The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Completion of the Causal Completability Problem

Michał Marczyk, Leszek Wroński

Published Mar 23, 2014• 17 citations

Abstract

We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. [1999]; Gyenis and Rédei [2004]). We prove that (i) any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style ‘explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality. 1 Introduction2 Basic Definitions and Results in the Literature3 Causal Completability the Easy Way: ‘Splitting the Atom’4 Causal Completability of Classical Probability Spaces: The General Case5 Infinite Statistical Common-Cause Systems for Arbitrary Pairs6 Conclusion Appendix A

DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axt030

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