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Fragile Universe Hypothesis and the Continual Anthropic Principle

Peter F Coin

Published Aug 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

A popular objection to the Many-worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is that it allows for quantum suicide where an experimenter creates a device that instantly kills him or leaves him be depending the output of a quantum measurement, since he has no experience of the device killing him he experiences quantum immortality. This is considered counterintuitive and absurd. Presented here is a speculative argument that accepts counterintuitiveness and proposes it as a new approach to physical theory without accepting some of the absurd conclusions of the thought experiment. The approach is based on the idea that the Universe is Fragile in that only a fraction of the time evolved versions retain the familiar structures of people and planets, but the fractions that do not occur are not observed. This presents to us as a skewed view of physics and only by accounting for this fact (which I propose calling the Continual Anthropic Principle) can we understand the true fundamental laws.

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Introduction As a prescription for ascribing a priori probability weightings to the eventuality of finding oneself in the position of particular conceivable observers, the anthropic principle was originally developed for application to problems of cosmology [1] and biology [2]. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a self-contained introductory account of the motivation and reasoning underlying the recent development [3] of a more refined version of the anthropic principle that is needed for the provision of a coherent interpretation of quantum theory. In order to describe ordinary laboratory applications, it is commonly convenient, and entirely adequate, to use a ‘Copenhagen’ type representation, in which a Hilbert state vector undergoes ‘collapse’ when an observation is made. However, from a broader perspective it is rather generally recognized that such a collapse cannot correspond to any actual physical process. A leading school of thought on this subject was founded by Everett [4], who maintained the principle of the physical reality of the Hilbert state, and deduced that — in view of the agreement that no physical collapse process occurs — none of the ensuing branch channels can be ‘more real than the rest’. This was despite the paradox posed by the necessity that they be characterized by different (my italics) ‘weightings’, the nature of which was never satisfactorily explained. This intellectual flaw in the Everett doctrine was commonly overlooked, not so much by its adherents, who were seriously concerned about it [5], as by its opponents, who were upset by its revolutionary ‘multi-universe’ implications.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 21, 2007•6 citations
A popular objection to the Many-worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is that it allows for quantum suicide where an experimenter creates a device that instantly kills him or leaves him be depending the output of a quantum measurement, since he has no experience of the device killing him he experiences quantum immortality. This is considered counterintuitive and absurd. Presented here is a speculative argument that accepts counterintuitiveness and proposes it as a new approach to physical theory without accepting some of the absurd conclusions of the thought experiment. The approach is based on the idea that the Universe is Fragile in that only a fraction of the time evolved versions retain the familiar structures of people and planets, but the fractions that do not occur are not observed. This presents to us as a skewed view of physics and only by accounting for this fact (which I propose calling the Continual Anthropic Principle) can we understand the true fundamental laws.
Observational evidence suggests that the universe is infinite, geometrically flat, homogeneous and isotropic on large scales. Hence, we should expect to find large numbers of identical copies of any object consistent with the laws of physics including conscious identities like people. Under suitable notions of continuity of identity, This would imply that immortality of these conscious identities is a consequence of functionalism. I argue that the same conclusion can be drawn using an Everett Deutsch interpretation of quantum mechanics. I also argue why this is the correct interpretation. Lewis’s “terrifying corollary” is reviewed and I discuss how Bostrom’s simulation argument, if correct, might mitigate our futures.
Future-generating variants of the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics assume that new worlds are created through quantum measurement, observation, or conscious choice. While such interpretations preserve unitary quantum evolution, they suffer from persistent conceptual difficulties, including uncontrolled ontological proliferation, ambiguity of personal identity across branches, and the absence of a principled explanation for why observers retain memories of the past but never of the future. This paper proposes the Fixed Worldline Anthropic Model (FWAM), a non-generating framework in which all physically admissible worldlines exist as a fixed global structure extending from an initial boundary a to a terminal boundary b. Observation does not generate new worlds; instead, each conscious observer experiences a single worldline selected from this pre-existing ensemble. Within FWAM, the epistemic inaccessibility of the future arises not from its non-existence, but from the absence of future experiential states within the present informational structure of consciousness. Observer identity is defined by informational continuity along a worldline, and identity does not persist when such continuity is broken. FWAM provides a unified explanation for memory asymmetry, temporal directionality, and the absence of pre-universe recollection, while avoiding the ontological inflation inherent in future-generating many-worlds models.
Hugh Everett thought it was preposterous to accept the Schrodinger equation as a fundamental law of quantum physics, but then assert that it is usually violated in any observation of quantum phenomena. Demanding that the Schrodinger equation always holds led him to the 'many worlds' interpretation. To avoid this conclusion, I propose that the Schrodinger equation is not fundamental, but that one should instead regard as primary a von Neumann version of the equation which lets the density matric evolve unitarily, but where conclusions reached concerning measurements always involve the non-unitary step of tracing out environmental degrees of freedom which always exist even if the system in question is the entire observable universe.
Erwin Schrodinger first described the thought-experiment which has since become known as 'the paradox of Schrodinger's cat' 51 years ago. In recent years, popular accounts of quantum mechanics have tended to adopt one or other of the philosophically most extreme solutions to this paradox, i.e. the consciousness hypothesis or the many worlds interpretation. The author attempts to redress the balance by describing what he takes to be the orthodox solution to the paradox which explains the paradox, without recourse to such counterintuitive notions as a cat simultaneously dead and alive or a universe continually splitting into multiple worlds, as being due to a misapplication of the quantum formalism.
Introduction As a prescription for ascribing a priori probability weightings to the eventuality of finding oneself in the position of particular conceivable observers, the anthropic principle was originally developed for application to problems of cosmology [1] and biology [2]. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a self-contained introductory account of the motivation and reasoning underlying the recent development [3] of a more refined version of the anthropic principle that is needed for the provision of a coherent interpretation of quantum theory. In order to describe ordinary laboratory applications, it is commonly convenient, and entirely adequate, to use a ‘Copenhagen’ type representation, in which a Hilbert state vector undergoes ‘collapse’ when an observation is made. However, from a broader perspective it is rather generally recognized that such a collapse cannot correspond to any actual physical process. A leading school of thought on this subject was founded by Everett [4], who maintained the principle of the physical reality of the Hilbert state, and deduced that — in view of the agreement that no physical collapse process occurs — none of the ensuing branch channels can be ‘more real than the rest’. This was despite the paradox posed by the necessity that they be characterized by different (my italics) ‘weightings’, the nature of which was never satisfactorily explained. This intellectual flaw in the Everett doctrine was commonly overlooked, not so much by its adherents, who were seriously concerned about it [5], as by its opponents, who were upset by its revolutionary ‘multi-universe’ implications.