put, is this: It is not at all clear what quantum mechanics is about. What, in fact, does quantum mechanics describe? It might seem, since it is widely agreed that the state of any quantum mechanical system is completely specified by its wave function, that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about the behavior of wave functions. Quite naturally, no physicist wanted this to be true more than did Erwin Schrodinger, the father of the wave function. Nonetheless, Schrodinger ultimately found this impossible to believe. His difficulty was not so much with the novelty of the wave function [2, page 156 of [3]]: "That it is an abstract, unintuitive mathematical construct is a scruple that almost always surfaces against new aids to thought and that carries no great message." Rather, it was that