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On propensity-frequentist models for stochastic phenomena; with applications to Bell's theorem

Tomasz Placek

Published Sep 1, 2009• 21 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The paper develops models of statistical experiments that combine propensities with frequencies, the underlying theory being the branching space-times (BST) of Belnap (1992). The models are then applied to analyze Bell's theorem. We prove the so-called Bell-CH inequality via the assumptions of a BST version of Outcome Independence and of (non-probabilistic) No Conspiracy. Notably, neither the condition of probabilistic No Conspiracy nor the condition of Parameter Independence is needed in the proof. As the Bell-CH inequality is most likely experimentally falsified, the choice is this: contrary to the appearances, experimenters cannot choose some measurement settings, or some transitions, with spacelike related initial events, are correlated; or both.

Related papers

Stochastic Outcomes in Branching Space-Time: Analysis of Bell's Theorem

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The paper extends the framework of outcomes in branching space-time (Kowalski and Placek [1999]) by assigning probabilities to outcomes of events, where these probabilities are interpreted either epistemically or as weighted possibilities. In resulting models I define the notion of common cause of correlated outcomes of a single event, and investigate which setups allow for the introduction of common causes. It turns out that a deterministic common cause can always be introduced, but (surprisingly) only special setups permit the introduction of truly stochastic common causes. I analyse next the Bell-Aspect experiment and derive the Bell-CH inequalities. I observe that we postulate there not a common cause for outcomes of a single event but rather a common common cause that accounts for outcomes of many events, where 'events' mean 'measurements with (different) directions of polarization'. Since the inequalities are violated, I claim that no causal story can be told about the Bell correlations, where causality is subliminal and restricted by screening-off condition. Similarly, given certain intuitive principles, no deterministic story can be told about these correlations.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 2000•29 citations

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Bell's theorem is a conditional statement about theoretical models specified by a complete physical state $\lambda$. It shows that models satisfying measurement independence and a stochastic Bell-locality (factorizability) condition obey Bell inequalities. Bell experiments, however, do not directly observe $\lambda$ or the $\lambda$-conditioned probabilities appearing in that condition. They record analyzer settings, detector outcomes, and experimental metadata, from which they estimate operational joint distributions, marginals, correlations, and Bell statistics. We clarify the logical relationship between these two levels. The $\lambda$-conditioned factorization identity cannot be directly evaluated at fixed $\lambda$ from the operational record alone. Nevertheless, by marginalizing over $\lambda$ under measurement independence, the model class implies observable inequalities that can be empirically violated. A Bell-inequality violation therefore excludes the corresponding Bell-local model class under the assumptions required for the inequality, but it does not by itself identify which latent assumption---measurement independence, parameter independence, or outcome independence---failed, nor does it uniquely determine an ontological interpretation. To illustrate this distinction concretely, we employ the Unified Quantum Mechanics formulation, in which the physical state is real, and the complex wavefunction is representational. We show that all four formulations of the dynamics---Schr\"odinger, Hilbert-transform, complex second-order, and real second-order---require the same two real initial functions $u_0=u(0)$ and $u_1=\partial_t u(0)$; the complex initial state is merely a repackaging of them, not additional physical information. We formulate the distinction as a three-level hierarchy: operational data, model-class exclusion, and ontological interpretation. The hierarchy separates experimental loopholes, which concern assumptions linking an actual experiment to an ideal Bell model, from the conceptual underdetermination of latent-variable conditional probabilities, which remains even in a loophole-free experiment. The result clarifies what Bell experiments establish without claiming that Bell-local models are empirically untestable. A Monte Carlo simulation illustrates the distinction between operational Bell-test results and latent-state factorization.

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Statistics, Causality and Bell’s Theorem

Richard David Gill

Bell’s [Physics 1 (1964) 195–200] theorem is popularly supposed to establish the nonlocality of quantum physics. Violation of Bell’s inequality in experiments such as that of Aspect, Dalibard and Roger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 49 (1982) 1804–1807] provides empirical proof of nonlocality in the real world. This paper reviews recent work on Bell’s theorem, linking it to issues in causality as understood by statisticians. The paper starts with a proof of a strong, finite sample, version of Bell’s inequality and thereby also of Bell’s theorem, which states that quantum theory is incompatible with the conjunction of three formerly uncontroversial physical principles, here referred to as locality, realism and freedom. Locality is the principle that the direction of causality matches the direction of time, and that causal influences need time to propagate spatially. Realism and freedom are directly connected to statistical thinking on causality: they relate to counterfactual reasoning, and to randomisation, respectively. Experimental loopholes in state-of-the-art Bell type experiments are related to statistical issues of post-selection in observational studies, and the missing at random assumption. They can be avoided by properly matching the statistical analysis to the actual experimental design, instead of by making untestable assumptions of independence between observed and unobserved variables. Methodological and statistical issues in the design of quantum Randi challenges (QRC) are discussed. The paper argues that Bell’s theorem (and its experimental confirmation) should lead us to relinquish not locality, but realism.

arXiv:1207.5103•Statistical Science•Nov 1, 2014•94 citations
The paper develops models of statistical experiments that combine propensities with frequencies, the underlying theory being the branching space-times (BST) of Belnap (1992). The models are then applied to analyze Bell's theorem. We prove the so-called Bell-CH inequality via the assumptions of a BST version of Outcome Independence and of (non-probabilistic) No Conspiracy. Notably, neither the condition of probabilistic No Conspiracy nor the condition of Parameter Independence is needed in the proof. As the Bell-CH inequality is most likely experimentally falsified, the choice is this: contrary to the appearances, experimenters cannot choose some measurement settings, or some transitions, with spacelike related initial events, are correlated; or both.
The paper extends the framework of outcomes in branching space-time (Kowalski and Placek [1999]) by assigning probabilities to outcomes of events, where these probabilities are interpreted either epistemically or as weighted possibilities. In resulting models I define the notion of common cause of correlated outcomes of a single event, and investigate which setups allow for the introduction of common causes. It turns out that a deterministic common cause can always be introduced, but (surprisingly) only special setups permit the introduction of truly stochastic common causes. I analyse next the Bell-Aspect experiment and derive the Bell-CH inequalities. I observe that we postulate there not a common cause for outcomes of a single event but rather a common common cause that accounts for outcomes of many events, where 'events' mean 'measurements with (different) directions of polarization'. Since the inequalities are violated, I claim that no causal story can be told about the Bell correlations, where causality is subliminal and restricted by screening-off condition. Similarly, given certain intuitive principles, no deterministic story can be told about these correlations.
Bell's theorem is a conditional statement about theoretical models specified by a complete physical state λ\lambdaλ. It shows that models satisfying measurement independence and a stochastic Bell-locality (factorizability) condition obey Bell inequalities. Bell experiments, however, do not directly observe λ\lambdaλ or the λ\lambdaλ-conditioned probabilities appearing in that condition. They record analyzer settings, detector outcomes, and experimental metadata, from which they estimate operational joint distributions, marginals, correlations, and Bell statistics. We clarify the logical relationship between these two levels. The λ\lambdaλ-conditioned factorization identity cannot be directly evaluated at fixed λ\lambdaλ from the operational record alone. Nevertheless, by marginalizing over λ\lambdaλ under measurement independence, the model class implies observable inequalities that can be empirically violated. A Bell-inequality violation therefore excludes the corresponding Bell-local model class under the assumptions required for the inequality, but it does not by itself identify which latent assumption---measurement independence, parameter independence, or outcome independence---failed, nor does it uniquely determine an ontological interpretation. To illustrate this distinction concretely, we employ the Unified Quantum Mechanics formulation, in which the physical state is real, and the complex wavefunction is representational. We show that all four formulations of the dynamics---Schr\"odinger, Hilbert-transform, complex second-order, and real second-order---require the same two real initial functions u0=u(0)u_0=u(0)u0​=u(0) and u1=∂tu(0)u_1=\partial_t u(0)u1​=∂t​u(0); the complex initial state is merely a repackaging of them, not additional physical information. We formulate the distinction as a three-level hierarchy: operational data, model-class exclusion, and ontological interpretation. The hierarchy separates experimental loopholes, which concern assumptions linking an actual experiment to an ideal Bell model, from the conceptual underdetermination of latent-variable conditional probabilities, which remains even in a loophole-free experiment. The result clarifies what Bell experiments establish without claiming that Bell-local models are empirically untestable. A Monte Carlo simulation illustrates the distinction between operational Bell-test results and latent-state factorization.
The violation of Bell inequalities is often interpreted as showing that, if hidden variables exist, they must be contextual and non local. But they can also be explained questioning the probability space employed, or the validity of the Kolmogorov axioms. In this article we explore the additional constrains which can be deduced from two widely used objetive probability theories: frequentism and propensities. One of the strongest objections in the deduction of one version of Bell inequalities goes about the probability space, which assumes the existence of values for the output of the experiment in each run, while only two of the four values can be measured each time, making them counterfactual. It is shown that frequentism rejects the possibility of using counterfactual situations, while long-run propensities allow their use. In this case the introduction of locality and contextuality does not help to explain the violation, and an alternative explanation could point to a failure of the probability. Single case propensities were designed to associate probabilities to single events, but they need to be conditional to the whole universe, and do not have a clear link with the observed relative frequencies. It heavily limits their use.
Bell's theorem states that no description of a Bell experiment can be simultaneously local, realistic in the sense of counterfactual definiteness, and free of conspiracy between settings and hidden state. The recent generation of experiments has confirmed the predicted violation of the CHSH inequality, so one of the assumptions must be abandoned. Which one, and how one reconstructs a coherent worldview after doing so, is a question on which many authors disagree. This paper is written by three such authors. All three reject both counterfactual definiteness and conspiratorial violation of statistical independence of setting choices and state. After a joint exposition of the classical half of Bell's theorem in the language of Pearl-style causal graphs, a joint summary of the loophole-free experiments, and a joint survey of the recent literature, each author states where they have presently arrived. Gill accepts irreducible and non-local quantum randomness and finds the choice between locality and realism a false dichotomy. In his later works, Bell derives counterfactual definiteness from classical local causality, and that is what has to go. The metaphysical concepts "realism", "locality", "causality" need to be reconsidered. Helland reconstructs the Hilbert-space formalism from a theory of accessible variables, and from this theory he concludes that every observer must be limited in a specific sense. Jongejan proposes a geometric hidden-variable construction in which the degree of violation of the CHSH inequality depends on the number of dimensions of space, Tsirelson's bound corresponding to three dimensions. The authors conclude with a discussion.
Using CH model of Bell’s theorem and only by applying the conditional probability definition in ”classical ” probability theory,without imposing the locality condition,we are able to show that the stochastic realistic (CH) model cannot reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics. PACS number: 03.65.Bz It is generally claimed that Bell inequalities are inconsistent with experimental data and with the predictions of quantum mechanics.A condition often used in the derivation of Bell inequalities is the so-called locality condition.The temptation is to attribute Bell inequalities violation to the violation of locality. In this paper we are going
Bell’s [Physics 1 (1964) 195–200] theorem is popularly supposed to establish the nonlocality of quantum physics. Violation of Bell’s inequality in experiments such as that of Aspect, Dalibard and Roger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 49 (1982) 1804–1807] provides empirical proof of nonlocality in the real world. This paper reviews recent work on Bell’s theorem, linking it to issues in causality as understood by statisticians. The paper starts with a proof of a strong, finite sample, version of Bell’s inequality and thereby also of Bell’s theorem, which states that quantum theory is incompatible with the conjunction of three formerly uncontroversial physical principles, here referred to as locality, realism and freedom. Locality is the principle that the direction of causality matches the direction of time, and that causal influences need time to propagate spatially. Realism and freedom are directly connected to statistical thinking on causality: they relate to counterfactual reasoning, and to randomisation, respectively. Experimental loopholes in state-of-the-art Bell type experiments are related to statistical issues of post-selection in observational studies, and the missing at random assumption. They can be avoided by properly matching the statistical analysis to the actual experimental design, instead of by making untestable assumptions of independence between observed and unobserved variables. Methodological and statistical issues in the design of quantum Randi challenges (QRC) are discussed. The paper argues that Bell’s theorem (and its experimental confirmation) should lead us to relinquish not locality, but realism.