The violation of Bell inequalities is often interpreted as showing that, if hidden variables exist, they must be contextual and non local. But they can also be explained questioning the probability space employed, or the validity of the Kolmogorov axioms. In this article we explore the additional constrains which can be deduced from two widely used objetive probability theories: frequentism and propensities. One of the strongest objections in the deduction of one version of Bell inequalities goes about the probability space, which assumes the existence of values for the output of the experiment in each run, while only two of the four values can be measured each time, making them counterfactual. It is shown that frequentism rejects the possibility of using counterfactual situations, while long-run propensities allow their use. In this case the introduction of locality and contextuality does not help to explain the violation, and an alternative explanation could point to a failure of the probability. Single case propensities were designed to associate probabilities to single events, but they need to be conditional to the whole universe, and do not have a clear link with the observed relative frequencies. It heavily limits their use.
The violation of Bell inequalities is often interpreted as showing that, if hidden variables exist, they must be contextual and non local. But they can also be explained questioning the probability space employed, or the validity of the Kolmogorov axioms. In this article we explore the additional constrains which can be deduced from two widely used objetive probability theories: frequentism and propensities. One of the strongest objections in the deduction of one version of Bell inequalities goes about the probability space, which assumes the existence of values for the output of the experiment in each run, while only two of the four values can be measured each time, making them counterfactual. It is shown that frequentism rejects the possibility of using counterfactual situations, while long-run propensities allow their use. In this case the introduction of locality and contextuality does not help to explain the violation, and an alternative explanation could point to a failure of the probability. Single case propensities were designed to associate probabilities to single events, but they need to be conditional to the whole universe, and do not have a clear link with the observed relative frequencies. It heavily limits their use.
Since the experimental observation of the violation of the Bell-CHSH inequalities, much has been said about the non-local and contextual character of the underlying system. However, the hypothesis from which Bell's inequalities are derived differ according to the probability space used to write them. The violation of Bell's inequalities can, alternatively, be explained by assuming that the hidden variables do not exist at all, that they exist but their values cannot be simultaneously assigned, that the values can be assigned but joint probabilities cannot be properly defined, or that averages taken in different contexts cannot be combined. All of the above are valid options, selected by different communities to provide support to their particular research program.
Bell's theorem states that no description of a Bell experiment can be simultaneously local, realistic in the sense of counterfactual definiteness, and free of conspiracy between settings and hidden state. The recent generation of experiments has confirmed the predicted violation of the CHSH inequality, so one of the assumptions must be abandoned. Which one, and how one reconstructs a coherent worldview after doing so, is a question on which many authors disagree. This paper is written by three such authors. All three reject both counterfactual definiteness and conspiratorial violation of statistical independence of setting choices and state. After a joint exposition of the classical half of Bell's theorem in the language of Pearl-style causal graphs, a joint summary of the loophole-free experiments, and a joint survey of the recent literature, each author states where they have presently arrived. Gill accepts irreducible and non-local quantum randomness and finds the choice between locality and realism a false dichotomy. In his later works, Bell derives counterfactual definiteness from classical local causality, and that is what has to go. The metaphysical concepts "realism", "locality", "causality" need to be reconsidered. Helland reconstructs the Hilbert-space formalism from a theory of accessible variables, and from this theory he concludes that every observer must be limited in a specific sense. Jongejan proposes a geometric hidden-variable construction in which the degree of violation of the CHSH inequality depends on the number of dimensions of space, Tsirelson's bound corresponding to three dimensions. The authors conclude with a discussion.
Among the various "no-go theorems" in the foundations of quantum mechanics, Bell inequalities are among the few, which do not implicitly rely on the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Instead, Bell inequalities are commonly understood to rest on Kolmogorov's theory of probability and a "locality" assumption. Physical evidence supporting their violation is hence taken as evidence against at least one of these two assumptions.
This work provides a comprehensive analysis of the physical debate on Bell inequalities from the point of view of Kolmogorov's theory of probability, focusing on the Bell-Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequality (BCHSH inequality). The central contribution is the motivation and mathematical study of the notion of contextuality in Bell experiments: in so-called contextual Bell models the detectors themselves behave randomly and the distribution of the random detector parameters depends on the chosen detector settings. It is shown how even "classical" Bell experiments motivate such a description. The need to account for contextuality was pointed out before by de la Peña, Cetto, Brody, Lochak, Bohm, Hiley and others. A broad class of contextual models is proven to satisfy the BCHSH inequality, thereby generalizing a previous result by Gill and Lambare. Nonetheless, even under strong locality requirements, contextual Bell models may violate the BCHSH inequality: based on work by Popescu and Rohrlich, we consider a "proof of concept" example exhibiting the maximum possible violation.
Contrary to the much debated "loopholes" in empirical tests of Bell inequalities, contextuality thus reveals a conceptual misunderstanding in the physical conclusions commonly drawn from Bell inequality violations.
In this work, we show that Bell's inequality violation of arise from the fact that the condition imposed upon the development of inequality is not respected when it is applied in the idealized experiment. Such a condition is that the quantities taken by probability must be non negative, and such a condition is represented by ∣P(w)∣=P(w). We will also show that, when trying to define the values of the joint probabilities of $ (Z_1, Z_2, Z_3) $, through the values obtained from the $ (Z_j, Z_k) $ pairs, we find that these values are negative, so not Kolmogorov's axiom is respected: P(w)≥0 in cases where Bell's inequality is violated, and we also show that only such violation is possible if Wigner's inequality, in a certain arrangement, is violated, and that both violations are related to the violation of one of Kolmogorov's axioms. At the end of the paper, we suggest a new interpretation of the probabilities involved, in order to avoid the situation of negative probabilities and the violation of Bell's inequality and, consequently, Wigner's inequality.
The Bell inequality constrains the outcomes of measurements on pairs of distant entangled particles. The Bell contradiction states that the Bell inequality is inconsistent with the calculated outcomes of these quantum experiments. This contradiction led many to question the underlying assumptions, viz. so-called realism and locality. The probability model underlying the Bell inequality is generally left implicit. We propose an explicit probability model for the CHSH version of the Bell experiment. This model has only two simultaneously observable detector settings per measurement, and therefore does not assume realism. The quantum expectation now becomes a conditional expectation, given the two detector settings. This probability model is in full agreement with both quantum mechanics and experiments. As a result, the model satisfies the Bell inequality; there are no so-called violations. We extend this model to include a hidden variable. This extended model is not Bell-separable. This non-separability implies that the model is non-deterministic or non-local (or both).
Abstract Quantum theory has accounted for a wide range of physical effects in systems ranging from microscopic to macroscopic. However, it is associated with various paradoxes—such as the well-known EPR example. Einstein’s suggestion that the theory was incomplete has led to numerous attempts to underpin quantum theory by a hidden variable theory, including the Bell approach. This approach was originally based on certain assumptions: (i) realism (ii) locality and (iii) non-contextuality. In its developed form, the theory involved only probabilities for outcome values of system observables. For systems involving two sub-systems, the hidden variable theory predicted that correlations between measurement outcomes of observable pairs of from different sub-systems would satisfy certain—such as the CHSH Bell inequality. The inequality was inconsistent with quantum theory predictions and with experiment. Hence, the question arose: Which of the three assumptions was invalid? A widely held view is that a non-local theory is needed—another is that hidden variable theory should be contextual. In this article, derivations of the CHSH Bell inequality based on various combinations of locality/non-locality and non-contextuality/contextuality assumptions are outlined, leading to the conclusion that for a hidden variable theory to underpin quantum theory, it must be both non-local and contextual. Non-locality or contextuality alone is insufficient. However, it is also concluded that the realism assumption is questionable. At present an alternative approach of augmenting quantum theory by adding additional features—such as the deterministic trajectories of Bohmian mechanics (also a non-local theory) may be a better route for completeness.