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Philosophy of Science

A Note on Peter Gibbins’ “A Note on Quantum Logic and The Uncertainty Principle”

Max Jammer

Published Sep 1, 1982• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The arguments presented by Gibbins (1981) in his Note are based on a sharp distinction between the product Δx·Δp, which refers to the ranges of position and momentum of an individual system, and the uncertainty principle ΔX·ΔP ≥ ħ/2, which expresses a statistical relation for an ensemble of systems. A critical role in Gibbins’ reasoning is played by the theorem T which states that the restriction of the dynamical variable of position x of an individual system to a finite range Δx excludes the possibility of restricting the canonically conjugate dynamical variable of momentum p to a finite range Δp.

DOI
10.1086/289072

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The arguments presented by Gibbins (1981) in his Note are based on a sharp distinction between the product Δx·Δp, which refers to the ranges of position and momentum of an individual system, and the uncertainty principle ΔX·ΔP ≥ ħ/2, which expresses a statistical relation for an ensemble of systems. A critical role in Gibbins’ reasoning is played by the theorem T which states that the restriction of the dynamical variable of position x of an individual system to a finite range Δx excludes the possibility of restricting the canonically conjugate dynamical variable of momentum p to a finite range Δp.
Physical observables which are measured in a particular state of a dynamical system can be conveniently represented in classical mechanics by mathematical variables, on the grounds that all have definite values in any classical state. In contrast, the statistical interpretation of wave functions describing the quantum states implies that there are uncertainties in the measurement of any two observables which can be represented by canonically conjugate variables, such as position q and momentum p q . This requires any measured dynamical observable A in a quantum state to be associated with an expectation value 〈 A 〉.
One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S, (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S, simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).
Does the Heisenberg uncertainty principle refer to errors of measurement, or to the spread of values of the physical variables intrinsic to a particle’s state, or to some combination of these? The most commonly quoted form of the uncertainty principle relates the spread of an ensemble of separate measurements of some variable to the analogous spread of its conjugate variable. In contrast, Heisenberg’s original argument for the uncertainty principle involved the perturbation to a particle’s state by a measurement of one variable, which affects one’s ability to predict the outcome of a subsequent measurement of the conjugate variable. The relation between these two views of the uncertainty principle is discussed in this paper. A familiar example is considered: an ensemble of identically prepared particles passing through a slit, and after further propagation being detected. From this arrangement it is possible to infer joint (although necessarily imprecise) information on both transverse position and conjugate momentum for each member of the ensemble. It is shown that in this case of joint measurement the product of standard deviations for the measurement outcomes is at least twice as large as the lower bound implied by the usual uncertainty principle. The discussion is meant to help clarify the different roles played in the various statements of the uncertainty principle by the initial state and by measurement error.
Two of the most fundamental structural features of quantum mechanics — the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Pauli exclusion principle — are standardly treated as posits: brute facts about the physical world that quantum theory describes but does not explain. This paper argues that both receive principled ontological grounding from Constraint Theory (CT), the thesis established by transcendental argument that constraint is the ontological primitive constitutive of determinate existence as such. On the CT account, determinate physical entities are constituted by their constraint profiles — the specific exclusion relations that individuate them from everything they are not. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is shown to reflect the conjugate structure of quantum constraint topology: position-space constraint and momentum-space constraint are dual expressions of a single underlying constraint structure, related by Fourier duality, such that closing one dimension of possibility space structurally requires opening the conjugate dimension. The Pauli exclusion principle is shown to be the direct physical expression of CT’s foundational claim that to be is to exclude: fermions are individuated through mutual exclusion, and the impossibility of two fermions occupying the same quantum state is the ontological requirement that distinct entities must differ in their constraint profiles. The fermion/boson distinction is given a unified structural interpretation: fermions are entities individuated by state-exclusion; bosons are entities whose mode of individuation does not proceed through state-exclusion. The paper engages the principal interpretive positions in the philosophy of quantum mechanics and the literature on quantum particle individuality, and argues that the CT account provides explanatory depth that these positions presuppose but do not supply.
Since the publication of Heisenberg’s paper1 on the “anschaulichen Inhalt” of quantum mechanics, discussions of the fundamental limitations on the accuracy of physical measurements have been much in the foreground. According to Heisenberg, the quantum mechanics implies that it is impossible to measure simultaneous values of a coordinate and its conjugate momentum with unlimited precision. Instead, if Δp be the estimated error or uncertainty in a momentum and Δq that in the associated coordinate one must have the inequality, ΔpΔq>h2π \Delta p\Delta q>\frac{h}{{2\pi}} ΔpΔq>2πh​ (1) This inequality has come to be known quite generally as Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation.