Dualistic interpretations attempt to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics by postulating the existence of non-physical minds, and by giving a suitable dynamical equation for how these minds evolve. I consider the relative merits of three extant dualistic interpretations (Albert and Loewer’s single-mind and many-minds interpretations, and Squires’ interpretation), and I defend Squires’ interpretation as preferable to the Albert/Loewer interpretations. I also argue that, for all three of these interpretations, the minds evolve independently of the physical universe, and hence render the physical universe otiose; the interpretations are better viewed as supporting not dualism, but mental monism.
Dualistic interpretations attempt to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics by postulating the existence of non-physical minds, and by giving a suitable dynamical equation for how these minds evolve. I consider the relative merits of three extant dualistic interpretations (Albert and Loewer’s single-mind and many-minds interpretations, and Squires’ interpretation), and I defend Squires’ interpretation as preferable to the Albert/Loewer interpretations. I also argue that, for all three of these interpretations, the minds evolve independently of the physical universe, and hence render the physical universe otiose; the interpretations are better viewed as supporting not dualism, but mental monism.
We argue that certain types of many minds (and many worlds) interpretations of quantum mechanics, e.g. Lockwood ([1996a]), Deutsch ([1985]) do not provide a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilistic algorithm. By contrast, in Albert and Loewer's ([1988]) version of the many minds interpretation, there is a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilities. We consider Albert and Loewer's probability interpretation in the context of Bell‐type and GHZ‐type states and argue that it implies a certain (weak) form of nonlocality.1Introduction2Albert and Loewer's interpretation3Probabilities in Lockwood's interpretation4Sets of minds and their correlations5Many minds and GHZ
Since quantum mechanics (QM) was formulated, many voices have claimed this to be the basis of free will in the human beings. Basically, they argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, I defend the opposite thesis, that free will cannot be defended in terms of QM. First, because indeterminism does not imply free will, it is merely a necessary condition but not enough to defend it. Second, because all considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against our scientific knowledge about human beings; in particular, neither neurological nor evolutionary theory can admit dualism. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario, so it is concluded that QM has nothing to say about the mind or free will, and its scientific explanation is more related to biology than to physics. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms.
Contemporary physics finds itself pondering questions about mind and consciousness, an uncomfortable area for theorists. But historically, key figures at the founding of quantum theory assumed that reality was composed of two parts, mind and matter, which interacted with each other according to some new laws that they specified. This departure from the prior (classical-physicalist) assumption that mind was a mere side effect of brain activity was such a startling proposal that it basically split physics in two, with one camp insisting that mind will ultimately be explained via physical processes in the brain and the other camp embracing mind as innate in creation and the key to understanding reality in its completeness. Henry Stapp made important contributions toward a coherent explanation by advocating John von Neumann’s orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. von Neumann postulated that at its basis, quantum mechanics requires both a psychological and physical component. He was left, however, with a dualist view in which the psychological and physical aspects of QM remained unresolved. In this article, the relevant issues are laid out with the aim of finding a nondual explanation that allows mind and matter to exist as features of the same universal consciousness, in the hope that the critical insights of Planck, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, von Neumann, and Stapp will be recognized and valued, with the aim of an expanded physics that goes beyond physicalist dogma.
An increasingly popular interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that in any genuinely chancy situation, all possible outcomes occur.1 For example, if the spin of a typical electron is measured in a given direction, then both 'up' and 'down' results will be registered. (True, 'up' and 'down' won't occur within the same 'branch of reality', for that would be inconsistent. Rather, the idea is that reality comes to contain two elements, with 'up' registered relative to one, and 'down' registered relative to the other.) This kind of 'many worlds' or 'many minds' interpretation of quantum mechanics has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that it avoids any 'collapse of the wave function' and so avoids the measurement problem, mysterious non-local interactions, and the like. The most obvious disadvantage is that its burgeoning world of duplicate histories seems repugnant to common sense. Some commentators think that there is another disadvantage. They argue that this interpretation undermines itself by destroying any notion of objective probability. Quantum mechanics is, if anything, a theory which specifies the objective probabilities of certain results. But in what sense is there an objective probability for 'up' and 'down' in a spin measurement, if both results always happen? (Albert [1]; Albert and Loewer [3], [4]; Healey [5]; Squires [9]; Stein [8].) This looks like a good objection. But I shall show in this note that it is not. The proposed interpretation does leave objective probability as a rather mysterious notion. But it is no more mysterious on the proposed interpretation than on the conventional view of the world. This is not the place to go into details about the 'many minds'2 interpretation of quantum mechanics, but one point may help readers. If both the 'up' and 'down' results occur, why do we experience only one?
The development of the subjective solutions to the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is presented. It is shown that - already in 1932 - von Neumann faced a dilemma: either quantum mechanics represents the only true physical reality and then the reduction of the wave packet is illusory, or the mind is able to act on the physical world producing a transition that is not allowed by quantum- mechanical laws. We show that the first alternative was followed by the many-world or many-mind interpretation, the second by the school of London-Bauer and Wigner. The difficulties of these two interpretations are also pointed out. Finally a third possibility, proposed by Albert and Loewer, is presented: The evolution of mind is independent from that of the physical world and is subjected to its own laws.