Journal of Mathematical Physics

Quantum logic as a consequence of realistic measurements on deterministic systems

H. D. Doebner, W. Lücke

Published Jan 1, 1991• 4 citations

Abstract

It is shown why, from the deterministic point of view, quantum logic and not classical logic is the appropriate language for describing realistic measurements.

DOI: 10.1063/1.529127

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