In concluding their major survey, “Quantum Logics,” Greechie and Gudder (1975) listed four outstanding directions for future research, the last of which was, “Explain the meaning of the word ‘logic’ in the title of this paper.” Broadly speaking, there are two radically different points of view on this. There is the view that, taken strictly, ‘logic’ is a misnomer: quantum logic studies certain algebraic structures naturally arising from the formal, apparatus of quantum theory, structures which may afford insights into quantum physics, on a number of levels, but which do not in any way involve giving up or replacing classical logical laws. (Cf., e.g., Jauch (1968, p. 77).) In contrast, there is the view that the non-Boolean structures arising from the Hilbert space formalism should be taken as giving rise to a genuine non-classical logic, in conflict with classical logic, but appropriate to the description of quantum mechanical reality.
In concluding their major survey, “Quantum Logics,” Greechie and Gudder (1975) listed four outstanding directions for future research, the last of which was, “Explain the meaning of the word ‘logic’ in the title of this paper.” Broadly speaking, there are two radically different points of view on this. There is the view that, taken strictly, ‘logic’ is a misnomer: quantum logic studies certain algebraic structures naturally arising from the formal, apparatus of quantum theory, structures which may afford insights into quantum physics, on a number of levels, but which do not in any way involve giving up or replacing classical logical laws. (Cf., e.g., Jauch (1968, p. 77).) In contrast, there is the view that the non-Boolean structures arising from the Hilbert space formalism should be taken as giving rise to a genuine non-classical logic, in conflict with classical logic, but appropriate to the description of quantum mechanical reality.
. We put forward a new take on the logic of quantum mechanics, following Schrödinger's point of view that it is composition which makes quantum theory what it is, rather than its particular propositional structure due to the existence of superpositions, as proposed by Birkhoff and von Neumann. This gives rise to an intrinsically quantitative kind of logic, which truly deserves the name ‘logic’ in that it also models meaning in natural language, the latter being the origin of logic, that it supports automation, the most prominent practical use of logic, and that it supports probabilistic inference. The physics and the logic of quantum-ish logic. In 1932 John von Neumann formalized Quantum Mechanics in his book “Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik”. This was effectively the official birth of the quantum mechanical formalism which until now, some 75 years later, has remained the same. Quantum theory underpins so many things in our daily lives including chemical industry, energy production and information technology, which arguably makes it the most technologically successful theory of physics ever. However, in 1935, merely three years after the birth of his brainchild, von Neumann wrote in a letter to American mathematician Garrett Birkhoff: “I would like to make a confession which may seem immoral: I do not believe absolutely in Hilbert space no more.” (sic)—for more details see [73]. Soon thereafter they published a paper entitled “The Logic of Quantum Mechanics” [13]. Their ‘quantum logic’ was cast in order-theoretic terms, very much in the spirit of the then reigning algebraic view of logic, with the distributive law being replaced with a weaker (ortho)modular law. This resulted in a research community of quantum logicians [68, 71, 47, 30]. However, despite von Neumann's reputation, and the large body of research that has been produced in the area, one does not find a trace of this activity neither in the mainstream physics, mathematics, nor logic literature. Hence, 75 years later one may want to conclude that this activity was a failure. What went wrong? The mathematics of it. Let us consider the raison d'être for the Hilbert space formalism.
The non-classical nature of quantum theory has led to a number of efforts to formalize the logic of statements whose universe of discourse is the subatomic (see, for example, [3], [6], [8], and [10]).It might be hoped that ideally the fruit of such efforts would be a formalism not totally divorced from the classical logic, but incorporating or incorporated in it in such a manner as to unify the logic of the micro-and the macro-worlds.Indeed, this has been the general direction taken by these efforts, including that which we principally examine and expand upon here.*Josef Jauch, [6], pp.67-89, developed a "propositional calculus of quantum mechanics".He objected to calling a system like his a "logic of quantum mechanics"; however, our use of 'logic' here is not, I think, the use to which Jauch objected.A logic, for our present purposes, is a mathematical formalism having a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction; its actual application as normative of argumentation in reality is a matter of empirical judgment.This seems close to the way Jauch wished to use "propositional calculus" but more general, allowing for extension to a quantification theory of quantum mechanics, for example.Although Jauch's presentation of a propositional calculus of quantum mechanics is mathematically interesting and suggestive, there are a number of problems connected with it.It is our purpose to engage some of these problems and to present a rigorously defined formalism intended to come close to doing the job intended by Jauch for his logic.The success or lack of success of this effort as related to actual application of this formalism in the foundations of quantum theory is, I think, a matter for the physicists to decide; the empirical judgment involved in this application is not in the scope of this paper.If a formalism is to have a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction, it seems clear that it must include a relation which, when it holds between two elements of the formalism, may be reasonably interpreted as expressing that one of the elements 'follows from' the other, in •The author wishes to thank Robert Piziak for advice and comments in the course of research for this paper.
According to quantum mechanics, the pure states of a microsystem are represented by vectors in a Hilbert Space. Sentences of the form, "x є L" (where x is the state vector for a system, L a subspace of the appropriate Hilbert space), may be called Q-propositions: such sentences serve to summarise our information about the results of possible experiments on the system. Quantum logic investigates the relations which hold among the Q-propositions about a given physical sys tem. These logical relations correspond to algebraic relations among the subspaces of Hilbert space. The algebra of this set of subspaces is non-Boolean, and may be regarded either as an orthomodular lattice or as a partial Boolean algebra. With each type of structure we can associate a logic. A general approach to the semantics for such a logic is provided in terms of interpretations of a formal language within an algebraic structure; an interpretation maps sentences of the language homomorphically onto elements of the structure. When the structure in question is a Boolean algera, the resulting logic is classical; here we develop a semantics for the logic associated with partial Boolean algebras. Two systems of proof, based on the natural deduction systems of Gentzen, are shown for this logic. With respect to the given sematics, these calculi are sound and weakly complete. Strong completeness is conjectured. Quantum logic deals with the logical relations between sentences, and so is properly called a logic. However, it is the logic appropriate to a limited class of sentences: proposals that it should replace classical logic wherever the latter is used should be viewed with suspicion.
In order to solve the problem of which is the real logic of Quantum Mechanics (QM), we suggest to study the mutual relationships between the physical theory (as a whole, that is both its experimental part and its theoretical part), its mathematics and its logic. That results to be a more general problem than what is considered by traditional studies on Quantum Logic (QL). These studies focus attention on the problem of the relationship between the experimental part of the physical theory and only its mathematics, from which logic is then derived. The new approach, that we suggest, generalises the interpretation that one of us (A. D.) successfully tested on the foundations of classical physical theories. The foundations of a theory are interpreted in terms of two options on the kind of mathematics, either classical one or constructive one, and the kind of logic, either classical logic or intuitionistic logic. It is remarkable that each theory making use of intuitionistic logic – i. e. L. Carnot’s classical mechanics, S. Carnot’s thermodynamics, Lobacevskij’s non-Euclidean geometry is organised in order to solve an universal problem (expressed by a double negated sentence), rather than in an entirely deductive way; hence, a non-classical logic does not belong exclusively to QM. From an historical and foundational analysis about QM, we conclude that in QM it is the law of double negation and not modular law (introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann without giving physical evidence to it) which fails, i. e. which represents the true difference between Classical Logic (CL) and QL. We have looked for previous works on QL supporting our suggestion; in the past Destouches-Fevrier (1948), Fine (1974), Bell-Hallett (1981), Gauthier (1983), Adelman-Corbett (1995) already defended this thesis on the relevance of double negation law for QL. Under this light, QL results to have the same logic of a classical theory organised in a problematic manner. Hence, QM has to be referred to intuitionistic logic, in the same way every theory which is developed around a fundamental problem, expressed by a double negated sentence, does. In particular, by following the founder of intuitionism, Brouwer, we reject the identification of intuitionistic logic with an entirely deductive system; rather, the logical system of QL, as a theory, is organised in such a way to put a crucial problem to be solved. In agreement with this kind of organisation, among the several QM formulations we choose Heisenberg’s formulation, which was ignored by previous authors on QL. This formulation is aimed to solve the problem of quantum measurement, that originates the uncertainty methodological principle. Moreover, it is remarkable that it makes use of an operational mathematics (discrete matrices only). We interpret its characteristic arguing about its principal problem through double negated sentences; it results to be a moving from arguments belonging to non-classical logic expressed by a double negated sentence to the recognition of a suitable mathematics for QM formulation. In sum, QL shows how it is possible to state the relationship between QM and mathematics. This point has been almost ignored by the most traditional approaches to QL, which rather drew it from an a priori mathematics of QM (commonly, Hilbert space). As a verification of our approach, we show that even both Lobachevskij’s geometry and S. Carnot’s thermodynamics argued in order to achieve mathematical formulas expressing the content of the basic double negated sentences of respective theory. In the same way the recent book on QM by T. F. Jordan formalised his matrix mechanics. 1. Logic in classical physics and in Quantum Mechanics An historical analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM) shows that there were at the origin of the theory two distinct formulations: Matrix Mechanics (Heisenberg, 1925) and Wave Mechanics (Schroedinger, 1926). Although Dirac subsumed these two formulations in a comprehensive mathematical framework (Hilbert space), we think that the organisation of the principles is different in Matrix Mechanics from that in Wave Mechanics, and this difference implies different logics. So we think that in order to characterise the logic of QM it is necessary to distinguish between this two formulations. In Matrix Mechanics, Heisenberg’s basic idea was to explain atomic spectra not in terms of atomic orbits (as Old Quantum Theory tried to make), but only by means of the study of experimental data; i. e., frequencies and intensities of light both emitted and absorbed by matter. Through a
In the last five years of his life Itamar Pitowsky developed the idea that the formal structure of quantum theory should be thought of as a Bayesian probability theory adapted to the empirical situation that Nature's events just so happen to conform to a non-Boolean algebra. QBism too takes a Bayesian stance on the probabilities of quantum theory, but its probabilities are the personal degrees of belief a sufficiently-schooled agent holds for the consequences of her actions on the external world. Thus QBism has two levels of the personal where the Pitowskyan view has one. The differences go further. Most important for the technical side of both views is the quantum mechanical Born Rule, but in the Pitowskyan development it is a theorem, not a postulate, arising in the way of Gleason from the primary empirical assumption of a non-Boolean algebra. QBism on the other hand strives to develop a way to think of the Born Rule in a pre-algebraic setting, so that it itself may be taken as the primary empirical statement of the theory. In other words, the hope in QBism is that, suitably understood, the Born Rule is quantum theory's most fundamental postulate, with the Hilbert space formalism (along with its perceived connection to a non-Boolean event structure) arising only secondarily. This paper will avail of Pitowsky's program, along with its extensions in the work of Jeffrey Bub and William Demopoulos, to better explicate QBism's aims and goals.
One can and often does use the word ‘logic’ in a variety of metaphorical ways, speaking of “the logic of the situation”, “the logic of events”, “the logic of history”, and so on. No harm is done, so long as one realizes that these usages are metaphorical, and should not be given any deeper significance – at least without extensive discussion of the meaning of the word ‘logic’ in these phrases. In this metaphorical sense, one may speak of “the logic of quantum mechanics”, just as one may speak of “the logic of modern art”, for example. But if we want to use the term ‘logic’ in a non-metaphorical sense – and I take it that this is the intent in all serious discussions of ‘quantum logic’–we are under some obligation to give an account of the significance to be given to the word ‘logic’ and to demonstrate that the proposed usage does not do violence to the several-thousand-year-old tradition in the field.